

LORD CLIVE

THE FOUNDATION OF BRITISH RULE IN
INDIA

BY


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A MEMOIR OF SIR THOMAS MUNRO

LONDON
T. FISHER UNWIN
PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1899



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PREFACE

IF Sir Walter Raleigh, as Mr Martin Hume described him in the volume with which the present series began, was the man who laid the foundation stone of the Colonial Empire of Great Britain, Clive may be called with not less truth, in the words of Sir Alfred Lyall, 'the man to whom above all others the English are indebted for the foundation of our Empire in India.'

(There have been few men who have so rapidly established such a reputation as was achieved by Clive very shortly after he had reached his twenty-sixth year.) The son of a small and impoverished country squire, belonging to a family which, although old, had never previously been distinguished, Robert Clive in a remarkably short time won for it a name second to none in the history of the world.

It is the object of this brief memoir to show how this came about, to describe the salient points in Clive's career, and to explain how entirely it was owing to Clive that the place

now filled by the British *Rāj* in India was not occupied in the middle of the last century by the French.

Landing in India in September 1744, Clive in little more than five years, by his remarkable defence of Arcot, had proved himself an able soldier, and in less than a year and a half later was able to return to England recognised by his immediate masters, the Directors of the East India Company, as the one man in their service most fitted to be entrusted with high military command. In a very few years more it was felt, not only in India and by persons interested in and acquainted with Indian affairs, but by English statesmen as well, by such men as the elder Pitt, by George Grenville and others, that the talents of the young soldier were by no means confined to the camp, but that he was as able in council as he was skilful in strategy and daring in fight.

And when we reflect upon his death at the early age of forty-nine, after a persecution which, whatever may have been his errors, it is difficult to read of without shame, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that of the many sad and discreditable incidents which, in this

and other countries, disfigured the latter part of the eighteenth century, one of the not least deplorable was the attack made by his countrymen upon the founder of our Indian Empire.

Regarding Clive's career, opinions of the most diverse kinds have been and still are entertained. According to James Mill, the leading historian of British India, Clive was artful, tricky and exceedingly quarrelsome—an opinion which is not, however, shared by Mill's annotator, Horace Hayman Wilson. And strange to say, when dealing with the Parliamentary proceedings against Clive, Mill denounces them in language which might have been used by Clive's warmest supporters.

Marshman, an essentially fair writer, bears a high tribute to Clive's lofty genius, and denounces the ingratitude which embittered the closing years of his life.

Clive's first biographer, Caraccioli, appears to have written for the sole purpose of attacking him both in his public and in his private life.

Sir John Malcolm, on the other hand, defends almost every incident of his career, including the fictitious treaty with Omichand.

Of the two more recent memoirs, that by the

late Colonel Malleson, while doing ample justice to Clive's genius and services, dwells unduly, as I think, upon what he describes as Clive's baser nature, and upon the defects of his early training and the disastrous influence on his subsequent career, of his idleness and wildness as a schoolboy. That Clive as a schoolboy was idle and somewhat wild may be freely admitted, but it must not be forgotten that one of his masters predicted with remarkable foresight that he would rise to eminence, and that the use which he made of the Governor's library at Madras is hardly consistent with the theory that when he attained to manhood his mind was in the absolutely uncultured condition which Colonel Malleson attributed to him. The adjective 'base' is the last that should be used in reference to Clive. He was doubtless at times unscrupulous, but what he did he never attempted to conceal, nor was there anything in his conduct or his character to which the term 'base' could fitly be applied. I believe that most students of Clive's life would greatly prefer the opinion of Sir Charles Wilson, who, writing eight years later than Colonel Malleson, ends a memoir, of which the interest is only

equalled by the care and accuracy which have been brought to bear upon it, by affirming that 'among the many illustrious men whom India has produced, none is greater than the first of her soldier-statesmen, whose successful career marks an era in the history of England and of the world.'

There is one question in connection with this biography which perhaps may not unreasonably be asked. While so many *Lives* of Clive have been published, the last only eight years ago, what is the need of another? It certainly cannot be said that any new facts have been discovered which would justify the publication of another *Life* of Clive. The answer is, and I think it is a sufficient answer, that a series which deals with the Builders of Greater Britain would be obviously incomplete if it did not include a memoir of the man who gave to England her greatest dependency.


It should be mentioned that at some points the present memoir closely follows the comparatively brief article on Clive which I contributed eleven years ago to the *Dictionary of National Biography*, although a very large portion of it consists of entirely new matter.

The two principal speeches made by Clive during the Parliamentary enquiry, which are no longer available in a form accessible to the public, have been reprinted in this volume.

The best acknowledgments of the Editor and myself are due to the Earl of Powis for his permission to reproduce the portrait of Lord Clive at Powis Castle as a frontispiece, to Mr Lionel Cust, Director of the National Portrait Gallery, for his advice in connection therewith, and to Mr A. Story-Maskelyne of the Public Record Office, for assistance kindly rendered with regard to the two pedigrees which form Appendices IV. and V., and have been carefully compiled from printed sources. In preparing the maps, which are founded upon two of those by Juland Danvers, appended to Vol. VI. of Thornton's *History of the British Empire in India*, valuable help has been given by Mr Thomas, Assistant Librarian, and Mr Foster of the Registry and Record Department, at the India Office.

ALEX. J. ARBUTHNOT.

NEWTOWN HOUSE,
NEWBURY, October 1898.



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
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LORD CLIVE, AFTER THE PORTRAIT BY NATHANIEL DANCE,
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MAP OF INDIA IN 1744, SHEWING EXTENT OF BRITISH
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MAP OF INDIA IN 1767, SHEWING BRITISH ACQUISITIONS
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ERRATA

Page 78, line 8, *delete* 'of Oude.'

„ 103, „ 4, *for* 'Ganjam Vizagaputam,' *read* 'Ganjam,
Vizagapatam.'

„ 137, „ 9, *delete* 'again.'

„ 141, „ 12, *for* 'Mahommadan,' *read* 'Muhammadan.'

„ 248, „ 1, *for* 'Sujah ul Daulah,' *read* 'Sujah ud
Daulah.'

Lord Clive

CHAPTER I

EARLY YOUTH—APPOINTMENT TO A WRITERSHIP IN INDIA—ARRIVAL AT MADRAS—DISTASTEFULNESS OF HIS WORK—OUTBREAK OF WAR—CAPTURE OF MADRAS BY THE FRENCH—ESCAPE OF CLIVE TO FORT ST DAVID—CLIVE'S DUELS—TEMPORARY COMMISSION AS ENSIGN—ATTRACTS THE NOTICE OF STRINGER LAWRENCE.

ROBERT CLIVE was born at Styche, in the parish of Moreton Say, near Market Drayton, in Shropshire, on the 25th September 1725. He was the eldest son of Richard Clive, the owner of Styche, a small estate which the Clive family had possessed ever since the reign of Henry VII.¹ The family was by no means wealthy, and the father of the subject of this memoir was obliged to supplement his income by practising as a solicitor. Robert Clive's mother was a daughter of Mr Nathaniel Gaskell,

¹ See Pedigree in Appendix IV.

of Manchester, and one of her sisters was the wife of Mr Daniel Bayley, of Hope Hall, Manchester, at whose house Robert Clive spent several years of his childhood. From a letter written by him after his arrival in India, Clive would seem to have cherished very pleasant recollections of this Manchester home, which he described as 'the centre of all his wishes,' and as 'a place which, if he should be so blessed as to revisit it, all that he could hope or desire would be presented before him in one view.'

At a very early age he gave evidence of that energy of disposition, combined with a certain amount of combativeness, which distinguished him in after life. Before he had completed his seventh year, Mr Bayley, in a letter to his father, described him as 'out of measure addicted to fighting.' In his school days he was fonder of out-of-door pursuits than of study, although his studies cannot have been entirely neglected, for one of his schoolmasters, who kept a school at Lostock, in Cheshire, predicted a brilliant career for him, observing that 'if opportunity enabled him to exert his talents, few names would be greater than his.' And later on, after his arrival in India, he appears to have devoted himself with some assiduity to repairing the imperfections of his early training, by studying the books which he was allowed to make use of in the Governor's library in Madras. Still his

school life was not a studious one, and was more remarkable for feats of courage than for success in book learning. It must also have been more or less interrupted by his frequent transfers from one school to another. Beginning his education at Lostock, he was removed at the age of eleven to a school at Market Drayton, not far from his father's home. Thence at the age of twelve he was sent on to Merchant Taylors' in London, and was finally transferred to a private school at Hemel Hempstead, where he remained until he was appointed in 1743, at the age of eighteen, to a writership in the service of the East India Company at Madras. It is related of him that on one occasion, when at Market Drayton, he climbed the lofty steeple of the church, and terrified the bystanders by seating himself upon a stone spout in the form of a dragon's head which projected from it near the top. About the same time he appears to have been the leader of his schoolfellows in boyish pranks, levying from the shopkeepers in the town a species of blackmail, in the form of coppers or apples, to induce him and his companions to abstain from breaking their windows and from other mischievous tricks. A story is told of his having lain down in a gutter while his companions were repairing a dam, which he and they had made for the purpose of flooding a small shop occupied by an unfriendly tradesman. Whether similar practices were carried on by him

at his other schools does not appear, but there can be no doubt that, both as a boy and in early manhood, he was impatient of control, though not vicious, and by no means destitute of affection for his family and friends.

Clive left England in the summer of 1743, and did not reach Madras until late in 1744, after an unusually protracted voyage, in the course of which he was detained for nine months at Rio de Janeiro. This detention led to his acquiring some slight knowledge of the Portuguese language, which is said to have been of use to him in after years in India. It would seem, however, that he was not an adept at learning foreign languages; for notwithstanding the great insight which he acquired into the character of the natives of India, he does not appear to have attained to any proficiency in the native languages. The unforeseen expenses in which he became involved owing to his enforced stay in Brazil led to his arriving at Madras in debt to the captain of the ship, who charged him a usurious rate of interest. Altogether, his earlier experiences were by no means satisfactory. He had taken out with him only one letter of introduction, and the gentleman to whom it was addressed had left India before he arrived. He appears to have been constitutionally shy with strangers, and consequently made no efforts to form new acquaintances. Nor was his work in any way

congenial to his natural tastes. The duties attached in those days to a writership in the East India Company's service were very different from those which devolve upon the covenanted Civil Servants of the present day. The writer at that time was merely the servant of a trading company; his duties were those of a clerk in a mercantile house. They were extremely uncongenial to a youth of Clive's temperament, nor was it without difficulty that he brought himself to submit to the orders of his official superiors. More than once he incurred censure for insubordination. In connection with this point a characteristic story is told of him. He was censured by the Governor for insolence to a superior officer, and was ordered to make an apology to the offended official. This he did; but when the same officer invited him to dinner, Clive stiffly declined, observing that the Governor had ordered him to apologise to, but not to dine with him. His distaste for his work and surroundings was at this time such that on one occasion he made an attempt upon his life, firing a pistol at his head, which, however, missed fire twice. A friend entering his room shortly afterwards, Clive asked him to try the pistol, when the other succeeded in firing it. Thereupon Clive said, 'Surely I must be reserved for something great, for I have twice fired that pistol at my head, and it would not go off.'

But Clive was not destined for prolonged employment at the desk. In the very year in which he arrived at Madras, war was declared between England and France. The French at that time possessed more troops in India than the English, and were the first, under Dupleix, the then Governor of Pondicherry, to recruit natives of India for military employment. But when war was declared in Europe, Dupleix did not feel prepared for the struggle in India, and endeavoured to induce the English Governor of Madras to agree to neutralise the Indian possessions of the two nations. This proposal the Governor was precluded from accepting by his instructions from home, and in 1746 Dupleix, taking advantage of the absence of the British fleet from the coast, ordered the French Admiral Labourdonnais, who had arrived from Mauritius with a squadron fitted out for the purpose, to attack Madras. The town, which had no garrison worth the name, surrendered on the 10th September 1746. The English functionaries were all admitted to parole, and the French Admiral entered into a private agreement with the Governor for the restoration of the place upon payment of a reasonable ransom. This agreement, however, was disallowed by Dupleix, and the English Governor and principal officials were removed to Pondicherry, and marched through the town as prisoners of war. Clive, deeming that this infraction of the terms upon which his parole had

been given released him from his obligations, in company with his friend Edmund Maskelyne escaped in the disguise of a native to Fort St David, the second English settlement on the coast, a few miles south of Pondicherry. There he appears to have passed some two years, nominally employed as a writer, but during a part of the time at all events taking his share with the garrison in repelling attacks made upon the fort by the French. During this time, having very little to do in the way of official duty, he spent a good deal of his leisure at cards, and while so occupied became involved in a duel with a military officer whom he accused of cheating. The incident, as related in Malcolm's *Life*, is characteristic. Clive, having fired at, and missed, his antagonist, the latter came close up to him, and holding his pistol to his head, desired him to ask for his life, which Clive did. His opponent then called upon him to retract his assertions regarding unfair play, and on his refusal, threatened to shoot him. 'Fire and be d—d,' was Clive's reply. 'I said you cheated, and I say so still, and I will never pay you.' Clive was much complimented upon the spirit he had shown, but declined to come forward against the officer with whom he had fought, and never afterwards willingly alluded to the behaviour of the latter at the card table. 'He has given me my life,' he said, 'and though I am resolved on never paying money which was unfairly won, or again associating with him, I shall never do

him an injury.' This incident forms the subject of Browning's poem 'Clive' (*Dramatic Idylls*, Second Series, 1880), in which, however, the facts of the case are stated somewhat differently, the poet omitting all mention of the demand that Clive should beg for his life and his compliance with it, and describing the officer as having, under the spell of Clive's undaunted courage, acknowledged the truth of the accusation.

Later on, in 1748, when the English besieged Pondicherry, after having been reinforced by a squadron under Admiral Boscawen, a somewhat similar incident occurred. Clive, having been granted a temporary commission as ensign, served with the force, and on several occasions distinguished himself greatly by his bravery. On one of these, having left his post for some minutes to bring up some ammunition, he became involved in an altercation with another officer, who made a remark implying that it was fear, and not zeal, which had induced him to leave his post. In the course of the altercation the officer struck Clive; but a duel was prevented, and a court-martial held, which resulted in Clive's assailant being required to ask his pardon in front of the battalion to which they both belonged. The court, however, having taken no notice of the blow, Clive, after the siege had been raised, insisted upon satisfaction for that insult, and on its being refused, waved his cane over the head of the offender, telling

him he was too contemptible a coward to be beaten. The affair ended in the person who had defamed Clive resigning his commission on the following day.

The biographers and historians who have dealt with this portion of Clive's career differ considerably in their estimate of his conduct on these occasions. Mill, in his *History of India*, characterises Clive as having been turbulent with his equals. Mr Gleig blames his conduct in both these cases, alleging in regard to his duel with the gambler that there was nothing to admire about it except the headstrong determination of the man who would rather submit to be put to death than retract a word which he had once uttered ; and with respect to the other case, that there was no need, after the humiliation which the other party had undergone, to force a dormant quarrel upon him. Sir John Malcolm, on the other hand, taking what seems to be a more just view of the facts, and of the manners and customs of the time, denies that any of these early disputes can be traced to a perverse or quarrelsome temper. 'Clive appears in all to have been the party offended—the resolute manner in which he resented the injuries done to him raised his reputation for courage, and protected him from further insult and outrage.'

The siege of Pondicherry proved to be a failure, and Clive was again employed upon civil duties. During the operations, however, he distinguished himself more than once by his gallantry and by his

judgment, and it was there that he attracted the notice of Major Stringer Lawrence, who, having been recently appointed to the command of the Company's forces, conducted the earlier stages of the siege, in the course of which he was unfortunately taken prisoner.


CHAPTER II

PEACE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE—ATTITUDE OF THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH IN INDIA TOWARDS THE NATIVE RULERS—THE AFFAIR OF DÉVI-KOTA—CLIVE'S NARROW ESCAPE—HE IS PERMANENTLY TRANSFERRED TO THE MILITARY SERVICE — CONFLICT BETWEEN ENGLISH AND FRENCH BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE AMBITION OF DUPLEIX—BATTLE OF AMBUR—CLIVE'S PROPOSAL TO SEIZE ARCOT.

IN 1748 the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which provided for the restoration of Madras to the English, put a stop for a time to further hostilities between the English and French in India. A few months later, however, circumstances occurred which induced Clive again to enter military employment. Before narrating these events, it may be well to say a few words as to what was at that time the position of

the English and French in India in relation to the native sovereigns. These rulers were headed by the Emperor of Delhi, commonly known as the Great Moghul, but more correctly designated as the Pádishah, who was nominally the supreme overlord of the countries then called India, but whose real power was extremely limited. When Clive arrived at Madras in 1744, only five years had elapsed since the sack of Delhi by Nádír Shah. The Moghul authority had then received its death-blow. In South India it was extinct in the principalities of Tanjore, Madura and Mysore, which were held by rulers of the Mahratta race. The Nizam of Hyderabad, or Subahdár of the Dekhan, was the ruler of the provinces now under the Nizam, with an authority shared by the Mahrattas, who were then the most powerful race in India. This chief was nominally, but not always in reality, the superior of the Nawáb of the Carnatic. It was as the tenants of the latter ruler that the English and French held their respective positions at Madras and Fort St David in the one case, and at Pondicherry in the other. Those possessions were very small, occupying in each case only a few square miles; for both the English and the French had gone to India not for the purpose of acquiring territory, but for the purpose of carrying on trade.

The immediate cause which led Clive to serve again in a military capacity was an invitation



MAP OF INDIA IN 1744.

SHOWING BRITISH POSSESSIONS AT THAT DATE.



addressed to the English authorities at Fort St David by Sáhuji, a member of the reigning family in the Mahratta principality of Tanjore, to aid him in recovering the throne of which he had been dispossessed, the invitation being accompanied by an offer to cede to the Company the town and fort of Dévikota, near the mouth of the Kolrún river. The English had previously supported Pertáb Singh, the actual occupant of the throne, but tempted by the offer of the cession of Dévikota, which, being near the mouth of an important river, they deemed to be in a very advantageous position for trade, they complied with Sáhuji's request, and sent a small force to his aid under the command of Captain Cope, with which Clive volunteered to serve. The expedition failed, chiefly on account of a severe storm which dispersed the ships carrying the baggage and the heavy guns. Another expedition, under the command of Major Stringer Lawrence, with which Clive also served with the rank of lieutenant, was more successful. On this occasion Clive volunteered for the command of a storming party told off to storm an embankment which had been thrown up to defend a breach made in the walls of the fort. He again behaved with his accustomed bravery, and had a very narrow escape; for the Sepoys—700 in number—having failed to advance, a small body of 33 British soldiers which accompanied Clive was suddenly attacked by the Tanjore horse, and almost wholly

destroyed. The fortunes of the day were subsequently retrieved by Major Lawrence, who, advancing with the whole of his force, took the fort. Mill, in describing this incident, accuses Clive of rashness in allowing himself to be separated from the Sepoys. Orme's version of the affair gives a different aspect to it. He writes, 'About 50 yards in front of the entrenchment ran a deep and miry rivulet. . . . The Europeans, marching at the head of the Sepoys, crossed the rivulet with difficulty, and four of them were killed by the fire from the fort before they reached the opposite bank. As soon as the Sepoys had passed likewise, Lieutenant Clive advanced briskly with the Europeans, intending to attack the entrenchment in flank, at an end where the work had not been completed. The Sepoys who had crossed the rivulet, instead of following closely, as they had been ordered, remained at the bank waiting until they were joined by greater numbers.' If Orme's statement of the facts is correct, the charge of rashness would seem in this case to be unfounded. Incidents very similar have frequently occurred in war, and it is right to bear in mind that if Clive (and the same may be said of other commanders in more recent times) had not carried daring to the verge of rashness, the conquest of India might never have been achieved. The affair ended in the cession by the Rájá of Tanjore to the East India Company of Dévikota, with as much land adjoining it as would

yield an annual income of thirty-six thousand rupees. The Rájá agreed to pay the expenses of the war, and to allow Sáhuji an income of four thousand rupees a year, on condition that the English should be answerable for his person. The transaction was not very creditable to the English name. They not only in the first instance threw over their ally, Pertáb Singh, for the sake of the possession of Dévikota, but when their arms prevailed and they made peace with the Rájá, they sacrificed Sáhuji for whom they had fought, depriving him of his liberty, and assigning to him what to a man of his rank was a miserable pittance.

Clive was not, however, concerned with these considerations. As a subaltern officer all he had to do was to obey orders, and to carry them out to the best of his capacity. At the close of this affair he was again relegated to civil duty, but such was the sense entertained of his services that he was appointed a commissary to the troops. Before he had long been employed upon his new work, he was attacked by a fever, accompanied by so much depression of spirits that the constant presence of an attendant became necessary, and he was ordered to take a sea trip during the cold weather of 1749-50 in the Bay of Bengal, which speedily restored him to health. His late commander, Lawrence, referring afterwards to Clive's conduct in the Dévikota campaign, described it in the following terms, 'His early genius surprised

and engaged my attention as well before as at the siege of Dévikota, where he behaved in courage and judgment much beyond what could have been expected from his years.'

Two years later Clive was present, in a civil capacity, at what Sir John Malcolm calls the disgraceful affair of Válkonda, where, owing to the irresolution of the English officers, a body of the Company's troops, sent to oppose a native chief, was compelled to retire and to seek shelter under the walls of Trichinopoly. But the young civilian speedily resumed military employment. Very shortly after the last affair he was sent with Mr Pigot, then a member of Council at Fort St David, in charge of some recruits and stores which were destined for Trichinopoly. The convoy consisted of 80 European soldiers and 300 Sepoys, and the orders were that the two English gentlemen should accompany it until it should be beyond the reach of attack. From Fort St David to Verdachalam, a distance of forty miles, the party traversed the territory of a petty chief who was hostile to the English. For the rest of the distance there was no cause for apprehension. The convoy reached Verdachalam unmolested, and thence Pigot and Clive returned with an escort of only twelve Sepoys. They were speedily attacked. Seven of the escort were killed. The rest, having expended their ammunition, were ordered to disperse, and the two English gentlemen,

riding for their lives, reached Fort St David in safety.

Soon afterwards, Clive, having been permanently transferred to the military service, was promoted to the rank of captain, and was sent for the third time to Trichinopoly in charge of another small reinforcement. He had, it would seem, on the occasion of one of his previous visits, come to the conclusion that the only feasible means of relieving the place, which was beleaguered by a large hostile force, was to create a diversion in another quarter, and that with this view an expedition should be sent to capture Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic. He had made a suggestion to that effect to Mr Saunders, the Governor of Fort St David, upon which Saunders, owing to the paucity of competent English officers, did not feel himself in a position to act. What Clive saw on this last visit confirmed him in his previous opinion. The garrison was utterly demoralised, and Muhammad Ali, whose cause the English had taken up, was in despair. Clive accordingly determined to return to Fort St David, and to press his former suggestion upon Saunders. The latter, who, though not a man of marked ability, was a good judge of men, determined to follow Clive's advice, and to place him in command of the expedition.

The operations in which Clive was now engaged, unlike those which preceded the affair of Dévikota,

were not caused by hostilities between the English and French nations. In Europe the two countries were for the time at peace. In India the English and French trading companies became involved in wars which arose between native Indian rivals for power in the Dekhan and in the Carnatic. The conflict between the English and French was immediately brought about by the ambition of Dupleix; but apart from this, the position of the two companies in relation to the native states was such that sooner or later the political ascendancy of one or the other must have become essential to their prosperity, if not to their continued existence. Dupleix was the first to recognise this important fact, as he had been the first to discern the expediency of training the natives of India as soldiers, and employing them under European direction. He was not a soldier by profession, and he had not, like Clive, the military instinct, which in Clive's case made up for the want of a military training. But he was a man of insatiable ambition and of considerable intellectual capacity, and in his dealings with the natives of India he received valuable assistance from his wife, a French Creole, who knew the native languages and the native character. Indeed, if it had not been for Clive, it is more than probable that Dupleix would have succeeded in obtaining for the French the position in India to which the English eventually attained. The struggle arose in connection with

rival claims to the posts of Subahdár, or Viceroy, of the Dekhan, and of Nawáb of the Carnatic. The holders of the first of these posts, though nominally subordinate to the Emperor of Delhi, had long been practically independent. The Subahdárs of the Dekhan were the real overlords of a great part of the South of India, receiving tribute from the Nawábs of the Carnatic. On the death in 1748 of Nizám ul Mulk, the last really powerful Subahdár of the Dekhan, at the great age of 104, the succession of his son, Názir Jung, was disputed by Mirzapha Jung, one of his grandsons. Shortly afterwards a similar dispute arose regarding the Nawábship of the Carnatic, at that time held by Anwárud dín Khán, whose claim was contested by Chandá Sahib, son-in-law of the former Nawáb. Mirzapha Jung, having determined to enlist the aid of the Mahrattas in his cause, repaired to Sattára for the purpose of obtaining the support of Balaji Ráo, the Mahratta chief. There he met Chandá Sahib, who was an extremely intelligent man, and greatly doubted the wisdom of calling in the Mahrattas. He persuaded Mirzapha Jung to enter into an alliance with the French, as being far safer than an alliance with the Mahrattas. The result was that Chandá Sahib, who at the time was a prisoner in the hands of the Mahrattas, was ransomed by Dupleix, and he and Mirzapha Jung joining forces, attacked the Nawáb, Anwárud dín Khán, at Ambúr on the 3d August 1749, and won

a decisive victory. In this battle Dupleix furnished a contingent of 400 Frenchmen under the command of M. d'Auteuil. The latter had also 36,000 native troops under his command. Anwárud dín Khán was killed in the fight. One of his sons, Máphuz Khán, was taken prisoner, and the other, Muhammad Ali, better known afterwards as the Nawáb Wallajah, had to fly for his life. D'Auteuil having been wounded early in the battle, the command on the French side devolved upon M. de Bussy, who was serving as second in command, and was the ablest of the French generals. The army of Anwárud dín Khán speedily dispersed, and Mirzapha Jung, repairing immediately to Arcot, proclaimed himself Subahdár of the Dekhan and Chandá Sahib Nawáb of the Carnatic.

These two personages next proceeded to Pondicherry, where Mirzapha Jung conferred upon Dupleix the sovereignty of eighty-one villages adjoining the French territory. It had been arranged that Mirzapha Jung and Chandá Sahib should then move upon Trichinopoly, where Muhammad Ali had taken refuge, and had collected troops for its defence, but this movement was delayed owing to various causes, of which the principal was the presence of Admiral Boscawen's fleet off the coast. Another was the attraction of the wealth of Tanjore, which induced Chandá Sahib to delay his advance until reinforcements sent from Madras enabled



Trichinopoly to hold out. Shortly after this Názir Jung was murdered by one of his tributaries, and Mirzapha Jung met his death in a revolt of some of his Pathán soldiers when on his way to Hyderabad with an escort of French troops under De Bussy.

CHAPTER III

CLIVE'S MARCH TO ARCOT—OCCUPIES THE FORT—
ANOTHER NARROW ESCAPE—GALLANT DEFENCE
—EFFECT OF HIS DEFENCE UPON THE NATIVE
MIND—BATTLE OF KAVERIPÁK.

THE events briefly referred to in the preceding chapter occupied a period of two years; for it was not until the 26th August 1751, the battle of Ambur having been fought on the 3d August 1749, that Clive found himself in a position to march upon Arcot. The force placed at his disposal numbered only 500 men, of whom only 200 were English. He had with him three field pieces of artillery. Of the English officers, eight in number, six had never been in action, and four were young men of the mercantile service, who, fired by the example of Clive, had volunteered to join the expedition. The miniature army started from Madras, from which place Arcot is seventy miles distant. The distance was traversed in less than six days, including a short halt at Conjeveram. Clive, hearing at that place that the garrison in the fort of Arcot was 1100 strong,

despatched thence a message to Madras requesting that two more guns might be sent after him. He and his men reached Arcot on the 31st August, making the last march in a violent thunderstorm, and arriving to find the fort evacuated by the enemy, who, it was said, were so much alarmed by the accounts they received of the unconcern with which Clive's force had pursued its march through the thunderstorm, that they fled in a panic. Clive occupied the fort without encountering any opposition, and at once set to work to lay in provisions to enable him to undergo a siege. During the first week after his arrival he marched out twice with the greater part of his force to beat up the quarters of the fugitive garrison, which had taken up a position in the fort at Timari, some six miles from Arcot. Two encounters took place. In one of them the enemy, greatly outnumbering Clive's force, collected in the dry bed of a tank or lake, surrounded by a high embankment, from which Clive dislodged them by dividing his men, and bringing a concentric fire to bear upon his opponents from opposite ends of the tank. The enemy at once broke and fled; but on Clive summoning the fort, the commandant, perceiving that he possessed no heavy guns, refused to surrender. Clive thereupon returned to Arcot to await the guns he had sent for, and he remained there for ten days engaged in strengthening the works. At the end of that time the enemy, augmented by rein-

forcements from the neighbourhood to 3000 men, and encouraged by the cessation of Clive's sallies, took up a position about three miles from Arcot, where Clive surprised them by a night attack and put them to flight without the loss of a single man. A few days later, having detached a considerable part of his force to strengthen the detachment coming from Madras in charge of the guns for which he had applied, he was attacked by and repulsed a large body of the enemy.

The occupation by the English of the fort of Arcot very speedily produced the effect which Clive had anticipated, in inducing Chandá Sahib to remove some of his troops from before Trichinopoly. On the 23d September 4000 of Chandá Sahib's men, reinforced by 150 French soldiers from Pondicherry, and by the troops already collected in the neighbourhood of Arcot, the latter numbering 2000 men, and all under the command of Chandá Sahib's son, Rájá Sahib, occupied the city of Arcot preparatory to laying siege to the fort. On the following day Clive made another sally in the hope of driving the enemy out of the city, or at all events of inflicting such loss upon him as would diminish his boldness in the prosecution of the siege. The first of these objects was not accomplished, and the sally was attended by the loss of fifteen of the small English force, Clive himself having one of those narrow escapes which were so numerous at this period of his career. The

story of this escape is thus told by Orme, 'The garrison suffered this day the loss of fifteen Europeans, who were either killed on the spot or died afterwards of their wounds; amongst them was Lieutenant Trenwith, who, perceiving a sepoy from a window taking aim at Captain Clive, pulled him on one side, upon which the sepoy, changing his aim, shot Lieutenant Trenwith through the body.'

The fort was then completely invested, and underwent a siege which, lasting for fifty days, is justly regarded as one of the most memorable events in military history. 'The fort was more than a mile in circumference; the walls in many places ruinous, the towers inconvenient and decayed, an everything unfavourable to defence, yet Clive found the means of making an effectual resistance. When the enemy attempted to storm at two breaches, one of fifty, one of ninety feet, he repulsed them with but 80 Europeans and 150 Sepoys fit for duty, so effectually did he avail himself of his resources, and to such a pitch of fortitude had he exalted the spirit of those under his command.'¹ The final assault was delivered on the 14th November and failed, and on the following morning it was found that the whole of the besieging army had disappeared from Arcot. Before the siege began Clive had lost four out of the eight officers who had accompanied him from Madras.

¹ Mill, *History of British India*, vol. iii., p. 84.

One had been killed, two wounded, and one had returned to Madras. The stock of provisions had fallen very low some time before the siege was raised. When it became apparent that famine might compel the garrison to surrender, the Sepoys offered to give up the grain to the Europeans, contenting themselves with the water in which the rice was boiled. 'It is,' they said, 'sufficient for our support. The Europeans require the grain.'

Clive was the life of the defence. It was almost a miracle that, exposing himself as he did, he escaped unhurt. The fort was surrounded by houses, from which the enemy, themselves in tolerable security, were able to fire into it. On three different occasions sergeants who accompanied Clive on his visits to the works were shot dead at his side. On the day of the final assault the stormers brought a raft into the ditch at a point which was not fordable, when Clive, who was directing the defence at that point, observing that the aim of the gunners who were firing upon the raft, was bad, took himself the management of one of the guns, and speedily cleared the raft.

Rájá Sahib had endeavoured, first by the offer of a bribe and then by threats, to induce Clive to yield up the fort ; but his offers and threats were alike met by defiance.

The defence of Arcot produced an immense effect upon the minds of the natives of Southern India. They had hitherto entertained but little respect for

the English, whom they ranked as very inferior to the French in military capacity, but from this time native opinion entirely changed, and the defence of Arcot may justly be regarded as not only the turning-point in Clive's career, but as 'the turning-point in the Eastern career of the English.'¹

The expected reinforcements from Madras reached Arcot the day after the siege was raised. About the same time Clive was joined by a body of Mahratta horsemen under Morári Ráo, a freebooting chief, who had been nominally in alliance with Muhammad Ali, and to whom Clive had applied for aid. The Mahratta chief had held aloof at first, not choosing to commit himself until he saw which side was likely to prevail, but as the siege went on he seems to have been really impressed by the gallantry displayed by Clive and his little force, and a few days before the siege was raised he had made a demonstration which had decided Rájá Sahib no longer to delay the final assault.

A few days afterwards, with untiring energy, Clive again took the field, accompanied by the reinforcements which, as above stated, had arrived from Madras. After taking the little fort at Timari, which had held out on the previous occasion, he determined to march upon Arni, a place about seventeen miles south of Arcot, towards which Rájá Sahib, having been reinforced by some French and native troops from Pondicherry,

¹ Malleeson, *French in India*, p. 290.

was also moving. Clive's march was somewhat delayed by the sluggish proceedings of his Mahratta allies, who, until they found that the troops sent from Pondicherry had with them a considerable amount of treasure, showed no disposition to advance. When they did march, not more than three-fifths of their party accompanied Clive. Rájá Sahib's force was considerably superior in numbers to that under Clive. The former had with him 300 Frenchmen, 2000 cavalry and 2,500 Sepoys, with 4 guns; Clive's force consisting of 200 Europeans, 700 Sepoys and 3 guns, with 600 Mahratta horse. The struggle was for a time severe, but was decided in Clive's favour by a strategic movement against a narrow causeway on which a considerable number of the enemy's force and his 4 guns were placed. The result was that Rájá Sahib's force was dispersed with a loss of 50 Frenchmen and 150 Sepoys killed or wounded, while Clive lost 8 Sepoys and 50 of the Mahratta horse. The victory showed that Clive could fight, not only behind walls, but in the open field, and as a consequence 600 trained Sepoys immediately afterwards took service with him, bringing their arms with them. Clive next marched upon and took the great pagoda at Conjeveram, which, during the siege of Arcot, had been seized by a French garrison. After this he proceeded to Madras, and thence to Fort St David, to report upon his campaign to the Government.

Rájá Sahib having meanwhile reassembled his army and commenced to ravage the Company's territory in the immediate vicinity of Madras, Clive was sent to Madras early in February, and on the 22d of that month again took the field, marching first upon Vandalur. Rájá Sahib had, however, broken up his camp there and gone on to Conjeveram, whence he was on his way to Arcot, when at a late hour of the day (the 23d February), coming suddenly upon Clive's force, he attacked it near the village of Kaveripák. The contest which ensued was severe and critical. The greater part of it was fought by moonlight, and the enemy's force was superior both in number and in guns. It also had a considerable number of cavalry, whereas Clive had none. The victory was again won by the strategy of Clive, who, having ascertained that the enemy's guns were unprotected in their rear, sent a detachment to attack the battery from that quarter, whereupon they abandoned their guns and fled. Sixty French soldiers were taken prisoners. Nine guns and three mortars were captured.¹ Advancing again to Arcot, Clive proceeded towards Vellore, and was planning the reduction of that place when he was recalled to Fort St David to command an expedition against Trichinopoly, which was still beleaguered by Chandá Sahib's troops. On his

¹ One of Clive's latest biographers pronounces the victory of Kaveripák to have done more to secure English predominance in Southern India than the defence of Arcot.—Footnote to Malleeson's *Life of Clive*, p. 111.

march back, discerning the importance of destroying as far as possible the prestige of the French, he razed to the ground a town which Dupleix had christened after himself, as Dupleix Fatihábád (*anglicé*, 'The scene of Dupleix's victory'), and also a monument which Dupleix had erected in commemoration of French victories.

CHAPTER IV

CONDITION OF TRICHINOPOLY—RETURN OF LAWRENCE, WHO ASSUMES THE COMMAND—CLIVE SENT TO SAMIAVARAM IN COMMAND OF A DETACHMENT—CLIVE'S STRATEGY SUCCESSFUL—HE HAS MORE THAN ONE HAIRBREADTH ESCAPE—SURRENDER OF LAW'S AND D'AUTEUIL'S FORCES—CLIVE AT COVELONG AND CHINGLEPUT—CLIVE'S MARRIAGE.

THE state of things at Trichinopoly was such as to demand the presence of energetic leaders on both sides. Notwithstanding the relief which had been afforded to the besieged by the withdrawal to Arcot of a large body from the besieging force, the position of the garrison was extremely unsatisfactory. Captain Cope, who had commanded in the fort, had been killed. Captain Gingen, who succeeded him, was a man of but small capacity, and very devoid of enterprise. The English troops were depressed and starving. Muhammad Ali and the native contingent under him were again in the depths of despair. On the side of the besiegers the command was held by

Law, a man of considerable intellectual power, but lamentably wanting in decision. There can be no question that the Governor of Fort St David judged rightly when he decided to send Clive to the rescue of Trichinopoly. But Clive was not destined to hold the chief command on this occasion. Two days before the date fixed for the departure of the expedition, Major Lawrence, who had been absent in England, returned to Fort St David, and as the senior officer in the Presidency, claimed the command. Clive readily assented, ever mindful of the kindness he had received from Lawrence in the earlier part of his career, and accompanied the expedition in a subordinate capacity. At the outset, indeed, notwithstanding his recent very brilliant services, he was not even granted the position of second in command, until, on a suggestion made by him, Lawrence, after reaching Trichinopoly, placed him in command of a detachment sent to Samiavaram, a place to the north of Trichinopoly, to intercept any supplies and reinforcements that might be sent to the besieging force from Pondicherry. The remonstrances of the senior captains with Lawrence's force against what they deemed to be their supersession by Clive in the command of this detachment were silenced by the refusal of the Mahratta horsemen, and of the other native troops detailed for the expedition, to serve under any other leader. Before, however, this movement was resolved on, Clive had rendered an important

service to Lawrence on the day prior to the latter's march into Trichinopoly. Owing to the inactivity of Law, Lawrence had been able to effect a junction with certain reinforcements which had been sent to his aid, but was attacked by Law immediately after the reinforcements joined him. His troops were preparing their breakfasts after a long march when intelligence came of the approach of the enemy. Clive, being sent to reconnoitre, found in front of Law's force, and nearer to it than to the English, a caravansarai flanked by stone buildings, the possession of which he at once discerned to be of the utmost importance. He immediately galloped back, and obtaining Lawrence's permission to take a portion of the force to seize these buildings, the latter was enabled to drive back the enemy with but slight loss to his own force, but with heavy loss to the French.

Law shortly after this withdrew his force into Shrirangham, an island situated between the two branches of the Kaveri river, and containing a famous pagoda of great strength. It was this movement on the part of Law that led Clive to advise the occupation of Samiavaram, which would enable Lawrence to invest from the north Law's position, already invested from the south, east and west. Clive, with his detachment, consisting of 400 Europeans, 700 Sepoys, 3000 Mahratta cavalry and 8 guns, marched on the night of the 17th April, and at once pro-

ceeded to strengthen the defences of the village. Meanwhile Duplex, thoroughly disgusted with Law's inactivity, had determined to supersede him, and had sent M. d'Auteuil, the general who, with De Bussy as his second in command, had commanded at Ambúr, to take his place. In the operations that followed, Clive's strategy proved thoroughly successful, and resulted in the course of a few weeks in the surrender of both Law and D'Auteuil in succession, and also in that of Chandá Sahib, who gave himself up to the Tanjore chief, and was brutally murdered by his orders. It has been held that Lawrence could, and ought to, have intervened to prevent this murder.

In the course of these operations Clive had more than one hairbreadth escape. During a night attack by the French, who, aided by some English deserters, had managed by stratagem to secure an entrance into Clive's position, a *choultry*¹ in which Clive was sleeping was fired into, a box that lay under his feet was shattered by bullets, and a servant sleeping close to him was killed. In the fighting which followed, Clive was wounded, and a few hours later had the narrowest escape of being killed. The incident is thus related by Orme, 'At daybreak the commanding officer of the French, seeing the danger of his situation, made a sally at the head of his men, who received so heavy a fire that he himself, and twelve others who first came out of the gateway, were killed

¹ *Choultry*—a shelter for travellers, generally open on one side.

by the volley, on which the rest ran back into the pagoda. Captain Clive then advanced into the porch of the gate to parley with the enemy, and, being weak with loss of blood and fatigue, stood with his back to the wall of the porch, and leaned, stooping forward, on the shoulders of two sergeants. An Irish officer in charge of the English deserters presented himself with great insolence, and telling Clive with abusive language that he would shoot him, fired his musket. The ball missed Clive, but went through the bodies of both the sergeants on whom he was leaning, and they both fell, mortally wounded.' The French officer in command was so indignant at the conduct of the Irishman that he at once surrendered with his whole force.

The surrender of Law's and D'Auteuil's forces put an end to the war for a time, and effectually prevented the capture of Trichinopoly, but was speedily followed by dissensions between the native chiefs, originating in the refusal of Muhammad Ali to fulfil a promise which he had made to the Rájá of Mysore to give up to him the town and fort of Trichinopoly—a refusal in which he was supported by the Rájá of Mysore, and secretly by the Mahratta chief, Morári Ráo. These dissensions, actively fomented by Dupleix, were followed by a renewal of hostilities, in the course of which an attack by the English upon the strong fort of Ginji, in the South Arcot district, ordered by the Governor of Madras in opposition to the

advice of Lawrence, completely failed, and was followed by the advance of the French to the neighbourhood of Fort St David. On this occasion neither Lawrence nor Clive were present, both of them having been compelled to leave the army for a time, owing to illness brought on by the exposure they had undergone at the hottest season of the year. Lawrence, however, again took the field, and defeated the French, taking prisoner Dupleix's nephew, who was in command.

Shortly after this, Clive was employed to reduce two forts to the south of Madras, both of them of considerable strength, one at Covelong (Covilam), on the coast, about twenty miles, and the other, Chingleput (Chengalpatt), about thirty miles inland from Madras. Both these forts were held by the French, and, being in dangerous proximity to Madras, the Governor was anxious that they should be taken before the arrival of French reinforcements which were expected at Pondicherry. The only troops available for this duty were 200 newly-arrived and untrained English recruits, and 500 Sepoys recently raised by Mr Saunders. The detachment was accompanied by four guns. On the morning after its arrival at Covelong, an English officer was killed in the course of a sally made by the garrison, whereupon the detachment fled in confusion, and, according to Orme, would 'have fled as far as Madras but that Clive, meeting them, forced them, sword in hand and not

without violence, to return.' During the siege which followed, similar panics occurred on more than one occasion, but Clive's attitude in the end prevailed, not only against the cowardice of his own troops, but against the French commanders. With half his force he beat back a reinforcement that had been sent from Chingleput to force him to raise the siege of Covelong. Upon this the officer in command there capitulated. A similar result occurred at Chingleput. At each place, the French, who appear to have been wretchedly commanded, yielded to the energy of the English leader, after a siege of four days.

Clive's health had not improved from the continued exposure which attended the expedition, and after capturing Chingleput he again returned to Madras. Here, on the 18th February 1753, he married Miss Margaret Maskelyne, daughter of Mr Edmund Maskelyne, of Purton, Wilts, and sister of Mr Edmund Maskelyne, who had been Clive's companion in his escape from Madras in 1746. The various biographies of Clive contain but scanty information regarding his wife, beyond the fact that she was a beautiful woman, possessing a great charm of manner. There is a tradition connected with the marriage that Clive, on one occasion, seeing in his friend Edmund Maskelyne's room a miniature of a lady, asked whose portrait it was, and on being told that it was the portrait of Mr Maskelyne's sister, at once requested him to invite his sister to come out to

Madras in order that he might marry her. The story is characteristic of Clive, and is probably true. However this may be, the marriage proved a very happy one. Clive was devoted to his wife, who was much beloved by his family and by his friends. With her own family also she appears to have been a universal favourite. She was evidently a refined and well-educated woman. Her picture at Basset Down, the Wiltshire home of the present head of the Maskelyne family, her handwriting and her letters suggest these qualities. She was well born and well bred, that is to say, her father's people for many generations had been gentlemen of good estate in Wiltshire, in the Visitation of which county, in 1623, their pedigree¹ and arms are entered. Her mother represented, on her father's side, a younger branch of the Booths of Dunham Massey, and on her mother's side, the family of Proger, otherwise Proger-Herbert, members of which had served about the person of Charles I. and of Charles II., and who claimed to be the elder line of all the Herberts. Letters written to them by the Stewarts are at Basset Down. Lady Clive's grandfather, Major Nevill Maskelyne, died in 1711. His wife had predeceased him, and a large family of young children were left orphans. Under a strict entail, executed in 1677 by Nevill Maskelyne, for many years M.P. for Cricklade, the whole of Major Nevill Maskelyne's estate passed to his eldest son, and

¹ See Pedigree in Appendix V.

there was but slender provision for the other children. William, the second son, was accordingly sent out to India, and is described in 1728 as of Fort Marlborough, on the North Coast of Sumatra, a long since abandoned settlement of the East India Company. Two of his sisters married in India, while Edmund, the third son, Lady Clive's father, became a clerk to the Duke of Newcastle in the Secretary of State's office, Whitehall. His second boy, Edmund, by the influence of the Duke, obtained a writership at Madras, from which town, as we have seen, after its capture by the French in 1746, he escaped in company with the subject of this Memoir. The other two sons became Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, one of them, Nevil,¹ rising to the post of Astronomer Royal. With these brothers, and with the children of her aunts, Mrs Walsh and Mrs Kelsall, Lady Clive maintained the most affectionate intercourse.

¹ The name was so spelt by this member of the family.

CHAPTER V

CLIVE RETURNS TO ENGLAND—HIS RECEPTION—
SEEKS BUT FAILS TO ENTER PARLIAMENT—
APPLIES FOR RE-EMPLOYMENT IN INDIA—AP-
POINTED GOVERNOR OF FORT ST DAVID —
REACHES BOMBAY IN OCTOBER 1755 — EX-
PEDITION TO GHERIAH — CLIVE ASSUMES HIS
GOVERNMENT—DISPUTES BETWEEN NAVAL AND
MILITARY OFFICERS.

CLIVE and his bride sailed from Madras towards the end of February 1753, and landed in England in the course of that year. The fame of his exploits having preceded him, his reception in England was most gratifying. The Court of Directors treated him with special honour, toasting the young Captain at their banquets as 'General Clive,' and presenting him with a sword of honour set with diamonds of the value of five hundred pounds, 'as a token of their esteem, and of their sense of his singular services to the Company on the coast of Coromandel.' Before accepting this sword, Clive, to his credit, stipulated that a similar honour should be conferred upon his late commander, Colonel Lawrence. Clive's stay in England was

short. He had brought home with him what may be described as a moderately handsome fortune, derived partly from prize money, and largely, it may be assumed, from munificent presents made to him by the native chiefs whose interests he had served. The acceptance of such presents, however objectionable in principle, was only in conformity with the custom of the time, and cannot fairly be judged by the standard of official morality now recognised. The fortune he had acquired did not last long. The first use which Clive made of it was unexceptionable. He extricated his father from his pecuniary difficulties, and redeemed the family estate from a burden of debt by which it was encumbered. His other methods of spending his money were less praiseworthy. He was fond of display, and more or less intoxicated by the reception he met with in London society. He indulged in expenses beyond his means, and to crown all he embarked upon a contested election for the Parliamentary borough of St Michael's in Cornwall, for which, with the aid of Lord Sandwich's interest and by a large expenditure of money, he was returned, but was subsequently unseated on petition. He had thrown in his lot with the more advanced section of the Whigs, under the leadership of Henry Fox.

Having thus expended the greater part of his fortune, and being foiled in his wish to enter public life in England, Clive applied to the Court of Directors for re-employment in India. His applica-

tion was promptly complied with, and he was appointed Governor of Fort St David, with the reversion of the Governorship of Madras on the first vacancy. The original intention was that, before proceeding to Fort St David, he should be employed in military operations which it was proposed to carry on in the Dekhan for the purpose of destroying French influence there, and so consolidating English influence in the Carnatic, then nominally a dependency of the Subahdár of the Dekhan. With this view it was proposed to enlist on the English side the co-operation of the Peshwa,¹ and matters had gone so far that an agreement had been made with the Peshwa, under which English troops were to be sent to act as the auxiliaries of his Mahratta force, and a British officer, Colonel Scott, who had been recently sent out to India as Chief Engineer, had been nominated to the command. This arrangement had been rendered abortive by a treaty of neutrality in contests between the native chiefs, which had been entered into by M. Godehieu, Dupleix's successor in the government of Pondicherry, and Mr Saunders, the Governor of Madras. Of this treaty, however, the Court of Directors were not aware until after Clive had left England, and notwithstanding the previous appointment of Colonel Scott, which had been pressed upon them by the Duke of Cumberland, so convinced were they of the superior fitness of Clive for the command of

¹ The head of the Mahratta confederacy.

the proposed expedition, that they obtained for him a commission as Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Army, and directed him to go to Bombay so as to be at hand in the event of his services being required in the Dekhan.

Clive, accompanied by his wife, left England early in 1755, and reached Bombay at the end of October, to find that Colonel Scott was dead, and that, in consequence of the treaty of neutrality already referred to, the expedition to the Dekhan was not to take place. The main motive, indeed, of the expedition had in a great degree ceased to exist. Dupleix, who in 1753 and 1754 had succeeded to a considerable extent in re-establishing French influence in the Carnatic, had been recalled, and his successor, M. Godehieu, was a weak man, devoid of ambition and anxious only for peace. This anxiety was probably stimulated by the arrival at Fort St David of a British squadron under Admiral Watson, conveying the 39th Foot to India. On the other hand, the influence of the French under M. De Bussy was so strong in the districts north of Madras that the Governor of Madras had his own reasons for regarding with apprehension a renewal of the war. But although the convention prevented the expedition which Clive was intended to command, he was not destined to remain long without active employment. The Bombay coast had for some years been subject to piratical raids, commenced two centuries before by the great Mahratta chief Sivaji, and

continued in later years by Kánhaji Angria, the commander of the Mahratta fleet, and more recently by his son Tulaji Angria, who had the boldness to attack English, French and Dutch warships, and had seriously harassed the trade between Bombay and Europe. Angria possessed two forts, one called Gheriah, on the mainland, at the mouth of the river Kánvi, about a hundred and twenty miles south of Bombay, and the other on the Island of Suvarndrug, eighty miles north of Gheriah. Before Clive arrived, Commodore James, under the orders of the Bombay Government, had captured Suvarndrug. Some months later, and about the same time as Clive, Admiral Watson, with his squadron, reached Bombay from Madras, and it was then settled that a joint naval and military force, the latter under the command of Clive, who had brought with him from England three companies of Royal Artillery and 300 infantry recruits, should be despatched to capture Gheriah. It had been arranged that on the land side a Mahratta force should co-operate with the English, but the Mahrattas proved faithless, and their commander, with whom Angria had taken refuge, extorted from him a promise to surrender the fort to him, and not to the English. Intelligence of this agreement having reached the English commanders, Clive immediately landed with his troops, and placed himself between the Mahrattas and the fort. The latter was bombarded by the ships, and capitulated on the

second day, after which Clive and Watson proceeded to Fort St David, where Clive took up his government.

It should be mentioned here that before the expedition sailed for Gheriah, a dispute arose between the naval and military officers on the subject of prize money, which foreshadowed disputes between the two services during the subsequent operations in Bengal. On this occasion the military officers urged that Clive's share of prize money should be equal to that of Admiral Pocock, Watson's second in command, while the naval officers contended that Clive, as a lieutenant-colonel, was only entitled to the same share as a post captain. Watson supported the opinion of his officers, but offered to pay the difference to Clive out of his own pocket,—an offer which Clive declined to accept. This dispute was, as we have said, the precursor of other differences between Watson and Clive during the military operations in which they were shortly afterwards engaged, which might have led to most disastrous results.

CHAPTER VI

CLIVE RETURNS TO MADRAS AT A CRITICAL TIME—
TRAGEDY OF THE BLACK HOLE—CLIVE AND
WATSON ORDERED TO BENGAL—DELAY IN
DESPATCHING THE EXPEDITION—ITS ARRIVAL
IN THE HUGHLI—CAPTURE OF BUDGE BUDGE
—SURRENDER OF CALCUTTA—WATSON'S PER-
VERSE OBSTINACY—PRESIDENTIAL JEALOUSIES
—CAPTURE OF HUGHLI—BATTLE ON 5TH FEB-
RUARY NEAR CALCUTTA—TREATY WITH THE
NAWÁB.

CLIVE returned to the Madras Presidency at a critical moment. War with France was imminent, and broke out in the course of a few months. The very day that Clive assumed the government of Fort St David, Calcutta was captured by the Nawáb of Bengal, and the tragedy of the Black Hole took place. The acquisition of Calcutta by the East India Company was somewhat later than that of Madras. It dates from 1686, when the representatives of the Company, driven by the Moghul authorities from Hughli, where they had established a factory, moved under the leadership

of Job Charnock some twenty-six miles down the river to Satánati, now one of the northern suburbs of Calcutta. Ten years afterwards they built the original Fort William, and in 1700 they purchased the villages of Satánati, Kálikata and Govindpur from the son of the Emperor. In 1707 the East India Company declared Calcutta a separate presidency. Here, surrounded by the richest districts in India, amidst a teeming population, on the banks of a river which was the chief highway of Eastern commerce, the servants of the Company drove a thriving trade, threatened only, but never actually assailed, by the raids of the Mahrattas, the memory of which is still kept alive by the famous Mahratta ditch. They were in the same relation to the Nawáb of Bengal as the servants of the Company at Madras were to the Nawáb of the Carnatic. In April 1756, Aliverdi Khan, who was a just and strong ruler, died, and was succeeded by his grandson, Suraj ud Daulah, a youth under twenty years of age, whose training had been of the worst description. One of the whims of this youth was hatred towards the English, and he had not been two months on the throne when he found a pretext for indulging this sentiment in the fact that the English, in anticipation of difficulties with the French, were strengthening the fortifications of Fort William. On the 4th June he seized the English factory at Kásimbazár,

and on the 15th attacked Calcutta. The women and children in the fort were removed on board ship on the 18th, and on the same day the Governor, Mr Drake, and the military commandant, Captain Minchin, deserted their posts, and to their lasting disgrace betook themselves to the ships. Mr Holwell, a member of the Council, assumed command in the fort, but on the 25th the place was taken.

All the Englishmen in the fort, 146 persons, were thrust at the point of the sword into a small room, the prison of the garrison, commonly known as the Black Hole, only twenty feet square. The Nawáb had promised to spare their lives, but had gone to sleep after a debauch. No expostulations on the part of the prisoners, not even bribes, would induce the guards to awake the Nawáb and obtain his leave to liberate the prisoners, until the morning, when, having slept off his debauch, he allowed the door to be opened. By that time, out of 146 prisoners, 123 had miserably perished. The survivors, among whom was the acting Governor, Holwell, were brought before the tyrant, insulted and reproached by him, and detained in custody in wretched sheds and fed upon grain and water. An Englishwoman who was one of the survivors, was placed in the Nawáb's harem. The details of this terrible tragedy and of the sufferings which the survivors

subsequently underwent, are given in a letter¹ from Mr Holwell, from which it appears that his eventual release was brought about by the intercession of Aliverdi Khán's widow, who had in vain endeavoured to dissuade the Nawáb from attacking Calcutta, and had predicted that his doing so would be his ruin. Intelligence of the outrage did not reach Madras until the 16th August, when it was at once decided to send a force under Clive to Calcutta to avenge it. Clive was appointed Commander-in-Chief, with full military and political control. He took with him 900 English soldiers, and 1200 Sepoys and some artillery. Owing, however, to the obstinacy of Watson, and to jealousy of Clive on the part of Colonel Aldercron, who had recently arrived at Madras in command of the 39th Foot, a delay of two months took place before the expedition sailed. Watson declined to undertake it at all unless the government of the Bengal settlement, which the Madras Council proposed to assume pending orders from home, was entrusted to the survivors of the Bengal Council, the leaders of which had so shamefully deserted their posts; while Aldercron, on being informed that Clive was to exercise the military command, actually went so far as to disembark the greater part of his regiment, together with guns and stores which had already been put on board ship, allowing

¹ Holwell's *India Tracts*, pp. 387-416.

only 250 men to remain, who were to serve as marines under Watson. The delay was unfortunate; for before the squadron sailed the North-east monsoon had set in, and in consequence none of the ships reached the Hughli until the middle of December, and even then two of the largest ships were missing; the *Marlborough*, with most of the artillery, and the *Cumberland*, with Admiral Pocock and 250 English soldiers, having failed to make their way against the monsoon. Clive's orders were to recapture Calcutta, to attack the Nawáb at his capital, Murshidabad, and in the event of war between England and France being declared, to capture the French settlement of Chandernagore (Chandranagar). When the expedition reached the Hughli, Clive wished the men under his command to be taken on in the ships as far as Budge Budge (Bajbaj)—a fortified place about ten miles from Calcutta, which it was necessary to capture; but Watson, with his habitual perversity, insisted upon the troops being landed at Mayapur, some miles further down, thus obliging them to make a most fatiguing night march through a swampy country covered with jungle. The result was that they reached Budge Budge in an exhausted condition, and being surprised by the Nawáb's troops shortly after their arrival, had a very narrow escape from destruction, which was averted only by Clive's presence of mind and readiness of resource.

Clive says, in a letter to Pigot reporting this affair a few days afterwards,—

‘You must know our march from Mayapur to the northward of Budge Budge was much against my inclinations. I applied to the Admiral for boats to land us at the place we arrived at after sixteen hours’ march by land. The men suffered hardships not easily to be described; it was four in the afternoon when we decamped from Mayapur, and we did not arrive off Budge Budge until past eight next morning. At nine the Grenadier company and all the Sepoys were despatched to the fort, where I heard Captain Coote was landed with the King’s troops. At ten, Manickchand, the Governor of Calcutta, attacked us with between two and three thousand horse and foot, and was worsted. . . . Manickchand himself received a shot in his turban. Our two field pieces were of little or no service to us, having neither tubes nor portfires, and heavy carriages were sent with them from Fort St David. Indeed, we still labour under every disadvantage in the world for want of the *Marlborough*. It seems the enemy were encamped within two miles of us, and we ignorant of the matter. So much for the intelligence of the country.’

There can be no doubt that Clive sustained a surprise that might have been prevented had the ordinary precautions been used; but in the circumstances there is much allowance to be made. Clive

himself was ill, and had suffered much from the fatiguing night march which he and his men had gone through, owing to Watson's wrong-headed obstinacy. But notwithstanding illness and fatigue, and the unexpected appearance of a hostile force, Clive on this, as on other occasions, never for a moment lost his nerve. He at once rallied his men, who, awakened out of their sleep by being fired upon, were at first thrown into confusion, and then with scarcely a pause made dispositions which retrieved the situation, although not without heavy loss to the English.

When Watson and Clive entered the river, they found at Falta some of the fugitives from Calcutta, and the scanty remains of a small force which, on the receipt of intelligence of the seizure of Kásimbazár, but before the news of the Black Hole tragedy had arrived, the Madras authorities had sent to Bengal under Major Kilpatrick. Clive, after beating off Manickchand's army, was met by Major Kilpatrick, who had been sent to his aid with reinforcements. In the meantime, Watson had bombarded Budge Budge from his ships, and had effected a breach in the ramparts of the fort. Clive had arranged to assault the fort the next day, when a drunken sailor, discovering the breach, entered it alone, and firing his pistol among a small group of the defenders who were sitting near, shouted out, 'The fort is mine,' accompanying the exclamation by three loud cheers.

He was at once attacked, but defended himself valiantly, and some of the English soldiers and Sepoys coming up, the garrison abandoned the fort, which was taken possession of by Captain Eyre Coote, who had come up from Madras with the detachment of the 39th Foot. The squadron, with the troops, then moved on to Calcutta, which surrendered on the 2d January, Manickchand having evacuated the place and returned with his army to the headquarters of the Nawáb at Murshidabad. Then occurred another of Watson's arbitrary and ill-judged proceedings. Notwithstanding the orders of the Madras Government, investing Clive with military and political control in Bengal, Watson appointed Coote, whose rank was that of captain, to be Governor of Fort William. Clive declined to permit this arrangement, claiming the command as the senior officer, and threatened to place Coote under arrest if he disobeyed his orders. Thereupon Watson threatened to fire upon the fort unless Clive gave it up. The matter ended in a compromise, Clive surrendering the fort to Watson on condition that it was afterwards handed over to the representatives of the Company. In this, and in other disputes with Watson, Clive appears to have kept his temper, while acting with firmness. Writing to Mr Pigot, Clive describes this affair in the following words :—

‘I cannot help regretting that I ever undertook this expedition. The mortifications I have received

from Mr Watson¹ and the gentlemen of the squadron in point of prerogative are such that nothing but the good of the service could induce me to submit to them. The morning the enemy quitted Calcutta, a party of our Sepoys entered the fort at the same time with a detachment from the ships, and were ignominiously thrust out. Upon coming near the fort myself, I was informed that there were orders that none of the Company's officers or troops should have entrance. This, I own, enraged me to such a degree that I was resolved to enter if possible, which I did, though not in the manner maliciously reported, by forcing the sentries; for they suffered me to pass very patiently upon being informed who I was. At my entrance Captain Coote presented me with a commission from Admiral Watson appointing him Governor of Fort William, which I knew not a syllable of before; and it seems this dirty underhand contrivance was carried on in the most secret manner, under a pretence that I intended the same thing, which I declare never entered my thoughts. The affair was compromised by the Admiral consenting that I should be Governor, and that the Company's troops should remain in the fort. The next day the Admiral delivered up the fort to the Company's representatives in the King's name.'

Watson, it would seem, could not bring himself to

¹ It should be remembered that at that time it was the fashion in private letters and in society to describe naval and military officers as if they were civilians, and not by their naval or military rank. See Thackeray's novels.

recognise the fact that Clive was not only an officer of the East India Company, but had been granted a royal commission. In this he showed himself both stupid and headstrong. Notwithstanding this petty jealousy of the Company's service, a jealousy in which he was by no means singular, he was an honourable man, desirous, according to his lights, to serve his King and country; and in the important transactions which afterwards took place, his co-operation with Clive appears to have been fairly cordial.

It was otherwise with the Council at Calcutta, who greatly resented the independent powers which had been conferred upon Clive by the Madras authorities. At that early period those presidential jealousies which have so often interfered with the efficient administration of Indian affairs, and even now are not entirely extinguished, appear to have existed in full force. The Select Committee at Calcutta, as the Governor's Council was then designated, called upon Clive to surrender the powers with which he had been invested, and to place himself under them. His reply was a decided refusal. 'I do not,' he wrote, 'intend to make use of my power for acting separately from you, without you reduce me to the necessity of so doing; but as far as concerns the means of executing these powers, you will excuse me, gentlemen, if I refuse to give them up. I cannot do it without forfeiting the trust reposed in me by the Select Committee of Fort St George. It does not become me, as an in-

dividual, to give my opinion whether the conduct of the gentlemen of Fort St George has been faulty or not. That point must be determined by our superiors.'

The attitude of the Calcutta Committee was described by Clive in a letter to his friend Pigot in the following terms, 'I am sorry to say the loss of private property and the means of recovering it seem to be the only objects which take up the thoughts of the Bengal gentlemen. Believe me, they are bad subjects and rotten at heart, and will stick at nothing to prejudice you and the gentlemen of the Committee. Indeed, how should they do otherwise when they have not spared one another? I shall only add, their conduct at Calcutta finds no excuse even among themselves, and that the riches of Peru and Mexico should not induce me to dwell among them.'

Immediately after the recapture of Calcutta, Clive, in conjunction with Watson, moved up the river to Hughli, and captured that place without difficulty, securing booty which was estimated at £15,000, and destroying some large and valuable granaries. They had also planned an expedition to Dacca, the capital of Eastern Bengal, when they learnt that the Nawáb was again marching upon Calcutta with a large force. A battle ensued on the 5th February, in which Clive, with 1350 Europeans, 800 Sepoys and 7 field guns, beat the Nawáb's force of 40,000 men, including 18,000 cavalry, 40 guns and 50 elephants.

The greater part of the battle was fought in a dense fog, and Clive's men, losing their way, came under the fire of their own guns and of those in Fort William. At one time the position of the troops was very critical. The English loss was heavy, amounting to 57 killed and 117 wounded, of whom 39, and 82, respectively, were Europeans, and it included Clive's aide-de-camp and secretary, who were killed by his side. But the battle, although attended by this heavy loss to the English, was even more disastrous to the Nawáb's troops, whose casualties amounted to 1300, among whom were 2 noblemen of high rank and 22 of lesser note.

Clive's account of the engagement is contained in the following letter, addressed by him, a few weeks after it was fought, to the Duke of Newcastle. It has been for many years deposited among the manuscripts in the British Museum, whence, by the kindness of Dr Richard Garnett, a copy has been furnished to the writer of this Memoir. It is believed that the letter has not been published before.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel ROBERT CLIVE to
THOMAS PELHAM HOLLES, Duke of New-
castle, First Lord of the Treasury.*

'May it please your Grace,—The countenance your Grace was pleased to shew me when I left England encourages me to address you on the subject of the East India Company.

‘No doubt your Grace hath been acquainted with the capture of the Town of Calcutta and Fort William by the Moors, the principal settlement in the Kingdom of Bengall and of the utmost consequence to the E. India Company. The loss of private property only is computed at more than 2 millions sterling.

‘When this unfortunate news arrived at Madrass, the President and Council aplied to Vice-Admiral Watson for assistance in recovering the rights and possessions of the Province of Bengal, and for the same purpose ordered a large body of land forces to embark under my command; and I have the pleasure to inform your Grace this expedition by sea and land has been crown’d with all the success that could be wished.

‘The Town of Calcutta and Fort William was soon retaken, with several other Forts belonging to the Enemy. This news brought down the Nabob, or Prince of the Country, himselfe at the head of 20,000 horse and 30,000 foot, 25 pieces of cannon, with a great number of elephants — our little army, consisting of 700 Europeans and 1200 blacks, arm’d and disciplin’d after the English manner, lay encamped about 5 miles from the Town of Calcutta. On the 4th of February the Nabob’s Army appear’d in sight, and past our camp at the distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamp’d on the back of the town. Several parties of their horse past within 400 yards of our advanc’d battery,

but as wee entertain'd great hopes of a peace from the Nabob's promises, wee did not fire upon them.

'On the 5th, agreeable to the Nabob's desire, I despatch'd two gentlemen to wait upon him, in hopes everything might be settled without drawing the sword, but the haughtiness and disrespect with which he treated them convinced me nothing could be expected by mild measures. This determin'd me to attack his camp in the night time, for which purpose I aply'd to Admiral Watson for 500 sailors to draw our cannon, which he readily sent me, and at 3 o'clock in the morning our little army, consisting of 600 Europeans, 500 blacks, 7 feild pieces and the sailors above mentioned, set out for the attack. A little before day break wee entred the camp, and received a very brisk fire. This did not stop the progress of our troops, which march'd thro' the enemie's camp upwards of 4 miles in length. Wee were more than 2 hours passing, and what escaped the van was destroy'd by the rear. Wee were obliged to keep a constant fire of artillery and musketry the whole time. A body of 300 of the enemy's horse made a gallant charge, but were received with so much coolness by the military that few escaped. Several other brisk charges were made on our rear, but to no purpose, and wee returned safe to camp, having killed by the best accounts 1300 men and between 5 and 600 horse, with 4 elephants; the loss on our side 200 men killed and wounded. This

blow had its effect, for the next day the army decamp'd and the Nabob sent me a letter offering terms of accomodation; and I have the pleasure of acquainting your Grace a firm peace is concluded, greatly to the honour and advantage of the Company, and the Nabob has entered into an alliance offensive and defensive with them, and is return'd to his capital at Muxadavad.

'As I have already been honour'd with your Grace's protection and favour, I flatter my selfe with the continuance of it, and that, if your Grace thinks me deserving, your Grace will recommend me to the Court of Directors.—I am, with the greatest respect, your Grace's most devoted humble servant,

ROBERT CLIVE.

'CAMP NEAR CALCUTTA,
'23d Feby. 1757.'

The terms of the treaty were exceedingly favourable to the Company. All the privileges formerly granted to the English were renewed, all trade covered by English passes was freed, all property of the Company or of its servants or tenants which had been taken by the Nawáb's officers to servants was to be restored; the English were to fortify Calcutta, and to coin money as they might deem proper. The Nawáb, on the 11th February, began his return march to his capital, previously commissioning Omichand, in whose garden the late battle had been fought, to propose a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive,

with the English. This treaty was accepted and signed by Clive and Watson, not without some hesitation on the part of the latter, who, the day after the fight in the outskirts of Calcutta, advised Clive to renew his attack. Clive, however, dreaded a combination between the French and the Nawáb, and regarded the French settlement at Chandernagore (Chandranagar) as a serious danger to Calcutta. He had learnt, when at Hughli, that war had been again declared between England and France, and before leaving Madras he had been instructed by the Government there that, in the event of a war with France again breaking out in Europe, he was to capture Chandernagore. Moreover, the Madras Government were urging him to return with the force under his command to Madras, where they apprehended a renewal of the contest with the French at Pondicherry under the leadership of M. Lally Tollendal, a far abler man than the successor of Dupleix. Still the situation was by no means clear and at one time Clive was in favour of accepting a proposal made by M. Renault, the Governor of Chandernagore, that the English and French authorities in Bengal should maintain a neutral attitude. Watson, however, was opposed to signing any treaty to this effect, arguing that the Governor of Chandernagore was not competent to execute any such treaty without the sanction of the Governor of Pondicherry, and that, if executed, it would not be binding on De Bussy and the other French commanders.

CHAPTER VII.

ARRIVAL OF BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS—CAPTURE OF CHANDERNAGORE—REASONS FOR CLIVE REMAINING IN BENGAL—PLOT AGAINST THE NAWÁB—OVERTURES MADE BY MÍR JAFAR—TREATY WITH OMICHAND—A REAL TREATY AND A SHAM TREATY—PROVISIONS OF THE REAL TREATY—WATSON'S ATTITUDE IN THE MATTER.

THE state of things in the districts north of Madras now engaged Clive's attention. De Bussy, who was the ablest of the French generals, had been sent by Dupleix after the battle of Ambúr to the Dekhan, where he speedily acquired a commanding influence. He had obtained possession for the French of the four northern districts of what is now the Madras Presidency, commonly known as the Northern Sirkárs. Having recently quarrelled with the Nizam, Salábat Jung, whom he had placed upon the throne of Dekhan, De Bussy had distinguished himself by his brilliant defence of a post he had taken up at Chármahal, close to Hyderabad. At this time he was in the Northern Sirkárs, and within three hundred miles of Calcutta. He had

under his command a considerable force, composed of Frenchmen and trained native Sepoys. He had been urged by the Nawáb of Bengal to come to Chandernagore and to aid him in expelling the English from Bengal. M. Law, who had failed so signally at Trichinopoly, but in many respects was an able man, was actually at Chandernagore. In those circumstances Clive held that if the treaty was not to be immediately executed, no time should be lost in attacking Chandernagore. The Council at Calcutta had to be consulted, but their opinions were so discordant, and one of them, Mr Drake's, so unintelligible, that the question was decided by Clive, in conjunction with Major Kilpatrick, in favour of the attack, in which Admiral Watson was requested to co-operate with his squadron. At this juncture intelligence was received of an important reinforcement having arrived from Bombay at the mouth of the Hughli, under Commodore James, and of the arrival in the river Baleshwar, one of the tributaries of the Ganges, of the long delayed *Cumberland*, with Admiral Pocock and a detachment of the 39th Foot. This intelligence would seem to have dispelled any doubts which Watson may have entertained as to the wisdom of proceeding with the attack. Both he, however, and Clive deemed it advisable to obtain the assent of the Nawáb to the proposed attack, and this, after a characteristic correspondence between Watson

and the Nawáb, and a good deal of wavering on the part of the latter, was ultimately obtained on the 13th March. On the same day Clive demanded the surrender of the place; but this was refused, the fort being well fortified both on the land and on the river side. It was not taken without severe fighting, and it is doubtful whether the combined forces under Clive and Watson would have sufficed to capture it had there not been treachery in the garrison. In anticipation of the attack, the French had sunk vessels in the passage through which the English ships would have to pass in order to get abreast of the fort; but the French engineer who superintended the operation left a passage sufficiently wide for the English ships to pass through in single file, and then, deserting to the enemy, gave him information which enabled him to carry out his intended movements. The French fought with the greatest gallantry, but were eventually obliged to capitulate on the 23d March. The main burden of the fighting fell upon the ships which, in making their way along the narrow passage already referred to in the face of a heavy fire from the fort, accomplished a feat memorable in naval history. Clive subsequently, in evidence before the House of Commons, stated that 'Admiral Watson's fleet surmounted difficulties which he believed no other ships could have done, and that it was impossible for him to do the officers of the squadron justice on

that occasion.' 'The English ships were anchored so close to the fort that the musketry from the tops and poops was most annoying to the enemy, who behaved with great gallantry, keeping up a heavy and destructive fire, nor did they offer to capitulate until their batteries were a heap of ruins, and all their guns dismounted.'¹ According to Sir Charles Wilson, 'the Admiral's flag-ship was hulled more than a hundred times, and every officer but one was killed or wounded.'

Clive with his land force rendered material help, driving the French from batteries which they had placed both on the north and south sides of the fort, and occupying houses which the French Governor had not time to destroy, and which gave to Clive's men some, though an imperfect, shelter from the guns of the fort. The loss on both sides was heavy, but it was heavier on the side of the English. The forces engaged were numerically small. On the side of the French, out of 500 European soldiers, 150 were killed or wounded, while on the English side the casualties amounted to 206.

During the whole of this time the Madras authorities were pressing Clive to bring back his force to Madras, where, owing to the renewal of the war in Europe, serious apprehension was entertained of another attack from Pondicherry under the leader-

¹ See Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, vol. i., p. 192.

ship of the famous M. Lally de Tollendal, who was expected there with a French fleet; but Clive regarded the destruction of French power in Bengal as a matter of the gravest importance, feeling that the English and their European rivals could not co-exist as political powers in India. Impressed by this consideration, Clive, very shortly after the capture of Chandernagore, called upon the Nawáb, through Mr Watts, the Company's agent at Murshidabad, either to surrender to the British, or to expel from Bengal any Frenchmen remaining in his territory. Watson took a similar view, and expressed it in language stronger even than that used by Clive. In a letter to the Nawáb, dated the 19th April 1757, he wrote that while a Frenchman remained in Bengal he 'would never cease pursuing him.' But the necessity of expelling the French from Bengal was not the only motive which induced Clive to delay his return to Madras. The character of the Nawáb, and the incompetence of the Calcutta Council, furnished cogent reasons why he should remain at that juncture in Bengal. Clive had already discovered that the Nawáb, treacherous as he was cruel, was not to be relied upon to fulfil any engagement, however solemnly entered into. During the siege of Chandernagore he had alternately threatened and courted Mr Watts. On hearing of the capture of Chandernagore he was filled with rage, and gave vent to his feelings in no measured

language. Shortly afterwards he sent letters to Watson and Clive congratulating them on their victory, and offering them the territory of Chander-nagore on the same terms on which it had been held by the French, and further offering to restore or make compensation for the property which had been destroyed at the capture of Calcutta in 1756. It seems probable that in making these offers the Nawáb was partly actuated by fear of a threatened invasion of Bengal by the son of the Emperor of Delhi, afterwards known as the Emperor Shah Álam.

Distrust of the Nawáb was by no means confined to Clive. It was shared by all the English in Bengal. It was also shared by many of the leading men among the Nawáb's own followers, who, disgusted by his cowardice, his cruelty and his perfidy, were already engaged in a plot to dethrone him.

The other reason which weighed with Clive in declining to comply with the orders from Madras, viz., the unfitness of the gentlemen composing the Calcutta Council, or Select Committee, as it was then called, to deal with any sudden crisis, was also very important. These persons had shown that they were individually weak and divided among themselves, and that, when acting in a body, they were unable to subordinate their own interests, as they regarded them, to the interests of the public service. The situation of Madras was very different. Both Stringer Lawrence and Pigot were strong and capable men,

and might be trusted to do all that was possible with the means at their disposal. Moreover, during the few months that Clive had been in Bengal, he had become strongly impressed by the great natural resources of the province, and by its importance from a commercial point of view, and he felt that some risk might well be incurred for the sake of securing for his countrymen, the advantages which must result from maintaining an influential position in Bengal.

After the capture of Chandernagore, Clive's distrust of the Nawáb was intensified, not only by the information supplied by Mr Watts of his intrigues with the French, but by his refusal to allow the passage of a few Sepoys and of supplies of ammunition and stores to the English factory at Kásimbazár. Meanwhile, Clive received from Watts information of the plot already referred to, which had been formed by some of the leading personages at the Nawáb's court, to dethrone him. These persons were Rájá Duláb Rám, the finance minister, Mír Jafar, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, and Yár Látif Khán, a man not of the first rank, who would seem to have started the conspiracy, stipulating that, if it succeeded, he should be made Nawáb. There is some ground, however, for supposing that the original suggestion emanated from Jaggat Seth, a wealthy banker, who had received personal insults from the Nawáb. Another person of considerable weight who was also implicated in the

plot, was Omichand, the wealthy Hindu, in whose garden the Nawáb's camp had been pitched on that foggy night in February when Clive marched through it. On that occasion he sustained a somewhat heavy loss, but inflicted a much heavier loss upon the troops of the Nawáb, and thereby frightened the latter into treating for peace. At an early stage of the proceedings Clive received overtures from Mír Jafar, the Commander-in-Chief, who offered to aid the English against the Nawáb on condition that he should succeed him. The events which followed included what in some respects were the most brilliant, and were certainly the most questionable, incidents in Clive's career. While his military reputation, already established by the defence of Arcot, the victory at Kaveripák, and the operations before Trichinopoly, rose higher than ever, and while he developed a capacity for civil and political administration of the highest order, the fame of his exploits was tarnished by a breach of faith which it is impossible to justify, and by the acceptance of large sums of money from the native prince whom he placed upon the throne of Bengal after the deposition of Suráj ud Daulah. The negotiations with Mír Jafar were principally conducted through the agency of the Hindu, Omichand, who, having entered into solemn engagements to support the English cause, was accused of having threatened to divulge the conspiracy to Suráj ud Daulah, demanding thirty lakhs of rupees as the

price of his silence. This story has been accepted by successive historians of British India, and until very recently by successive biographers of Clive. It is mentioned by Orme, who, however, qualifies his mention of it by using the words, 'It is said,' without vouching for the correctness of the statement, although not further throwing any doubt upon it. It is accepted by Mill, by his annotator, Wilson, and by Marshman. It is adopted by Malcolm in his *Life of Clive*, by Macaulay in his famous *Essay on Clive*, by Gleig, and by Sir Charles Wilson in the series or *English Men of Action*. It is, however, strongly questioned by Colonel Malleon in his memoir published as recently as 1882, where for various reasons he endeavours to show that there is no evidence to prove it, and that in the circumstances it is very improbable that Omichand, whatever his secret intentions may have been, used any such threat either in speech or in writing. But Colonel Malleon does not question the fact that Omichand made an excessive demand, or that at a meeting of the Council, Clive denounced him as 'the greatest villain upon earth.'

It had been settled that a treaty should be drawn up, embodying the terms upon which Mir Jafar should be placed upon the throne, and Omichand had demanded that the payment to be made to him should be inserted in the treaty. In order to defeat the latter demand, Clive resorted to the expedient,

which was sanctioned by the Calcutta Council, of drawing up two treaties, one on white paper, and the other on red paper. In the white treaty, which was the real one, no mention was made of any payment to Omichand. In the red treaty, which was shewn to Omichand, but which was not the document given to Mr Jafar, the payment to be made to Omichand was set forth in full. It appears that Admiral Watson, who in all the operations in Bengal up to that time had been associated with Clive, declined to sign the red treaty. It was feared that the absence of Watson's signature would be noticed by Omichand, and might therefore lead to the disclosure of the plot. Accordingly Watson's signature was attached to the red treaty by another person—by Clive, according to Macaulay, but if not by Clive, at all events under his orders. On the strength of evidence subsequently given by Clive, Sir John Malcolm, who defends the transaction as a pious and necessary fraud, represents that Watson, while refusing to affix his signature to the fictitious treaty, did not object to its being done for him. At any rate, he did not resent the use which was made of his name; for before the expedition started for Plassey, and after having been made fully acquainted with what had taken place, he wrote to Clive in the following terms:—

‘I am glad to hear that Mr Jafar's party increases. I hope everything will turn out in the expedition to

your wishes, and that I may soon have to congratulate you on the success of it. I most heartily pray for your health and a speedy return crowned with laurels.' It is also the fact that after the plot succeeded, Watson claimed a share in the plunder. Clive to the last maintained that, looking to Omichand's misconduct, the artifice which had been resorted to was perfectly justifiable, and that while he believed that Watson had authorised Mr Lushington to attach his signature to the fictitious treaty, he would, in the circumstances, have ordered Watson's name to be attached, whether he had consented or not.

CHAPTER VIII

TERMS OF THE TREATIES — ADVANCE TOWARDS
PLASSEY — CLIVE'S LETTER TO THE NAWÁB —
HIS ANXIOUS POSITION — ARRIVAL AT KATWA —
COUNCIL OF WAR — CLIVE VOTES FOR DELAY —
HIS CHANGE OF MIND — ARRIVAL AT PLASSEY —
CLIVE'S DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE — FATE OF
SURÁJ UD DAULAH — SEQUEL OF THE STORY OF
OMICHAND.

THE treaties were signed on 19th May, and were at once sent to Mír Jafar for signature. The real treaty provided for an offensive and defensive alliance with Mír Jafar; for a prohibition against any re-settlement of the French in Bengal, and for the transfer of their factories to the English Company; for compensation for English losses at Calcutta, viz., to the Company, £1,000,000; to the European inhabitants, £500,000; to the native inhabitants, £200,000; to the Armenians, £70,000; for the cession of all land within the Mahratta Ditch and 600 yards beyond it; for the cession to the Company of the Zemidári of the country to the south of Calcutta as far as Kalpi, subject to the payment of

the customary rent ; for the payment by the Nawáb of all English troops sent to his assistance, and for a prohibition against the erection of any new forts below Hughli. Under a supplementary treaty, Mír Jafar was to pay £500,000 to the army and navy, and £120,000 to the Members of Council.

Mír Jafar's signature to the treaty was received on the 12th June, and Clive's force at once advanced. On that day all the troops quartered at Calcutta, together with 150 sailors from the fleet, crossed over to Chandernagore, where they joined the remainder of the force already quartered at the latter place. The Europeans, including the artillery, were sent up the river in 200 boats, the Sepoys marching by land. On the 13th June, Clive despatched to the Nawáb a letter which was practically a declaration of war. It arraigned the Nawáb for his breach of treaty, and informed him that Clive had determined, with the approbation of all who were charged with the Company's affairs, to proceed immediately to Kásimbazár, and to submit the dispute with the Nawáb to the arbitration of Mír Jafar, Rájá Duláb Rám, Jaggat Seth, and 'others of your Highness' great men.' 'If these,' he wrote, 'decide that I have deviated from the treaty, then I swear to give up all further claims upon your Highness ; but if it should appear that your Highness has broken faith, then I shall demand satisfaction for all the losses sustained by the English, and all the charges

of the army and navy.' The letter ended with an intimation that as the rains were at hand, and it would take many days to receive an answer, the writer would 'wait upon the Nawáb at his capital to receive satisfaction.' The attitude which Clive adopted was bold and defiant, but, for all that, Clive was by no means free from anxiety. It was not at all certain that Mír Jafar would adhere to his agreement. He was to have joined Clive at Katwa with a friendly force, but instead of doing so he merely sent Clive a letter promising to join him on the field of battle. On the 14th, Clive's force reached Kalna, where it was joined by Watts, who had escaped from Murshidabad on the previous day. On the 17th, they captured Katwa, with its fortress, after a slight resistance, and found the place well stocked with grain. On the 19th, while they halted at Katwa, the monsoon rains set in, and the troops, who were lodged in tents, had to take shelter in huts and small houses. On the same day Clive, whose anxiety continued to be very great, addressed the following letter to the Committee at Calcutta :—

'I feel the greatest anxiety at the little intelligence I receive from Mír Jafar, and if he is not treacherous, his *sang froid* or want of strength will, I fear, upset the expedition. I am trying a last effort by means of a Brahmin to prevail upon him to march out and join us. I have appointed Plassey as the place of rendezvous, and have told him at the same time that

unless he gives this or some other sufficient proof of the sincerity of his intentions, I will not cross the river. This, I hope, will meet with your approbation. I shall act with such caution as not to risk the loss of our forces; and whilst we have them, we may always have it in our power to bring about a revolution, though the present should not succeed. They say there is a considerable quantity of grain in and about the place. If we collect eight or ten thousand maunds' (eight or ten hundred thousand pounds), 'we may maintain our situation during the rains, which will greatly distress the Nawáb, and either reduce him to terms which may be depended upon, or give us time to bring in the Birbhúm Rájá, the Mahrattas, or Gházi ud din. I desire you will give your sentiments freely how you think I should act if Mír Jafar can give us no assistance.'

The situation was certainly a very alarming one. Clive had only 3200 men to oppose to what proved to be an army of 50,000. He had no cavalry, and only a few guns, while the enemy had a large artillery force. In the circumstances, it is perhaps hardly to be wondered at that Clive should desire to share the responsibility. This he did, for what proved to be the first and last time in his life, by holding a council of war, to which he propounded the following question: 'Whether, in our present situation, without assistance, and on our own bottom, it would be prudent to attack the Nawáb, or whether we should wait till

joined by some country power.'¹ Of the sixteen Members of the Council, nine, including Clive, voted for delay, and seven, including Eyre Coote, were for an immediate attack. But Clive did not adhere to his original vote. After the Council had risen, he withdrew to a clump of trees, and having passed an hour in thinking over all the arguments for and against delay, he determined to move forward at once. Meeting Eyre Coote on his way back to camp, he told him he had changed his mind, and intended to march the next morning. Accordingly, in the early morning of the 22d June, the force marched down the bank of the Bhághirathi, and crossed the river the same afternoon without meeting with any opposition. There still remained fifteen miles to be traversed in order to reach Plassey. Clive's force, after struggling through mud and water in a continued torrent of rain, did not arrive at the village until one o'clock on the morning of the 23d. Clive had heard from Mír Jafar that the Nawáb's army would halt at Mankárah, a place some miles short of Plassey; but the Nawáb had changed his plans, and reached Plassey twelve hours before Clive. Thus, on his arrival, Clive found that the enemy were close at hand.

¹ Colonel Malleeson states the question which was put to the Council in the following terms:—'Whether the army should at once cross into the island of Kásimbazár, and at all risks attack the Nawáb; or whether, availing themselves of the large supplies of rice they had taken at Katwa, they should maintain themselves during the rainy season, and in the meantime invite the co-operation of the Mahrattas.'

He spent the remainder of the night making his dispositions, while his troops bivouacked in an extensive mango grove on ground already soaked by the rain, which was still falling. The mango grove was 800 yards in length and 300 in breadth, and was surrounded by a bank and a ditch. About 50 yards beyond it stood a hunting box belonging to the Nawáb of Oude. Of this Clive at once took possession. The grove was little more than a mile from the Nawáb's encampment. The force under Clive, as stated, did not exceed 3200 men, of whom 900 were English, 200 were Eurasians, and 2100 native Sepoys. There was a small artillery train, composed of eight six pounders and two small howitzers. The Nawáb's army, so far as numerical strength was concerned, was enormously superior to Clive's force. It consisted of 35,000 infantry, for the most part imperfectly trained and undisciplined, and 15,000 cavalry well mounted and well armed. He had 53 pieces of artillery, most of them of heavy calibre, and with them 40 or 50 Frenchmen commanded by M. St Frais, who had been a member of the French Council at Chandernagore. His army occupied a strongly intrenched position. His right rested on the river, while his left stretched out into the open plain.

The following is a brief description of the battle, taken from Clive's journal of military proceedings :—¹

'At daybreak we discovered the Nawáb's army at

¹ See Colonel Wilson's *History of the Madras Army*, vol. i., p. 83.

the distance of about three miles in full march towards us, upon which the whole were ordered under arms, being in two battalions. The Europeans were told off in four grand divisions, the artillery distributed between them, and the Sepoys on the right and left of the whole.

‘Our situation was very advantageous, being in a grove surrounded by high mud banks. Our right and front were entirely covered by those mud banks, our left by Placis’ house and the river, our rear by the grove and a large village. The enemy approached apace, covered a fine extensive plain in front of us as far as the eye could discern from right to left, and consisted, as we have since learned, of 15,000 horse and 35,000 foot, with more than 40 pieces of cannon, from thirty-two to nine pounders. They began to cannonade from this heavy artillery, which, though well pointed, could do little execution, our people being lodged under the banks. We could not hope to succeed in an attempt on their cannon, as they were planted almost round, and at a considerable distance both from us and each other. We therefore remained quiet in front, in hopes of a successful attack on their camp at night. At 300 yards from the bank under which we were posted was a pool of water with high banks all round it, and was apparently a post of strength. This the enemy presently took possession of, and would have galled us much from thence, but for our advantageous position, with some

cannon managed by 50 Frenchmen. This heavy artillery continued to play very briskly on the grove.

‘As their army, exclusive of a few advanced parties, were drawn up at too great a distance for our short sixes to reach them, one field piece with a howitzer was advanced 200 yards in front, and we could see that they played with great success amongst those that were of the first rank, by which the whole army was dispirited and thrown into confusion.

‘A large body of their horse starting out on our right, and as by that movement we supposed they intended an attempt on the advanced field piece and howitzer, they were both ordered back.

‘About eleven o’clock a very heavy shower of rain came on, and we imagined the horse would now, if ever, have attacked in hopes of breaking us, as they might have thought we could not then make use of our firelocks; but their ignorance or the brisk firing of our artillery prevented them from attempting it.

‘At noon, a report being made that a party of horse had attacked and taken our boats, the pickets were ordered, but the account proving false, they were countermanded.

‘The enemy’s fire now began to slacken, and soon after entirely ceased. In this situation we remained until two o’clock, when, perceiving that most of the enemy were returned to their camp, it was thought a proper opportunity to seize one of the eminences from which the enemy had much annoyed us in the

morning. Accordingly, the Grenadiers of the 1st Battalion, with two field pieces and a body of Sepoys, supported by four platoons and two field pieces from the 2d Battalion, were ordered to take possession of it, which accordingly they did.

‘This encouraged us to take possession of another advanced post within 300 yards of the entrance to the enemy’s camp.

‘All these motions brought the enemy out a second time, but in attempting to bring out their cannon they were so galled by our artillery that they could not effect it, notwithstanding they made several attempts. Their horse and foot, however, advanced much nearer than in the morning, and by their motions made as if they intended to charge; two or three large bodies being within 150 yards. In this situation they stood a considerable time a very brisk and severe cannonade, which killed them upwards of 400 men, among whom were four or five principal officers. This loss put the enemy into great confusion, and encouraged us to attack the entrance into their camp and an adjacent eminence at the same time. This we effected with little or no loss, although the former was defended by the 50 French and a very large body of black infantry, and the latter by a large body of horse and foot intermixt together. During the heat of the action the remainder of the forces were two or three times ordered to join us, and that order as often countermanded on account of the movement of a

large body of horse towards the grove, whom we had often fired upon to keep at a proper distance. Those afterwards proved to be our friends, commanded by Mír Jafar. The entrance to the camp being gained, a general rout ensued, and the whole army continued the pursuit for upwards of six miles, which, for want of horse, answered no other purpose than that of taking all their artillery, consisting of forty pieces of cannon, and all their baggage.'

Such is the account which Clive gave of the battle in a journal written by him very shortly after, if not on, the day after it was fought. It cannot be said that it furnishes a very clear or full narrative of the events of the day. It does not mention the death of Mír Mudin, the Nawáb's only faithful general, which appears to have occurred shortly after eleven o'clock, and was really the crisis of the battle. It contains no statement of the loss sustained, which, however, was very slight. Orme gives some particulars, but as regards the Europeans in a very imperfect form. He states: 'This important victory was gained with little loss, only sixteen Sepoys were killed and thirty-six wounded. And of the Europeans about twenty were killed and wounded, of which number six of the killed and ten of the wounded were of the artillery, as were likewise the two officers who were wounded during the different operations of the day.' The numbers of killed and wounded are given somewhat more in detail by Malleeson, although his totals agree with those

given by Orme. By Malleson's account, seven Europeans were killed and sixteen wounded. According to both these writers, the total number of killed and wounded in Clive's force was seventy-two. The loss on the Nawáb's side appears to have been between five and six hundred.

Considering the great disparity of numbers, the loss to Clive's force was ridiculously small. Indeed, as Sir Alfred Lyall justly observes in his interesting review of *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, the so-called battle of Plassey was a rout rather than a battle. As a military achievement it cannot be compared with the defence of Arcot, or with the fight at Kaveripák, or with some other actions in which Clive was engaged. At the same time its results were far-reaching and of the greatest political importance. Indeed, it is universally regarded by historians as the starting-point of British dominion in India.

Had Plassey been lost, the establishment of British rule in India would in all probability never have taken place; and although Plassey was followed in a very few years by other contests far more severe, such as Adams's fights at Gheriá and at Andhanala, and Sir Hector Munro's victory over the Moghul's and the Nawáb Vazír's troops at Buxar, the political importance of Plassey, which placed the ruler of the richest provinces in India in subjection to the English Company, can hardly be over-estimated. Nor, although the victory was so easily won, was it less

remarkable than Clive's other military achievements for the strategy which he displayed or for the unflinching nerve and coolness with which he encountered the enormous odds against him. Clive had not anticipated that the Nawáb would be able to array against him so large a force. When day broke on that June morning, and revealed to his astonished gaze the 50,000 horse and foot and the large artillery force, to which he had to oppose his 3200 infantry, his eight light field pieces and no cavalry, it must have needed an amount of nerve which is rarely possessed even by the bravest men to make his dispositions for the approaching battle. But on this, as on other occasions, Clive's nerve never failed. Indeed, the greater the danger, the more clear was his judgment and the more keen his courage.

The position which Clive took up in the mango grove, protected as it was by the trees and by the mud bank surrounding it, which rendered the heavy artillery of the enemy practically innocuous, and the skill with which his few field pieces were directed, were important elements in securing the victory. Indeed, the most remarkable feature in the battle is that while the artillery force of the enemy was enormously superior in the weight of metal and in the number of guns to that of Clive, the contest was mainly an artillery contest, and was practically decided by that arm. The death of the Nawáb's only faithful general, Mír Mudin, who was mortally

wounded by a cannon shot, was, as we have said, the crisis of the battle. It so disheartened the Nawáb that from that moment he gave himself up to despair, and became only too ready to listen to the insidious advice of the leaders who had betrayed him, that he should quit the field and leave it to them to continue the battle. Important as Plassey was, and well as it was fought by Clive and his small force, it is not a battle that can be held to redound to the credit of British arms. Looking to the enormous disparity of numbers, and making every allowance for the superior courage and training of the victorious force, it can hardly be supposed that the result could have been what it was, had it not been for the treachery of the Nawáb's principal generals.

On the evening after the battle, Clive's force halted at Daudpúr, six miles beyond Plassey. There on the next day he was joined by Mír Jafar, the latter not altogether at ease as to the reception he might meet with after his somewhat ambiguous attitude both before and during the engagement ; but Clive at once reassured him, and saluted him as the Nawáb of Bengal, Behar and Orissa, advising him to proceed at once to Murshidabad, to secure the person of Suráj ud Daulah and prevent the place being plundered.

Suráj ud Daulah had fled from the battlefield some time before the issue was finally decided, and had arrived the same night at Murshidabad. On the following night Mír Jafar reached that

place. The whole of that day Suráj ud Daulah had passed in a state of the greatest perplexity as to the course he should pursue, whether he should submit to the English or should make a stand in the city. Some of his principal officers advised the former, some the latter, course. He had decided to resist, and had ordered his troops to be massed for this purpose, when he heard of the arrival of Mír Jafar. Then he resolved upon flight, and accompanied by his favourite wife and a single eunuch, he left his palace in disguise, and entering a boat which had been engaged for the purpose, reached Rájmahal, ninety miles distant, on the evening of the fourth day. There the rowers were obliged to halt for a rest, and taking refuge in a deserted garden, the Nawáb was seen by a fakír whose ears he had caused to be cut off thirteen months before, and was handed over to Mír Jafar's brother, who resided at Rájmahal. He was at once captured, sent back to Murshidabad, and handed over to Mír Jafar on the 2d July. He pleaded earnestly for his life, offering to give up everything else, and Mír Jafar, probably remembering the kindness he had received from the grandfather of his prisoner, was at first disposed to spare him, but afterwards consulted with his higher officials, some of whom advocated a policy of clemency, while others, including Mír Jafar's son, Míran, a truculent youth, not unlike Suráj ud Daulah in disposition, urged that the only security against a fresh revolution lay in the death of

the prisoner. The latter accordingly was made over to Míran, by whose orders he was brutally murdered in the course of the night.

Meanwhile Clive with a portion of his force had on the 29th June entered Murshidabad, and had formally installed Mír Jafar as Nawáb. His entry into the city had been somewhat delayed owing to the alleged discovery of a plot to assassinate him, in which Míran was said to have been the principal agent. This statement, however, was afterwards discredited. On the following day Clive, accompanied by Mír Jafar, repaired to the house of Jaggat Seth for the purpose of obtaining the price of his victory. It has been already stated that the payments to be made to the Company, to the inhabitants of Calcutta, to the army and navy, to Clive and to the members of the Council in the event of Mír Jafar being placed upon the throne, amounted to little short of two millions and a half sterling, or two crores four hundred and ninety thousand rupees. The wealth of the deposed Nawáb had been greatly over-estimated. Mr Watts had stated that it amounted to four millions. When Clive went to the treasury, it was found that the sum actually there did not exceed one million and a half. The result was that Clive had to be satisfied with receiving at once one-half of the stipulated sum, of which two-thirds were to be paid in money and one-third in gold and silver plate, jewels and goods, while the other half was to be discharged in three annual

payments. Mr Jafar subsequently made Clive a personal present of £160,000. After these arrangements had been made, it became necessary to inform Omichand of the trick which had been practised upon him. This was done under Clive's instructions, and in his presence, by his secretary, Mr Scrafton, who said to Omichand, 'the red paper is a trick—you are to have nothing.' According to Orme, 'these words overpowered him like a blast of sulphur. He sank back fainting, and would have fallen to the ground had not one of his attendants caught him in his arms. They carried him to his palankin, in which they conveyed him to his house, where he remained many hours in stupid melancholy, and began to show symptoms of insanity. Some days afterwards he visited Colonel Clive, who advised him to make a pilgrimage to some pagoda, which he accordingly did soon after to a famous one near Málđa. He went, and returned insane, his mind every day more and more approaching to idiotism; and contrary to the usual manners of old age in Indostan, still more to the former excellence of his understanding, he delighted in being continually dressed in the richest garments and ornamented with the most costly jewels. In this state of imbecility he died about a year and a half after the shock of his disappointment.'

This account is adopted by Mill; but some doubt is thrown upon the alleged loss of reason by Wilson, who edited and commented upon Mill's *History*,

inasmuch as Clive, in a subsequent letter to the Court of Directors, describes Omichand as 'a person capable of rendering you great services, and therefore not wholly to be discarded.'¹

After the capture of Chandernagore, Law had joined the Nawáb at Murshidabad with the French contingent under his command; but before Plassey was fought, the Nawáb, intimidated by Clive's demand that he should dismiss all Frenchmen from his service, had sent Law away, bidding him not to go further than Bhágalpur, in case his services should be again required. This was a fatal step; for had Law and his contingent been at Plassey, supporting M. St Frais with his small body of French soldiers, who remained faithful to the end, it is quite possible that the result might have been different. Clive, after Plassey, sent Eyre Coote in pursuit of Law, but the latter by forced marches made his escape into Oudh, whither Coote's men refused to follow him.

¹ See also Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, vol. i., p. 301.

CHAPTER IX

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOIL—CLIVE'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE MILITARY OFFICERS—HIS LETTERS TO THE COMMITTEE AT CALCUTTA—DEATH OF WATSON—STATE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE—DIFFICULTIES OF MÍR JAFAR—SLIGHT PUT UPON CLIVE BY COURT OF DIRECTORS—HIS SUBSEQUENT APPOINTMENT AS GOVERNOR OF BENGAL—THE ROTATION PLAN—THREATENED INVASION OF BENGAL BY THE SHÁHZÁDA—CLIVE'S JAGÍR.

THE distribution of the spoil was the next matter which engaged Clive's attention. The first instalment was sent to Calcutta in boats, with flags flying and drums beating, and naturally caused great rejoicing in the settlement. The compensation to be given to the sufferers from the events of the preceding year was settled without much difficulty. Not so the distribution of the sums payable to the army and navy. Admiral Watson had preferred a claim to a special grant in addition to his share of the sum allotted to the navy, in consideration

of the part he had taken in the various operations which preceded Plassey. This claim was rejected, although strongly supported by Clive, who offered to give up a portion of his own share, and invited the other members of the Calcutta Committee to do the same, in order that Watson's claim might be met. A claim preferred by the navy, to the effect that the officers and sailors belonging to the squadron who had accompanied the land force to Plassey should be allowed to share in the prize money, was also rejected by a council of war convened by Clive, and on his overruling the votes of the council, a remonstrance was addressed to him by the mal-content military officers, which elicited the following reply :—

‘GENTLEMEN,—I have received both your remonstrance and protest. Had you consulted the dictates of your own reason, those of justice, or the respect due to your commanding officer, I am persuaded that such a paper, so highly injurious to your own honour as officers, would never have escaped you.

‘You say you were assembled as a council to give your opinion about a matter of property. Pray, gentlemen, how comes it that a promise of a sum of money from the Nawáb, entirely negotiated by me, can be deemed a matter of right and property? So very far from it, it is now in my power to return to the Nawáb the money already advanced, and leave

it to his option whether he will perform his promise or not. You have stormed no town and found the money there; neither did you find it in the plains of Plassey after the defeat of the Nawáb. In short, gentlemen, it pains me to remind you that what you are to receive is entirely owing to the care I took of your interests. Had I not interfered greatly in it, you had been left to the Company's generosity, who perhaps would have thought you sufficiently rewarded in receiving a present of six months' pay; in return for which I have been treated with the greatest disrespect and ingratitude, and, what is still worse, you have flown in the face of my authority for overruling an opinion which would have been highly injurious to your own reputation, being attended with injustice to the navy, and been of the worst consequences to the cause of the nation and the Company. I shall therefore send the money direct to Calcutta, give directions to the agents of both parties to have it shroffed; and when the Nawáb signifies his pleasure (on whom it solely depends) that the money be paid you, you shall then receive it, and not before.

'Your behaviour has been such that you cannot expect I should interest myself any further in your concerns. I therefore retract the promise I made the other day of negotiating either the rest of the Nawáb's promise, or the one-third which was to be received in the same manner as the rest of the

public money at three yearly equal payments—I am, gentlemen, your most obedient humble servant,

‘ROBERT CLIVE.

‘MURSHIDABAD, 5th July 1757.’

The malcontents having expressed regret at their conduct, Clive at once sent them the following reply :—

‘GENTLEMEN,—I have ever been desirous of the love and good opinion of my officers, and have often pursued their interests in preference to my own. What passed the other day is now forgotten, and I shall always be glad of an opportunity of convincing you how much I am, gentlemen, your most obedient humble servant,

‘ROBERT CLIVE.

‘MURSHIDABAD, 9th July 1757.’

Clive’s equanimity was also much disturbed by the conduct of the Select Committee at Calcutta. In a letter written three days after Plassey, he comments thus upon the attitude of that body :—

‘I have received a letter from Mr Drake in answer to my letter to the Committee which is very unusual on such important occasions; and I cannot help thinking that had the expedition miscarried, you would have laid the whole blame upon me.’

The next day, in answer to a letter written on the very day on which Plassey was fought, he writes :—

‘I have received your letter on the 23d instant, the contents of which are so indefinite and contradictory that I can put no other construction upon it than an intent to clear yourself at my expense had the expedition miscarried. It puts me in mind of the famous answer of the Delphic Oracle to Pyrrhus, “Aio te Æacide Romanos vincere posse.”’

Clive remained at Murshidabad until the return of Coote to Patna from his fruitless march after Law. He then proceeded to Calcutta, where he arrived just in time to attend the funeral of Watson, who died on the 16th August after a few days’ illness. From a letter which he wrote on this occasion, it appears that notwithstanding Watson’s obstructive proceedings during the earlier months of their acquaintance, Clive fully recognised his worth and sincerely lamented his death. He found many things which called for immediate attention. The state of the Civil Service was far from satisfactory. With two brilliant exceptions, Warren Hastings and Watts, there was then no civil servant of great mark in Bengal. More officers were needed for the army. The new Nawáb was by no means a capable person, and needed all the support that Clive could give him. If he had consulted his own personal predilections, Clive would have left India and retired upon the large fortune which he had acquired. But the situation in the Carnatic was extremely critical. The representatives of the English Company at

Madras were again threatened with an attack by the French. Lally, an ambitious and energetic, though ill-judging man, full of martial ardour, had been appointed Governor of Pondicherry, with orders to attack the English. Bussy was still in the Northern Sirkars, and Stringer Lawrence, who commanded the troops at Madras, had, under the weight of advancing years, lost some of the energy which had distinguished him a few years before. The Madras authorities were urgent in their demands that Clive should return with the troops which he had taken to Bengal. Clive, who was most loyal in his attachment to his former masters, and to the Presidency to which he belonged, had quite made up his mind to return with as little delay as possible to the Carnatic. But this decision he was compelled to abandon by the state of affairs in Bengal. Mír Jafar was by no means an able man, and whatever capacity at an earlier period he may have displayed as a soldier, he was no statesman. His position, it must be admitted, was one of extreme difficulty. The payments which he had been compelled to make to the English after Plassey had emptied his treasury, and the only means he had of replenishing it was to exact contributions from the wealthy natives around him. This led to rebellions on the part of some of his leading Hindu subjects. At the same time he was threatened with invasion by the Nawáb of Oudh, with whom Law

and his French contingent had taken refuge. Clive felt bound to help him in his difficulties, but at the same time to prevent him from oppressing his own subjects. In this he succeeded. He effected a reconciliation between Mir Jafar and his disaffected subjects, and he availed himself of the opportunity to secure the means of enforcing the claims of the Company under the treaty, which still remained unsatisfied, by obtaining an assignment of the revenue of certain districts near Calcutta in satisfaction of those claims. He also obtained for the Company a lucrative monopoly as renters of the Salt Tax. The threatened invasion from Oudh collapsed. About this time Clive was created by the Emperor of Delhi an Amir, or noble of the Empire, with the rank of Mansubdár or Commander of six thousand foot and four thousand horse, and the title of Zábit-ul-mulk, Nasir-ud-daulah, Sábat Jung Bahadur. Ever after this Clive was known by the natives of India as 'Sábat Jung,' or the 'Daring in War.'

In the course of the same year two despatches were received from the Court of Directors, one written before, and the other written after, the news of the recapture of Fort William had reached England. In the first, orders were given for the appointment of a Council consisting of five members, of which Clive was to be the President. In the second, which arrived a few months later, but which was written before the news of Plassey had been re-

ceived, a Council of ten was nominated, and it was laid down that the office of President should be held by the four senior members in rotation for three months. In this despatch Clive's name was entirely omitted; but the nominated members had the sense to see the absurdity of the proposed arrangement, and to feel that they could not carry on the government without him. They accordingly pressed him to undertake the presidency of the Council pending further orders from home. Clive, naturally much affronted by the slight which had been put upon him by the Court of Directors, hesitated at first to undertake the office; but the general feeling in favour of his being placed at the head of the Government was so strong that he yielded, and assumed the office of President. Before the report of these proceedings reached England, the Court of Directors, on hearing of Plassey, anticipated the views of the Bengal Council, and appointed Clive Governor of Bengal. The absurdity of the rotation plan is sufficiently manifest in these days; but in the time of Clive, when the English in India were only just beginning to emerge from the position of traders to that of territorial rulers, it was probably regarded from a very different point of view. The omission of Clive's name from the list of members of the new Council has been accounted for in different ways. One theory is that when the appointments were

made, it was supposed that before they could reach India Clive would have returned to Madras. Another, and perhaps the more probable one, was that his exclusion was due to jealousy at the East India House of his commanding powers, such as was felt some years later, when, before his last return to Bengal, considerable opposition was offered by some of the Directors to his reappointment to the Government. On this occasion, however, the opposition, from whatever cause it may have arisen, was completely silenced by the news of the victory of Plassey.

In the meantime other circumstances arose which delayed Clive's return to Madras. One was a threatened invasion of Behár, the North-western Province of Bengal, by the eldest son of the Emperor of Delhi, commonly known as the Sháhzáda, who, having quarrelled with his father and escaped from Delhi, had gathered round him a large but undisciplined force, and laid siege to Patna. He had hopes of aid from the Nawáb of Oudh, whose state bordered upon Behár, but these hopes were disappointed. Still, the situation was not otherwise than alarming, and the Nawáb in his difficulty implored Clive to aid in extricating him from this new danger. Clive, feeling bound to support the Prince whom he had placed upon the throne, responded to the appeal, and although it compelled him almost to denude Calcutta of troops,

he despatched a detachment to Patna, following himself in a few days with all his available force.

Rám Narayan, the Governor of Behár, who had been a loyal supporter of Suráj ud Daulah, after his death had submitted to Mír Jafar. Subsequently, owing to the oppression of the latter, he had rebelled against him, but under the influence of Clive had resumed his allegiance, which had somewhat wavered when the Sháhzáda appeared before Patna. After a visit to the Sháhzáda's camp, however, he had determined to adhere to the Nawáb, and had made a resolute defence of Patna. This was the position of affairs when the detachment sent by Clive appeared before that place. The news of its arrival, and the intelligence that Clive was coming, produced such an effect that the Sháhzáda's army at once retired and dispersed. The Sháhzáda appealing to Clive for aid, and afterwards for money, to enable him to effect his retreat, Clive sent him a present of eight thousand rupees; but stated that he was unable to help him in his operations against the Nawáb, having received repeated orders from the Emperor not only to oppose him, but to lay hold of his person. Clive concluded with these significant words: 'I have only to recommend your Highness to the Almighty's protection. I wish to God it were in my power to protect you, but it is not. I am now on my march to the Karamnassa, and earnestly

recommend it to you to withdraw before I arrive there.'

Clive's intervention on these occasions was for the moment greatly appreciated by Mír Jafar, who manifested his gratitude by conferring upon Clive as a Jagír the quit-rent, variously computed from £27,000 to £30,000 a year, which was payable by the East India Company on lands which had been ceded to them in the neighbourhood of Calcutta. This grant was made ostensibly for the support of the title which had been conferred upon Clive by the Emperor of Delhi. It was really given as a return for the great services which Clive had rendered to the Nawáb by suppressing the rebellion of his nobles and by protecting him from the invasion of the Sháhzáda. It was much criticised in after years, and not altogether without reason. It is perfectly true, as Macaulay remarks, making what seems to be a somewhat questionable distinction between this grant and the presents which Clive accepted from the Nawáb after Plassey, that it was a 'present which, from its very nature, could be no secret. In fact, the Company itself was his tenant, and by its acquiescence signified its approbation of Mír Jafar's grant.' Still, it was clearly open to the objection in principle that a general ought not to accept presents from a foreign ruler without the express permission of his own Government. Moreover, the fact that the grant made the Government

the tenants of their subordinate, however much its nature rendered it impossible of concealment, was surely on general grounds of public policy an objectionable feature in the transaction.

CHAPTER X

THE NORTHERN SIRKÁRS—COLONEL FORDE APPOINTED
TO COMMAND EXPEDITION AGAINST MASULIPATAM—THE ASSAULT SUCCESSFUL—WAR WITH THE
DUTCH — CLIVE'S CHARACTERISTIC LETTER —
CLIVE'S FAILURE TO SECURE THE APPOINTMENT
OF FORDE TO COMMAND THE BENGAL ARMY
—REMARKS ON DECORATIONS.

ALTHOUGH Clive felt that it would not be right for him to leave Bengal in the circumstances which then existed, he was by no means indifferent to the situation of his old Presidency. The course which he took was very similar to that which, on his advice, had been adopted seven years before to relieve the garrison of Trichinopoly, when a small force was sent to create a diversion by taking Arcot. In the present instance Clive resolved to create a diversion by despatching a force to the Northern Sirkárs, which were then in the hands of the French. Just at that time Bussy had been recalled by Lally from the Dekhan. One of the leading chiefs in the Northern Sirkárs, Ananduráz Gajapati, then the head of the family now represented by the Rájás of Vizianagram, had rebelled against the French, and had made over-

tures both to the authorities at Madras and to Clive to aid him in wresting the Northern Sirkárs from the French. The districts so named included the present districts of Ganjam Vizagaputam, Godávári, Krishna and Guntur. They possessed an area of about seventeen thousand geographical miles, and contained important manufactures and considerable agricultural wealth. According to Orme, they 'rendered the French masters of the greatest dominion both in extent and value that had ever been possessed in Hindustan by Europeans, not excepting the Portuguese at the height of their prosperity.' The result of Clive's policy, which at the time was much opposed by his colleagues in the Bengal Council, was not only to create a diversion which rendered material help to the English in resisting French aggression in the Carnatic, but eventually to place the whole of this important territory under English rule. The officer whom Clive selected for the duty was Colonel Francis Forde, an officer belonging to the 39th Foot, senior to Colonel Eyre Coote, who belonged to the same regiment. Clive had formed a very high opinion of Forde, and appears to have considered him an abler man than Coote. By some, Clive's preference for Forde was attributed to prejudice caused by the dispute with Watson when Fort William was recaptured, and when Coote, acting under Watson's orders, refused to deliver the fort up to Clive. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that Forde

was a very able officer, and performed the duty which was now entrusted to him with brilliant success. With a force of 500 Europeans, 2000 Sepoys, many of them Rájputs, whom Clive had begun to enlist, and twelve guns, Forde landed at Vizagapatam on the 14th October 1758, and after defeating the French under the Marquis de Conflans (who had succeeded Bussy in the Dekhan), in a battle fought at Kondúr, and taking Rajahmundry and all the baggage of the French army, proceeded to lay siege to Masulipatam. Masulipatam was at that time the strongest position on the eastern coast of India. Forde, in his very brief report upon its capture, described it as 'by far the strongest situation in India.'¹ The fort stood about a mile and a half from the sea shore, on the edge of an inlet of the sea upwards of five hundred yards in breadth, and surrounded on three sides by a morass of considerable extent, varying in depth from three to eighteen feet. The works were strong, and the garrison in numerical strength exceeded the besieging force. The battle of Kondúr had been fought, not without a considerable loss to Forde's force in killed and wounded, and it was essential that Masulipatam should be taken before the French were reinforced either from Pondicherry or by the troops of Salábatjung, the Subahdár of the Dekhan, who was still in alliance with the French.

¹ See Colonel Wilson's *History of the Madras Army*, vol. i., p. 129.

In prosecuting the siege, Forde was greatly hindered by want of money. Ananduráz Gajapati, who had promised to supply money as well as men, failed for several weeks to provide any of the former, and it was not until the 7th March, after a delay of fifty days, that Forde was in a position to invest the fort. It took him from that day to the 25th to erect his batteries. During all this time his men were without pay, and on the 19th the English troops mutinied and threatened to march away. It was only upon Forde assuring them that the money was on its way from Bengal that they were persuaded to return to their duties. Meanwhile, Salábat Jung had arrived at Bezwada, forty-four miles from Masulipatam, with a force of 40,000 men, and a French force under M. du Rocher was moving towards Rajamundry and threatening Vizagapatam. On the 5th April there fell heavy rain, which added greatly to the difficulty of the morass, and on the same day the senior artillery officer reported that the ammunition in store was only sufficient for two days' service of the batteries. Forde's force had been reduced, partly by sickness, partly by his losses at Kondúr, to about 400 Europeans and 1400 Sepoys. In these circumstances he decided that his only chance was to make an immediate assault. This was delivered on the night of the 7th April, and after a keen struggle which lasted some hours, Conflans, with his garrison, consisting of 500 Europeans, 2537 Sepoys and 120 guns, surrendered

at discretion. The loss to Forde's force was 84 killed and wounded, among whom two of the killed were British officers. The victory gained for the English the possession of the five districts before mentioned, the formal cession of which seven years later was made by the Nizám. It also involved the transfer of the paramount influence at the Court of Hyderabad from the French to the English. It effectually served Clive's purpose of detaining in the Dekhan a large body of French troops who would otherwise have been available for the siege of Madras. Colonel Malleeson, in his *Fifteen Decisive Battles of India*, treating the fight at Kondúr and the siege of Masulipatam as two parts of one operation, remarks that 'few battles have produced more brilliant results. If Kaveripák was the turning-point in the contest between the French and English for the possession of Southern India south of the Krishna, the capture of Masulipatam most assuredly secured for them the authority they now command and the influence they now exercise in the provinces lying between that river and the Vindhayan range.'

A few months later Forde was employed by Clive upon another important duty, in which he again justified the high opinion which Clive had formed of him. Mír Jafar, very soon after he was seated on the Masnad, had begun to resent the great influence of Clive, and to look about for some means of weakening that influence, and placing himself in a

position of greater independence. With this object, in November 1758 he had entered into secret negotiations with the Dutch, who had suffered in their trade from the ascendancy of the English in Bengal, and although Great Britain and Holland were at that time at peace, the representatives of the Dutch at Batavia had collected ships and troops for a movement into the Hughli. After Clive's march upon Patna, Mír Jafar seems to have felt some shame at the treachery of which he had been guilty, and in July 1759 he gave notice to Warren Hastings, then the Resident at Murshidabad, that the Dutch were in league with the Nawáb of Oudh, and were fitting out an expedition which was destined for Chinsurah, a Dutch settlement on the Hughli, near the town of that name. In October, seven Dutch ships, filled with Dutch and Malay troops, anchored at the mouth of the Hughli. It speedily became manifest that the object with which this expedition had been organised, was hostile to the English, and that Mír Jafar, having shaken off his short-lived gratitude to Clive, was in league with the Dutch. Clive was equal to the occasion. He strengthened the batteries which commanded the most important passages in the river near the town. He mounted heavy guns on the fort. He despatched special messengers to call in all available men from the outposts. Of four English vessels in the river, he despatched the smallest to summon Admiral Cornish, then cruising off the Arakan coast,

to come to his aid, and ordered the other three to assist in the defence of the town. He called out 300 militia, five-sixths of whom were Europeans; he formed half a troop of horse, and enlisted a small body of infantry volunteers. At this critical juncture Forde, accompanied by Captain Knox, who had taken a distinguished part in the siege of Masulipatam, returned to Calcutta. Clive at once placed Forde in command of the whole available force, assigning to Knox the charge of certain batteries below Fort William. In the second week of November, the Dutch sent a memorandum to Fort William stating their grievances and threatening reprisals, to which Clive replied that all that had taken place was done by direction of the Nawáb, and with the authority of the Emperor, and referred them to the Nawáb. The tenor of Clive's reply appears to have enraged the Dutch, who at once attacked and captured some small English ships lying near the mouth of the river, tore down the English colours, and transferred the guns and stores to their own ships. They then landed troops at Falta and Raipur, and burnt the houses and effects of the English agents.

Clive had been somewhat perplexed as to what course he should take in case the Dutch should advance up the river, the two nations being at peace in Europe; but these outrages solved his doubts. Forde, by his orders, occupied the Dutch factory at Baránágar, on the left bank of the river, and then crossing over

to Serampur, on the right bank, marched thence to Chandernagore, in order to intercept the Dutch troops in case they should attempt to reach Chinsurah by land. Captain Wilson, in command of the three East Indiamen, all of which carried guns, was directed to attack the Dutch ships if they persisted in passing up the river. Clive's orders were 'to demand restitution of our ships, subjects and property, or to sink, burn and destroy the Dutch ships on their refusal.' Wilson made the demand, and was refused. He then with his three ships, mounting 90 guns, attacked the seven Dutch ships, which mounted 212 guns, and after a sharp action captured six of them. The seventh escaped down the river, but was captured at the mouth of the Hughli by two English ships. Before this action was fought, the Dutch ships had landed their soldiers. Forde, meanwhile, had encountered and defeated the garrison of Chinsurah, which had come out to the ruins of Chandernagore. He then awaited the arrival of the Dutch troops, which had landed from their ships. These last he met on the plain of Biderra, a small village near Chinsurah, and beat them in half an hour, driving them up to the walls of Chinsurah and capturing all their guns. In connection with this last engagement, a characteristic story is told of Clive. Forde, on hearing that the Dutch were advancing, sent by express a note to Clive and asked for an order of Council authorising him to attack them. Clive was

playing at whist when the note arrived, and without rising from the table, wrote on the back of the note : 'Dear Forde,—Fight them immediately. I will send you the order of Council to-morrow.'

The result of these victories was that the Dutch sued for peace, and three days afterwards were obliged to apply to Clive for protection against a body of 6000 cavalry which the Nawáb's son, Míran, had brought down to Chinsurah with the intention of using against the English ; but which, on learning the turn affairs had taken, he was about to employ in exterminating the Dutch. Clive showed great prudence and moderation, and also true patriotism, in the whole of this affair. After having defeated the Dutch, he treated them with generous consideration, and his mediation with the Nawáb averted the attack which the young Prince was about to make upon them. He secured the interests of his own country by exacting from the Dutch an engagement never to maintain more than 125 European soldiers in Bengal, and to pay all the costs and damages caused by the expedition. During the whole of this time £180,000 of his private fortune was in the hands of the Dutch East India Company. An investigation into the affair was subsequently held in Europe by commissioners deputed by the two nations, who acquitted Clive of all blame, and both the British Government and the Directors of the East India Company in London expressed high approval of his action.

The time of Clive's return to England was now approaching. Before his departure he endeavoured to secure the appointment of Forde to command the army in Bengal, but this the Court of Directors for some unknown reason declined to sanction. Ten years later, Forde, on Clive's recommendation, was sent back to India as one of three supervisors who were appointed to inquire into every department of Indian administration. The frigate in which they sailed touched at the Cape on the 27th September 1769, and was never heard of again. It has been suggested that Clive's pertinacity in endeavouring to promote the interests of Forde was one of the chief causes of the estrangement which, after Clive's return to England, arose between him and Lawrence Sullivan, a leading member of the Court of Directors, with whom he was on friendly terms both before and for some little while after his return home. Coote had visited England before Clive's return, and Sullivan, it was said, was much impressed by him, and owing to his preference for Coote induced his brother Directors to ignore the claims of Forde. They were both very able soldiers, but there can be no doubt that, after Forde's brilliant conduct of the siege of Masulipatam and the results of that siege, it was not creditable to his countrymen that his services should have been left, as they were, entirely unrecognised. In these days of decorations, bestowed with a lavish hand, and too often given for services

of a very mediocre quality, an attentive student of Indian history is amazed to learn that Forde was allowed to go to his grave without having received a decoration or honours of any description.

CHAPTER XI

EVENTS IN MADRAS—CLIVE'S UNFAVOURABLE OPINION OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS—HIS LETTER TO THE ELDER PITT ADVOCATING TRANSFER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA TO THE CROWN—HIS LETTER TO THE COURT—HE RETURNS TO ENGLAND.

DURING all this time Clive had not failed to bestow very close attention upon the affairs of Madras. Lally, as we have said, had landed at Pondicherry in 1758, and had shortly afterwards sent a force against Fort St David, which after a very weak defence capitulated, the garrison surrendering as prisoners of war. Clive was highly indignant at this surrender, and in writing to his friend Stringer Lawrence, expressed in no measured terms his contempt for the poltroonery of the garrison. Lally afterwards laid siege to Madras, but receiving no support from the French Admiral, and having no money to pay his troops, was obliged to raise the siege in about two months. In the following year, 1760, just before Clive left India, Coote, who

had been sent to Madras, defeated the French at Wandiwash, and a year later Pondicherry surrendered.

Before embarking for England, Clive was again called upon to repel an invasion of Behár by the Sháhzáda. This was done under his orders by Major Calliaud, who had been sent up from Madras with reinforcements. After bidding farewell to the Nawáb at Murshidabad, Clive returned to Calcutta on the 14th January 1760, and on the 25th of the following month he embarked for England, leaving the Government in the hands of Mr Holwell, pending the arrival from Madras of Mr Vansittart, who had been appointed to succeed him.

Clive had for some time entertained a very unfavourable opinion of the administrative capacity of the Court of Directors, and in a letter to the elder Pitt, dated the 7th January 1759, he had suggested, though in somewhat guarded language, the expediency of transferring to the Crown the supreme control of the administration of Indian affairs, thus anticipating by nearly a century the measure which, after the Mutiny of 1857, was carried out by the Government of Lord Derby.

The following is the text of the letter :—

‘To the Rt. Honble. WILLIAM PITT, one of His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State.

‘SIR,—Suffer an admirer of yours at this distance to congratulate himself on the glory and advantage

which are likely to accrue to the nation by your being at its head, and at the same time to return his most grateful thanks for the distinguished manner you have been pleased to speak of his successes in these parts, far indeed beyond his deservings.

‘The close attention you bestow on the affairs of the British nation in general has induced me to trouble you with a few particulars relative to India, and to lay before you an exact account of the revenues of this country, the genuineness you may depend upon, as it has been faithfully extracted from the Minister’s books.

‘The great revolution that has been effected here by the success of the English arms, and the vast advantages gained to the Company by a treaty concluded in consequence thereof, have, I observe, in some measure engaged the public attention; but much more may yet in time be done if the Company will yet exert themselves in the manner the importance of their present possessions and future prospects deserves. I have represented to them in the strongest terms the expediency of sending out and keeping up constantly such a force as will enable them to embrace the first opportunity of further aggrandising themselves; and I dare pronounce, from a thorough knowledge of this country government, and of the genius of the people, acquired by two years’ application and

experience, that such an opportunity will soon offer. The reigning Subah whom the victory at Plassey invested with the sovereignty of these Provinces still, it is true, retains his attachment to us, and probably, while he has no other support, will continue to do so; but Mussulmans are so little influenced by gratitude that, should he ever think it his interest to break with us, the obligations he owes us would prove no restraint: and this is very evident from his having lately removed his Prime Minister and cut off two or three principal officers, all attached to our interest, and who had a share in his elevation. Moreover, he is advanced in years, and his son is so cruel and worthless a young fellow, and so apparently an enemy to the English, that it will be almost unsafe trusting him with the succession. So small a body as 2000 Europeans will secure us from any apprehensions from either the one or the other; and in case of their daring to be troublesome, enable the Company to take the sovereignty upon themselves.

‘There will be the less difficulty in bringing about such an event, as the natives themselves have no attachment whatever to particular princes; and as under the present Government they have no security for their lives or properties, they would rejoice in so happy an exchange as that of a mild for a despotic government; and there is little

room to doubt our easily obtaining the Mogul's sunnud (or grant) in confirmation thereof, provided we agreed to pay him the stipulated allotment out of the revenues, viz., fifty lakhs annually.

‘This has of late years been very ill-paid, owing to the distractions in the heart of the Moghul Empire, which have disabled that court from attending to their concerns in the distant provinces; and the Vazir has actually wrote to me, desiring I would engage the Nawáb to make the payments agreeable to the former usage; nay, further, application has been made to me from the Court of Delhi to take charge of collecting this payment, the person entrusted with which is styled the King's Diwán, and is the next person both in dignity and power to the Subah. But this high office I have been obliged to decline for the present, as I am unwilling to occasion any jealousy on the part of the Subah; especially as I see no likelihood of the Company's providing us with a sufficient force to support properly so considerable an employ, and which would open a way to secure the Subahship for ourselves. That this would be agreeable to the Moghul can hardly be questioned, as it would be so much to his interest to have these countries under the dominion of a nation famed for their good faith, rather than in the hands of people who, a long experience has convinced him, never will pay him his proportion of

the revenues unless awed into it by the fear of the Imperial army marching to force them thereto.

‘But so large a sovereignty may possibly be an object too extensive for a mercantile company; and it is to be feared they are not of themselves able, without the nation’s assistance, to maintain so wide a dominion. I have therefore presumed, sir, to represent this matter to you, and submit it to your consideration, whether the execution of a design that may hereafter be still carried to greater lengths, be worthy of the Government’s taking it into hand. I flatter myself I have made it pretty clear to you that there will be little or no difficulty in obtaining the absolute possession of these rich kingdoms; and that with the Moghul’s own consent, on condition of paying him less than a fifth of the revenues thereof. Now I leave you to judge whether an income yearly of upwards of two millions sterling, with the possession of three provinces abounding in the most valuable productions of nature and of art, be an object deserving the public attention; and whether it be worth the nation’s while to take the proper measures to secure such an acquisition; an acquisition which, under the management of so able and disinterested a Minister, would prove a source of immense wealth to the kingdom, and might in time be appropriated in part as a fund towards diminishing

the heavy load of debt under which we at present labour. Add to these advantages the influence we shall thereby acquire over the several European nations engaged in the commerce here, which these could no longer carry on but through our indulgence, and under such limitations as we should think fit to prescribe. It is well worthy consideration that this project may be brought about without draining the mother country, as has been too much the case with our possessions in America. A small force from home will be sufficient, as we always make sure of any number we please of black troops, who, being both much better paid and treated by us than by the country powers, will very readily enter into our service. Mr Walsh, who will have the honour of delivering to you this, having been my Secretary during the late fortunate expedition, is a thorough master of the subject, and will be able to explain to you the whole design, and the facility with which it may be executed, much more to your satisfaction and with greater perspicuity than can possibly be done in a letter. I shall therefore only further remark that I have communicated it to no other person but yourself; nor should I have troubled you, sir, but from a conviction that you will give a favourable reception to any proposal intended for the public good.

‘The greatest part of the troops belonging to

this establishment are now employed in an expedition against the French in the Dekhan; and by the accounts lately received from thence, I have great hopes we shall succeed in extirpating them from the Province of Golconda, where they have reigned lords paramount so long, and from whence they have drawn their principal resources during the troubles upon the coast.

‘Notwithstanding the extraordinary effort made by the French in sending M. Lally with a considerable force the last year, I am confident before the end of this they will be near their last gasp in the Carnatic, unless some very unforeseen event interfere in their favour. The superiority of our squadron, and the plenty of money and supplies of all kinds which our friends on the coast will be furnished with from this province, while the enemy are in total want of everything, without any visible means of redress, cannot fail of wholly effecting their ruin in that, as well as in every other part of India.

‘May the zeal and the vigorous measures projected for the service of the nation which have so eminently distinguished your Ministry be crowned with all the success they deserve, is the most fervent wish of him who is, with the greatest respect, sir, your most devoted humble servant,

ROB. CLIVE.

‘CALCUTTA, 7th January 1759.’

Clive's last act before resigning the government was to draft a letter to the Court of Directors, in which he roundly rated them for 'the unprovoked and general asperity' of a dispatch which had been received from them. This letter, which was signed by Clive and a majority of his colleagues, was couched in language seldom used by subordinate officials, however high in rank, when addressing their official superiors. It characterised the diction of the Court's dispatch as 'most unworthy of yourselves and us, in whatever relation considered, either as masters to servants or as gentlemen to gentlemen.' It alleged that 'groundless informations' proceeding from persons who had obviously their own interests to serve, had received from the Court 'countenance and encouragement' to the detriment of the public service.

The terms of this letter are so remarkable that it seems desirable to append in full the obnoxious paragraph:—

'Having fully spoken to every branch of your affairs at this Presidency, under their established heads, we cannot, consistent with the real anxiety we feel for the future welfare of that respectable body from whom you and we are in trust, close this address without expostulating with freedom on the unprovoked and general asperity of your letter per *Prince Henry* packet. Our sentiments on this head will,

we doubt not, acquire additional weight from the consideration of their being subscribed by a majority of your Council, who are at this very period quitting your service, and consequently independent and disinterested. Permit us to say that the diction of your letter is most unworthy yourselves and us, in whatever relation considered, either as masters to servants or gentlemen to gentlemen. Mere inadvertences, and casual neglects arising from an unavoidable and most complicated confusion in the state of your affairs, have been treated in such language and sentiments as nothing but the most glaring and premeditated faults could warrant. Groundless informations have without further scrutiny borne with you the stamp of truth, though proceeding from those who had therein obviously their own purpose to serve, no matter at whose expense. These have received from you such countenance and encouragement as must most assuredly tend to cool the warmest zeal of your servants here and everywhere else; as they will appear to have been only the source of general reflections, thrown out at random against your faithful servants of this Presidency, in various parts of your letter now before us—faithful to little purpose if the breath of scandal, joined to private pique or private or personal attachments, have power to blow away in one hour the merits of many years' services, and deprive them of that rank and those rising benefits which are justly a spur to their integ-

riety and application. The little attention shown to these considerations in the indiscriminate favours heaped on some individuals, and undeserved censures on others, will, we apprehend, lessen that spirit of zeal so very essential to the well-being of your affairs, and consequently in the end, if continued, prove the destruction of them. Private views may, it is much to be feared, take the lead here from examples at home; and no gentleman hold your service longer, nor exert themselves further in it, than their own exigencies require. This being the real present state of your service, it becomes strictly our duty to represent it in the strongest light, or we should with little truth and less propriety subscribe ourselves, may it please your honours, your most faithful servants,

‘ROBERT CLIVE.

‘J. Z. HOLWELL.

‘WM. B. SUMNER.

‘W. M‘GUIRE.’

The language of the letter was not unnaturally resented by the Court, who promptly dismissed from their service all the members of the Council still in India who had signed it, including Mr Holwell, who had temporarily succeeded to the office of Governor.

CHAPTER XII

CLIVE'S ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND—HIS CORDIAL RECEPTION — HOSTILITY OF SULLIVAN — CLIVE ATTACHES HIMSELF TO GEORGE GRENVILLE—THREAT TO DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS JAGÍR—THE DEPOSITION OF MÍR JAFAR—SUCCESSION OF KÁSIM ALI KHÁN—RAPACITY OF THE COUNCIL—WAR WITH KÁSIM ALI—MÍR JAFAR REPLACED ON THE THRONE—INVASION OF BENGAL BY NAWÁB OF OUDH — BATTLE OF BUXÁR — DISORGANISED STATE OF BENGAL — MACAULAY'S DESCRIPTION OF IT—REMARKS OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS—SIR JOHN MALCOLM'S OPINION —CLIVE URGED TO RESUME GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL.

CLIVE reached England in the autumn of 1760. The exact date of his arrival does not appear to be known; but it seems to have been very shortly after the accession of George III. The reception which he met with was even more enthusiastic than that which had greeted him on his return from India a few years before. The victor of Plassey

was even more welcome than the hero of Arcot. He was received with distinction by the young King and his Ministers, and also by the Court of Directors of the East India Company, notwithstanding the letter which had given so much offence. The Directors during his absence had placed a statue of him in the East India House, and had struck a medal in his honour. The estimation in which he was held by the authorities was fully shared by the country. His successes as a soldier had been unchequered by defeat. He was the first of the soldier-statesmen of whom India has produced so many. He had proved that he was as wise in council as he was brave and able in the field. His moderation in the hour of victory, as shown by his treatment of the Dutch, had made a great impression upon thoughtful men, not led away by the glamour of military achievements. The only real blots upon his fame, arising from his conduct towards Omichand and from his acceptance of an enormous fortune from the Nawáb whom he had placed upon the throne of Bengal, had not, it would seem, attracted the attention which they did a few years later, when they furnished the ground for attacks which embittered his latter years, and drove him in the end to a self-inflicted death. Not only had his success, both as a soldier and an administrator, been conspicuous, but it had been achieved at a time when, with the exception of Wolfe, England

had possessed no general since Marlborough whose capacity could be compared with that of Clive. If the Englishmen of that time could have known what was about to happen a few years later, they would have seen that while by the genius of Clive we were acquiring a great Empire in the East, we were, owing to the incompetency and obstinacy of the King's Ministers, losing our great Colonial Empire in the West.

Notwithstanding the very gratifying reception which was given to Clive on his arrival, he was in some respects doomed to disappointment. He had fully expected that an English peerage would be conferred upon him; but two years elapsed before he was raised to the peerage, and then it was only an Irish peerage that was given to him; and it was not until 1764 that he was admitted to the Order of the Bath. These delays must be in part attributed to his having been attacked shortly after his return by a dangerous illness, which for more than a year entirely incapacitated him from business; but they were also partly owing to personal jealousy of his fame on the part of some of those connected with Indian affairs. Reference has been made to the very strong letter of remonstrance against the style of correspondence adopted by the Court of Directors which he caused to be sent to the East India House shortly before he left India. Although the resentment aroused by this

letter was not allowed to interfere with the reception accorded to Clive by his late masters at a time when the popular voice was so strongly in his favour, it was not without its effect when the first impressions created by his extraordinary achievements had in some measure subsided; and among the Directors there were some who never forgave the language of that letter. Foremost among these was Lawrence Sullivan, one of the ablest members of the Court, and probably the most ambitious. While Clive was still in India, Sullivan was among his warmest admirers. He was one of the few members of the Direction who had any personal knowledge of India, and Clive had formed and expressed a high opinion of his capacity. Indeed, he had rendered some help to Sullivan in his candidature for the chairmanship of the Court at a recent election. But when Clive returned to England, and the praise of his extraordinary successes was on everybody's lips, and when it was seen that the great Minister of the time extolled his merits and pronounced him to be the one man who had saved 'our glory, honour and reputation,' then Sullivan's admiration speedily underwent a change, and was succeeded by a lasting jealousy of Clive's influence. Moreover, Clive's letter to Pitt, which has been already quoted, had not been kept secret, and not unnaturally the suggestion made in it, that the day might not be

far distant when the supreme control over Indian affairs would have to be transferred to the Crown, was by no means acceptable in Leadenhall Street. This suggestion, as we have said, was not fully carried out for nearly a century ; but there can be no doubt that it considerably influenced the legislation regarding India at a much earlier date. The India Bills, both of Charles Fox and of William Pitt, and the establishment under the latter of the Board of Control, may both be said to have owed their origin to Clive's letter to the elder Pitt.

Clive's endeavours to obtain a suitable recognition of the services rendered by Forde, and the urgency with which he pressed reforms in the administrative system, both civil and military, also seem to have intensified Sullivan's hostility. Clive was much impressed with the necessity of improving and strengthening the Civil Service. He wanted young men of ability sent out, and in larger numbers. He urged the importance of maintaining a strong military force. He advocated the grant of Royal commissions, as Major-Generals, to the Governors of the three Presidencies, as a check upon the pretensions of the King's military officers. His opinions on most public questions were much in advance of his time, and were consequently not acceptable to persons holding more limited views. The political situation in England at the time was also a cause of Sullivan's

hostility. Very shortly after his return to England, Clive was elected member for Shrewsbury, and on entering the House of Commons at once ranged himself among the followers of Pitt, for whose genius and character he had the warmest admiration. Pitt, however, resigned office in October 1761, and after a short interval was succeeded by Bute, of whom Sullivan was a follower, but whom Clive absolutely declined to join. He speedily attached himself to George Grenville, with whose political views he in the main concurred, and with whom he remained on terms of intimacy until the death of the latter. In entering Parliament, Clive does not seem to have been actuated by any desire to take an active part in English politics, except in so far as his position as a member might strengthen his influence over Indian administration. To promote the welfare of India and the efficiency of its Government appears to have been the main object of his ambition. With this object he expended a large sum of money (£100,000 is the sum stated) in acquiring votes at the East India House, for friends upon whom he could rely to support his projects of reform. Every £500 of East India stock gave a vote at the Court of Proprietors, and £2000 was the qualification for a Director. In order to check his opposition, Sullivan at an early date caused it to be intimated to him that the question of his title to the Jagir which Mīr Jafar

had conferred upon him was under consideration at the India House. The intimation was for the moment not without its effect; for Clive felt that the loss of the Jagir, the annual income from which has been variously stated at from £27,000 to £30,000, would materially weaken his influence; but very shortly afterwards the breach widened, and Sullivan, who, notwithstanding strong opposition offered by Clive and his friends, had been elected Chairman of the Court, persuaded the majority of his colleagues to send orders to Calcutta prohibiting any further payments to Clive on account of the Jagir. To this Clive at once replied by filing a bill in Chancery against the Directors, and by giving notice to the Government of Bengal that if they discontinued the annual payment to him, he should institute legal proceedings at Calcutta to enforce his claim.

It is impossible to say what turn events might have taken if the state of affairs in Bengal had continued in the position in which Clive had left them. In all probability Clive would in that case have been beaten in his contest with the India House, and would have retired into private life. But the position in Bengal rapidly assumed a phase which necessitated the strongest measures to put a stop to the abuses which had sprung up almost immediately after Clive left India. Vansittart, whom Clive had known at Madras, and who had been upon his re-

commendation appointed to succeed him as Governor of Bengal, was fairly honest and well meaning, but by no means a strong man. Why Clive should have selected him as his successor it is difficult to understand. At that time there were two men in Bengal both of whom had stronger claims and far greater abilities than Vansittart. One was Watts, who, during the critical months which preceded Plassey, had in the most difficult situation shown great nerve and capacity, and had rendered most valuable services to Clive. The other was Warren Hastings, destined in a few years to occupy the position which Clive had held, and to become the first Governor-General of India. Hastings was the younger man of the two. When Clive left India in 1760, Hastings was only twenty-seven; but his youth can hardly have been the reason for rejecting him in favour of Vansittart. His age at that time was within a few months of that at which Clive had first left India after having established his fame as a soldier. The fact seems to have been that Clive, with a lack of discernment which he seldom evinced, had formed an impression that Hastings was somewhat deficient in those qualities which afterwards proved to be his chief characteristics, viz., firmness and tenacity of purpose.

Clive, when he left India in 1760, was by no means free from misgivings as to the immediate future. In a letter to his successor, written not

long before he embarked, he observed that certain military reinforcements which were then expected would, in his opinion, 'put Bengal out of all danger but that of venality and corruption.' The latter danger was not long in showing itself. Clive's temporary successor was Holwell, who, ever mindful of the sufferings he had undergone during that terrible night in the Black Hole, had long entertained an extreme dislike to Mír Jafar, and had determined to take the first opportunity of displacing him. The arrangements which he had made with this object were not completed when Vansittart took charge. But Vansittart quite fell in with Holwell's views, and about the time of Clive's arrival in England, Mír Jafar was removed from the Nawábship, and his post was conferred upon his son-in-law, Kásim Ali Khán. This revolution, like the revolution of 1757, was not effected without the exaction of a large sum from the Bengal treasury. The members of the Select Committee were on this occasion paid £200,000, of which £28,000 were received by Vansittart. Nor was this exaction by any means the only one to which the new Nawáb was subjected during his brief occupancy of the Masnad. He agreed, on condition of a money payment, to cede to the English the three districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong, besides certain advantages in the district of Sylhet, and to redeem by a cash payment the jewels of Mír Jafar, which had been

received in part payment of the sum payable by the latter after Plassey.

The tenure by Kásim Ali of the Nawábship did not last long. Matters were brought to a crisis by the rapacity of the Council, and indeed of the Civil Service generally, in connection with the inland transit duties. It had been arranged that country goods, protected by an English pass, should be free from taxation. Such a rule was, of course, absolutely unjust to the native traders; but it was the abuse of the rule which brought matters to a head. The English passes were openly sold, and were often forged. The system was ruinous to the honest native trader and to the revenues of the Nawáb. The latter remonstrated; but though supported by Vansittart and by Warren Hastings, he found the greatest difficulty in getting his remonstrance attended to. At last the Council empowered Vansittart to compromise the matter. The arrangement which was made was extremely advantageous to the English. While servants of the Company were to be allowed to carry on the inland private trade on payment of a fixed duty of nine per cent. on all goods, the native traders were to pay a duty of twenty-five per cent., and no passes were to be valid unless they were signed by an agent of the Company. Favourable as this compromise was to the English, and flagrantly unjust as it was to the native traders, and notwithstanding the fact that the Council had

given full powers to Vansittart, a majority of the Council refused to ratify the engagement, and insisted that, except in the matter of the salt trade, on which they agreed to a duty of two and a half per cent., English private trade should be subjected to no duty whatever.

The new Nawáb was a very different man from his predecessor. He was clear-sighted and firm. On learning that the engagements which had been entered into by Vansittart, and had been executed in the most formal manner, were rejected by the Council, he at once issued orders abolishing all duties, and establishing free trade throughout Bengal. Thenceforth a declaration of war between the English and Kásim Ali was merely a question of time. The immediate cause of it was an attack which Mr Ellis, a violent, arbitrary man, who was a member of the Bengal Council, and head of the factory at Patna, made upon that city. It was seized, but immediately afterwards re-captured by the Nawáb's troops.

Ellis endeavoured to escape, but was taken prisoner, while Mr Amyatt, another member of the Council, who had been deputed by his colleagues to confer with the Nawáb, was killed when attempting to escape. Kásim Ali, in anticipation of differences with the English, had taken steps very soon after his accession to strengthen his position. He had moved the seat of government from Murshidabad to Mungf,

a place 320 miles from Calcutta, where he employed himself in re-forming and increasing his military forces. He had created a force of 15,000 cavalry and 25,000 infantry, disciplined and organised on the model of the Company's troops. He had established the manufacture of muskets of an improved pattern, and had formed a foundry for casting cannon, and trained up a corps of artillerymen. He was a good man of business, and had placed the finances of Bengal upon a sound footing. Shortly after his accession he investigated the public accounts, compelled corrupt subordinates to disgorge their ill-gotten gains, and by enforcing the payment of all arrears of rent, and revising the land assessment, he increased the revenue and was thus enabled to discharge his obligations to the English.

On hearing of Kásim Ali's recapture of Patna, the Council declared war against him, entrusting the command of the Company's troops to Major Adams, another officer from the 39th Foot, trained in the school of Clive. Three battles were fought, one at Katwa, close to Plassey, and the others at Gheriah and Andhwa Nala. The fights at Gheriah and Andhwa Nala were very severe, and proved that Kásim Ali's training of the Sepoys had enabled him to provide a formidable force. At Gheriah the issue was for some time very doubtful, and had it not been for the gallantry and strategical skill of Adams, the victory would have probably been won by Kásim

Ali's troops. Andhwa Nala was also a hotly contested fight. The position of the enemy was extremely strong by nature, and had been considerably strengthened under Kásim Ali's orders. In this case the victory was partly due to the treachery of an English deserter, who, after having deserted from the British and taken service under Kásim Ali, deserted back, and gave information to Adams of a ford through a morass, which enabled the latter to capture the key of the enemy's position, and thereby to win the battle. In these battles the superiority in the numerical strength of the forces engaged was, as at Plassey, and in almost all battles in India, largely on the side of the native troops. The defeat at Andhwa Nala compelled Kásim Ali to flee into Oudh, but before his departure he gave orders for a massacre of the European prisoners who had been taken at and near Patna, including Ellis—a massacre which, according to Macaulay, surpassed in atrocity that of the Black Hole. Previous to this Kásim Ali had caused Rám Narayan, the able Governor of Patna, whom Vansittart had weakly placed in his power, and the Seths, who had been so helpful to Clive before and after Plassey, to be murdered.

After Katwa, Mír Jafar was for the second time placed upon the throne, and for the second time was compelled to pay large sums to the Company and to the Company's servants, to confirm the cession of the three districts which had been ceded by Kásim Ali,

and to reimpose the transit duties upon native traders, while exempting the servants of the Company. One of the most atrocious of the exactions to which he was subjected, was the payment of a large sum as compensation to the English for the losses which they had sustained in the war with Kásim Ali—a war entirely brought on by the criminal and tyrannical acts of the Council.

Some six months later, Bengal was again invaded by the Nawáb of Oudh, acting in concert with Kásim Ali and with the Emperor Shah Álam, who, as Sháhzáda, had threatened Patna, but had withdrawn on the advance of Clive. This incursion, after a long campaign, was repelled by the Company's troops under the command of Major, afterwards Sir Hector, Munro, who at Buxár won a decisive victory over the combined forces arrayed against him. Here again the battle was won by the bravery of the small English contingent, numbering only 1200 men, supported by 8000 native Sepoys, and led by an able and determined commander, against an army of 50,000 men, most of them well disciplined, and supported by a numerous artillery. After the battle, the Emperor abandoned his allies and joined the English camp. The Nawáb of Oudh submitted, and Kásim Ali fled to Rohilkhand. The battle of Buxár may be regarded as in its results hardly, if at all, less important than Plassey. It is further remarkable as a victory won against heavy odds by troops of whom the native portion were in a

state of mutiny very shortly before it was fought, and had to be coerced by the execution of twenty-four of the ringleaders, who were blown from guns. Buxár is justly included by Colonel Malleeson among the decisive battles of India.¹

During the whole of this time the affairs of the Company were going from bad to worse. While the Calcutta Council and their subordinates were enriching themselves at the expense of the so-called rulers of Bengal and of their native subjects, the interests of the Company were being grossly neglected. Every ship which arrived from Calcutta brought intelligence of the abuses which were being perpetrated, while the Company's investments were steadily falling off. Macaulay describes the misgovernment of the English during the five years which followed the departure of Clive from Bengal as having been carried to a point 'such as seems hardly compatible with the very existence of society.' Revolution succeeded revolution, and 'at every one of these revolutions the new prince divided among his foreign masters whatever could be scraped together from the treasury of his fallen predecessors. The immense population of his dominions was given up as a prey to those who had made him a sovereign, and who could unmake him. The servants of the Company obtained, not for their employers, but for themselves, a monopoly of

¹ *The Decisive Battles of India, from 1746 to 1849 inclusive.* By Colonel G. B. Malleeson, C.S.I.

almost the whole internal trade. They forced the natives to buy dear and sell cheap. They insulted with impunity the tribunals, the police, and the fiscal authorities of the country. They covered with their protection a set of native dependents, who ranged through the provinces, spreading desolation and terror wherever they appeared. Every servant of a British factor was armed with all the power of his master, and his master was armed with all the power of the Company. Enormous fortunes were thus accumulated at Calcutta, while thirty millions of human beings were reduced to the extremity of wretchedness.¹ Terrible as this picture is, there is no reason to believe that it is in any way exaggerated.

The opinions recorded by the Court of Directors, after they had become acquainted with the actual facts, were in substance not less emphatic. In reply to a despatch written by Clive after his return to Bengal, they expressed their condemnation of what had been going on in these words :—

‘When we look back to the system that Lord Clive and the gentlemen of the Select Committee found to be established, it presents to us a Subah (Nawáb) disarmed, with a revenue of almost two millions sterling, for so much seems to have been left, exclusive of our demands upon him, at the mercy of our servants, who had adopted an unheard of ruinous

¹ Macaulay's *Critical and Historical Essays* in one volume, 1851, p. 521.

principle of an interest distinct from the Company. This principle showed itself in laying hands upon everything they did not deem the Company's property.

'In the province of Burdwán, the Resident and his Council took an annual stipend of near 80,000 rupees per annum from the Rájá, in addition to the Company's salary. This stands on the Burdwán accounts, and we fear was not the whole; for we apprehend it went further, and that they carried this pernicious principle even to the sharing with the Rájá of all he collected beyond the stipulated *malguzári*, or land revenue, overlooking the point of duty to the Company to whom properly everything belonged that was not necessary for the Rájá's support. It has been the principle, too, on which our servants have falsely endeavoured to gloss over the crime of their proceedings on the accession of the present Subah; and we fear would have been soon extended to the grasping of the greatest share of that part of the Nawáb's revenue which was not allotted to the Company. In short, this principle was directly undermining the whole fabric; for whilst the Company were sinking under the burden of the war, our servants were enriching themselves from those very funds that ought to have supported the war.'¹

Sir John Malcolm, after a long service in India, and

¹ Gleig's *Life of Clive*, p. 191.

possessing an intimate acquaintance with its people and with its history, states that 'there is no page in our Indian history which is so revolting as the four years of weak and inefficient rule of Mr Vansittart.' A more modern writer, the late Lord Justice James, in his admirable sketch of British Rule in India, writes of 'the rampant misrule and uncontrolled license' which prevailed at this time in Bengal. The same writer characterises these years as 'the darkest in the history of British rule in India.'¹ To the same effect is the testimony of the native historian of the time. The Mahommadan author of the *Siyar-ul-Mutakharin*, while praising the bravery and the great military qualities of the English, goes on to say: 'If to so many military qualifications' this nation 'knew how to join the arts of government, if they exerted as much ingenuity and solicitude in relieving the people of God as they do in whatever concerns their military affairs, no nation in the world would be preferable to them or worthier of command. O God, come to the assistance of Thine afflicted servants and deliver them from the oppressions which they suffer.'

When this state of things became known in England, the fears of the proprietors of India stock were seriously aroused. Very speedily there arose a demand for the reappointment of Clive as the only

¹ *The British in India*, by the late Right Hon. Sir William Melbourne James, Lord Justice of Appeal, pp. 36 and 40.

man, either in England or in India, who was fit to cope with the evil. The alarm thus created originated, it is to be feared, not so much in shame at the disgrace which was being inflicted upon the British name by the malpractices of the Company's servants, as in fears for the destruction of the Company's dividends. Sullivan and his friends in the Direction were of course opposed to the reappointment of Clive, and did what they could to prevent it; but they were at once overruled by the Court of Proprietors, who, by an enormous majority, decided that Clive should be invited to return to India, not only as Governor of Bengal, but with authority over all the Company's possessions in the East. It was also proposed that Clive's Jagir should be at once restored, and that Clive's right to it on a permanent tenure should be affirmed. On this point Clive made an alternative proposition which was readily accepted, viz., that his tenure of the Jagir should be confirmed to him for ten years, if he lived so long. But this concession did not, in his opinion, suffice unless another step were taken which would enable him to discharge in a satisfactory manner the important duties which it was proposed to entrust to him. This was no less than the removal of his enemy Sullivan from the chairmanship of the Company. Clive carried his point, but not without a struggle; for Sullivan had several supporters among the Directors, and Bute, though not at that time in office, was able to exert

considerable influence in his favour. The Proprietors, however, as a body, were determined that no obstacle should be allowed to stand in the way of Clive's acceptance of the government. It was in vain that Sullivan and his friends argued that the appointment of Clive would be unfair to more than one public servant in India, that it would be unjust to supersede Vansittart, whom they supposed to be still at the head of the government, and that Spencer, a Bombay civil servant who had been nominated to succeed Vansittart, ought not to be passed over. The Court of Proprietors refused, and indignantly refused, to listen to any of these arguments.

The election of Directors took place in the spring, and Clive's opponents, finding that they could not prevail against the general desire that he should resume his post in India, endeavoured to hurry his departure in order that he might be out of the way when the impending election to the Direction took place. But Clive was determined, and was not to be shaken in his decision, to remain in England until the election was over, and when he was informed that a ship was available for him, he declined to sail, repeating the conditions on which he had accepted the appointment. An attempt was then made to procure the annulment of his appointment; but this failed. The election was held on the 25th April, and the result was less favourable to Clive than had been expected; for out of the twenty-four Directors twelve

were supporters of Clive and twelve of Sullivan ; but both the chairman and deputy-chairman were friends of Clive. In regard to the higher appointments in India, Clive's views were adopted with the single exception that Forde, whose claims to high military employment were unquestionable, would seem to have been again ignored. Whether Clive again pressed Forde's claims on this occasion does not clearly appear, but we know that it was at the instance of Clive that Forde in 1769 was sent out as one of the supervisors appointed to report upon and control Indian administration.

After all that had taken place, it is not surprising that the Bengal Council, as then composed, commanded little or no confidence. In these circumstances Clive urged that he should be invested with power to overrule the Council on his own responsibility whenever he deemed it necessary to do so. This power, which since 1793 has been vested in successive Governors-General, the Court of Directors at that time did not think fit to give ; but in order to meet Clive's views they resorted to the somewhat clumsy expedient of appointing a Select Committee, including and nominated by Clive, which was empowered to act without consulting the Council.

CHAPTER XIII

CLIVE RETURNS TO INDIA FOR THE LAST TIME—
DEATH OF MÍR JAFAR—SUCCESSION OF NÁZIM
UD DAULAH—APPOINTMENT OF SELECT COM-
MITTEE—SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN MEMBERS OF
THE COUNCIL — INCOMPETENCY OF THE NEW
NAWÁB — TRANSFER OF THE DIWÁNI TO THE
COMPANY.

CLIVE sailed from Portsmouth on the 4th June 1764, and after a tedious and prolonged voyage, reached Calcutta on the 3d May in the following year. Before sailing he placed before the chairman of the Company his views on the situation in India. He condemned the course taken by the Government of Bengal in permitting Kásim Ali to establish himself at so great a distance from Calcutta that the Government could not exercise an effective control over his proceedings, and in practically encouraging him to assume an independent position. 'The princes of the country,' he said, 'must in a great measure be dependent on us, or we totally so on them.' In his opinion it was 'impossible to rely upon the moderation or justice of Mussulmans.' He had long been

convinced that the whole of the British possessions in India ought to be under one head, and he now expressed his opinion 'that if ever the appointment of such an officer as Governor-General should become necessary, he ought to be established in Bengal, as the greatest weight of your civil, commercial, political and military affairs will always be in that province.'

Clive arrived at Madras on the 10th April 1765, and then heard of the death of Mír Jafar, which had taken place on the 25th February. Mír Jafar had left a natural son, Názim ud Daulah, a lad of eighteen, and a grandson, a son of Míran, a child of six. Clive at once decided to recognise the grandson as Nawáb, and to rule in his name during his minority, but on reaching Calcutta he found that Názim ud Daulah had already been placed on the throne. In the circumstances, this appointment, made as it was with the full knowledge that Clive was expected to arrive immediately, was obviously indecent. The motive for it is supplied by Mill, who tersely remarks: 'Názim ud Daulah could give presents; the infant son of Míran, whose revenues must be accounted for to the Company, could not.'

Clive's unfavourable opinion of the Council was speedily justified. Those gentlemen had lost no time in following the precedents of 1757, of 1761 and of 1764, by making it a condition of the succession of the new Nawáb that he should make large presents to themselves. The sums thus exacted on this occa-

sion amounted to £139,357, and were received in defiance of a despatch from the Court of Directors, which reached Calcutta a fortnight before Mir Jafar's death, forbidding their servants to accept presents from natives, and requiring them to execute covenants framed to secure obedience to this order. The order, however, had been ignored, and the covenants had remained unexecuted. Shortly before this time Vansittart had retired, and had been succeeded by Spencer. Of this gentleman Clive had previously formed a good opinion, but on looking into matters he came to the conclusion that Spencer was as corrupt as his colleagues, and also that he was extremely deficient in independence of character. He had lowered the status of the office of Governor to such an extent that, in Clive's words, 'the office had been hunted down, stripped of its dignity and then divided into sixteen shares'—sixteen being the number of members of Council. Clive lost no time, on assuming the government, in notifying to the Council the powers which had been assigned to the Select Committee. Two of the members of Council seeming disposed to question those powers, Clive at once cut them short, intimating that he would not permit any discussion on the subject, but that if the members of Council thought fit, they might record their dissents. Within a week after his arrival, he insisted upon the immediate execution of the covenants ordered by the Court, failing which the recusants were to be sus-

pended from the service. His firmness prevailed, and the covenants were signed forthwith.

It cannot be denied that Clive's position was one of great difficulty. It was not to be supposed that the recipient of the enormous wealth which he had accepted from the Nawáb of his own creation after Plassey would be allowed to enforce the new policy without being subjected to a strong remonstrance from those who might say, as they did say, that they had only followed the example set by him. Clive's answer was that the two cases were very different. When Plassey was fought, there were no orders prohibiting the acceptance of presents by public servants, and, moreover, the revolution which then took place was decidedly beneficial, not only to the interests of the Company, but to the interests of the people of Bengal, or would have been so if it had not been for the venality and corruption of the Government which had succeeded his own. The answer was effective as a reply to the persons to whom it was addressed, but it clearly furnished no justification of the acceptance by a man in Clive's position of large sums of money from a foreign prince. The real defence, and this by no means complete, was that suggested by Macaulay, that the Company, by paying very small salaries to its servants, 'had, by implication at least, authorised its agents to enrich themselves by means of the liberality of the native princes, and by other means still more objectionable.'

This defence clearly fell to the ground after the acceptance of presents had been prohibited by the Directors of the Company, and even before that prohibition such a defence could have no application to the circumstances under which large sums of money had been extorted from Kásim Ali, and more recently from Mír Jafar and from his son, Názim ud Daulah. Whatever might be said in extenuation of the acceptance of presents voluntarily offered by a native chief, there could be no justification for the course taken in 1761, when Mír Jafar was dethroned and the Nawábship was practically sold to Kásim Ali. Under the same category must be regarded the presents received from Mír Jafar in 1764, in consideration of his reinstatement on the Masnad. In the more recent case of Názim ud Daulah, there was a clear violation of orders, which no amount of casuistry could justify or extenuate.

Clive at first found some difficulty in getting at all the facts connected with the accession of Názim ud Daulah. For the purpose of clearing up matters, he invited the young prince and his minister, together with one or two other Bengal notables, to Calcutta, and, fortified by the information then obtained, and after hearing the defence of the persons implicated, he at once suspended from the service three members of the Council, Messrs Spencer, Johnston and Leicester, as well as some other high officials. This step, right as it was, and necessary in the public

interests, entailed upon Clive, as he doubtless foresaw, the determined hostility of the persons thus dealt with. This hostility manifested itself soon after his return to England, when Johnston, aided by several members of the House of Commons, brought charges against him. These, however, will form the subject of a subsequent chapter.

It was on the occasion of this visit from the young Nawáb that Clive resolved to institute a change in the arrangements which had been made by the Council for conducting the administration of Bengal. The Council, when placing Názim ud Daulah on the throne, had required him to appoint a Muhammadan, named Muhammad Rizá Khán, to aid him, and practically to carry on the management of his affairs. Rizá Khán was an able man, but somewhat dictatorial. The Nawáb disliked him, and Clive was not favourably impressed by him. Clive accordingly tried the experiment of associating with him two Hindus, viz., Dúláb Rám, who had taken part in the negotiations before Plassey, and one of the Seths. But notwithstanding these appointments, Rizá Khán managed to hold his own.

We have seen that Clive's experience and his reflections upon the course of events during his first visit to Bengal led him to form several important conclusions. One was that the Company's territories were likely to become too large and too important to be left under the government of a trading company, and that they

should be taken over by the Crown. This conclusion was not unfavourably entertained by the elder Pitt, and had the latter remained in health and in power, it would probably have been carried into effect. As it was, although Clive's suggestion doubtless helped to shape various measures which, as time went on, were carried out for the purpose of increasing the efficiency of the government of India, and some of them at no very distant date, it took nearly a hundred years before full effect was given to it. Another of Clive's proposals was very speedily brought into operation. It was the transfer of the administrative power, beginning with the management of the revenue, and speedily extended to the administration generally, from the Nawáb of Bengal to the Company.

Clive had felt for some time that there was not room for a double government in Bengal, and that, to use the words already quoted, 'the princes of the country must be in a great measure dependent on us, or we totally so on them.' It was under the influence of this conviction that, on hearing at Madras of the death of Mír Jafar, and not foreseeing that he might be forestalled by his future colleagues in the selection of a successor, Clive had determined to recognise Mír Jafar's grandson as Nawáb, and, governing in his name and with the authority of the Emperor, to adopt the system of government which he deemed to be most conducive to the welfare of the people of the three provinces,

as well as to the interests of the Company. This, for the moment, seemed to be impossible, for Názim ud Daulah was no longer a minor; but of course a great deal depended upon the character of the new Nawáb. If he had been a strong man, in short, if he had been a second Kásim Ali, Clive's vision could not have been realised; but, as it turned out, Clive was not long in discovering that Názim ud Daulah was, both by character and by education, absolutely unfit to conduct the government of Bengal for a single day. Indeed, when Clive broached to him the plan under which the Diwáni was to be conferred upon the Company, or, in other words, the duty of collecting and administering the revenues was to be discharged by the latter, while the Nawáb was to receive a fixed income of fifty lakhs a year, ultimately raised to fifty-three lakhs, wherewith to defray his personal expenses and the outgoings of his Court, the proposal met with the most ready acceptance, the young prince exclaiming, 'Thank God, I shall now be able to have as many dancing girls as I please.'

This arrangement was made at Murshidabad, but there were other treaties to be executed, one of which was essential to the validity of that which had just been made. Before, however, taking up the business here referred to, Clive deemed it advisable to avail himself of the opportunity of the Nawáb Vazír of Oudh being at Benares to place upon a satisfactory footing the relations between the Company

and that prince. This undertaking proved to be by no means difficult. The Nawáb Vazír had very recently been thoroughly beaten at the battle of Buxár by the Company's troops, and was both surprised and pleased at the liberal, indeed generous, terms which Clive was willing to accept. There was only one point, and that was not pressed by Clive, upon which the Nawáb Vazír would make no concession. He would not allow any English factories to be established in his territories. He had seen the result of the establishment of such factories in Bengal, and had wisely decided to give no opening for the disputes which he felt sure would arise from the grant of trading facilities to foreigners. The terms which were eventually settled were that Oudh proper should be restored to the Nawáb Vazír, that Allahabad and Corah should be restored to the Emperor, and that the Nawáb Vazír should pay £600,000 as compensation for the expenses incurred by the Company in the war. It was also agreed that the Rájá of Benares, who, having been a subject of Oudh, had during the war submitted to the English, should retain his districts, but in subordination to the Nawáb Vazír, that there should be a defensive alliance between the Company, the Subáhdár of Bengal and the Nawáb Vazír, and that the Company should, in case of need, supply the Nawáb Vazír with troops, but should be paid for their services.

These terms, though discussed at length, were not

finally agreed upon until Clive, in company with the Nawáb Vazír, had reached Allahabad, where the Emperor was awaiting them. The latter brought forward numerous demands, but was obliged to abandon most of them, and the negotiations resulted in the grant of the Diwáni already referred to, in return for which the Company were bound to pay to the Emperor an annual tribute of twenty-six lakhs of rupees. In the language of the grant, the Diwáni was given 'as a free gift without the association of any other person.'

The policy of this settlement would seem from the outset to have been regarded by Clive without any misgivings. When reporting what had taken place in a despatch addressed to the Court of Directors, under date the 30th September 1765, he defended his policy in these words:—

'The perpetual struggles for superiority between the Nawábs and your agents, together with the recent proofs before us of notorious and avowed corruption, have rendered us unanimously of opinion, after the most mature deliberation, that no other method can be suggested of laying the axe to the root of all those evils than that of obtaining the Diwáni of Bengal, Behár and Orissa for the Company. By establishing the power of the Great Moghul, we have likewise established his rights; and His Majesty, from principles of gratitude, of equity, and of policy, has thought proper to bestow

this important employment on the Company, the nature of which is the collecting of all the revenues, and after defraying the expenses of the army, and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the Nizámat, to remit the remainder to Delhi, or wherever the King shall reside or direct. But as the King has been graciously pleased to bestow on the Company, for ever, such surplus as shall arise from the revenues upon certain stipulations and agreements expressed in the Sanad, we have settled with the Nawáb, with his own free will and consent, that the sum of fifty-three lakhs shall be annually paid to him for the support of his dignity and all contingent expenses, exclusive of the charge of maintaining an army, which is to be defrayed out of the revenues ceded to the Company by this royal grant of the Diwáni; and indeed the Nawáb has abundant reason to be well satisfied with the conditions of this agreement, whereby a fund is secured to him without trouble or danger, adequate to all the purposes of such grandeur and happiness as a man of his sentiments has any conception of enjoying. More would serve only to disturb his quiet, endanger his government, and sap the foundation of that solid structure of power and wealth which, at length, is happily reared and completed by the Company, after a vast expense of blood and treasure.

‘By this acquisition of the Diwáni, your

possessions and influence are rendered permanent and secure, since no future Nawáb will either have power or riches sufficient to attempt your overthrow, by means either of force or corruption. All revolutions must henceforth be at an end, as there will be no fund for secret services, for donations, or for restitutions. The Nawáb cannot answer the expectations of the venal and mercenary, nor will the Company comply with demands injurious to themselves out of their own revenues. The experience of years has convinced us that a division of power is impossible without generating discontent and hazarding the whole. All must belong either to the Company or to the Nawáb. We leave you to judge which alternative is the most desirable, and the most expedient in the present circumstances of affairs. As to ourselves, we know of no other system we could adopt that would less affect the Nawáb's dignity, and at the same time secure the Company against the fatal effect of future revolutions, than this of the Diwáni. The power is now lodged where it can only be lodged with safety to us, so that we may pronounce with some degree of confidence that the worst which will happen in future to the Company will proceed from temporary ravages only, which can never become so general as to prevent your revenues from yielding a sufficient fund to defray your civil and military charges and furnish your investments.

‘The more we reflect on the situation of your affairs, the stronger appear the reasons for accepting the Diwání of these Provinces, by which alone we could establish a power sufficient to perpetuate the possessions we hold and the influence we enjoy. While the Nawáb acted in quality of collector for the Moghul, the means of supporting our military establishment depended upon his pleasure. In the most critical situations, while we stood balancing on the extreme border of destruction, his stipulated payments were slow and deficient, his revenues withheld by disaffected Rájás and turbulent Zamin-dárs, who despised the weakness of his government; or they were squandered in profusion and dissipated in corruption, the never-failing symptoms of a declining constitution and feeble administration. Hence we were frequently disappointed of those supplies, upon the receipt of which depended the very existence of the Company in Bengal.’

The settlement thus arrived at was in its results the most important that had yet been effected in India on behalf of the East India Company. It made the Company not only in fact, but in title, the rulers of Bengal; and at the same time their territorial acquisitions in other parts of India were confirmed to them. It established the peace between the Company and the Nawáb of Oudh, which remained unbroken until 1855, when, owing to the long-continued misgovernment of Oudh, that pro-

vince was annexed by Lord Dalhousie's Government to British territory, and the Nawáb was removed to Calcutta, and, after the mutiny of the Bengal army, to British Burma.

Important as the arrangement was, it cannot be said that it completely met the requirements of the case. It was open to some of the objections which invariably attach to a double government. Under it, the collection of the revenue was left to persons appointed by the representatives of the Company, and the Company was thus insured against a failure of the funds which were necessary to meet the expenses of their administration. The army was placed under the Company, but the administration of justice was left under the Nawáb. It was Clive's policy to rely as far as possible upon native agency, and to maintain the semblance of the Nawáb's authority, while retaining the real power in the hands of the Company. Very soon, however, he found it necessary to appoint three English supervisors to control the collection of the revenues; but this plan proved upon trial to be by no means sufficient, and after a lapse of seven years, Warren Hastings was compelled to entrust the executive duties, including the collection and administration of the revenues, to English civil servants, who were, and still are, styled collectors. The creation of courts of justice, and of some semblance of police, was the work of the same very able administrator. In thus postponing the

open assumption by the English of the government of Bengal, Clive was actuated by political considerations. He deemed it inexpedient, having regard to the position of the Company in relation to foreign European powers, and also in relation to the independent native princes, that the Company should appear openly as the rulers of Bengal, and for this reason he maintained the pageant of a Nawáb, 'through whom any encroachment attempted by foreign powers could be effectually crushed by the military force at our disposal,' and 'all real grievances complained of by them could through the same channel be examined into and redressed.' Clive was unwilling to 'do any act by an exertion of the English power which can equally be done by the Nawáb at our instance, as that would be throwing off the mask, and would be declaring the Company Subah of the Provinces.'

Clive's views as to the limits of the Company's territory were at that time very decided. His foreign policy was by no means a forward one. He considered it absolutely unsafe to advance beyond Allahabad, and held that the English should be content with the three provinces of Bengal, Behár and Orissa, in addition to their acquisitions in South and Western India. In a state paper which he wrote at this time, the following expressions occur :—

'Our possessions should be bounded by the Provinces.' 'Studiously maintain peace ; it is the ground-

work of our prosperity.' 'Never consent to act offensively against any powers except in defence of our own, the King's or the Nawáb Vazír's dominions, as stipulated by treaty, and above all things be assured that a march to Delhi would be not only a vain and fruitless project, but attended with destruction to our own army, and perhaps put a period to the very being of the Company in Bengal.'

The Mahrattas were then in possession of Delhi, and Clive had been urged by the young Emperor to advance upon that city and help him to recover it; but to all such suggestions he turned a deaf ear. He advised the Emperor to reside within the Company's territory, and refused to assist him in any enterprise beyond its limits. A few years before—indeed, up to the time of his last return to India—he had held different views; but the state of corruption in the civil service which he discovered on his return satisfied him that the three Provinces which had been made over to the Company would fully tax the capacity of the agency which was likely to be available. As to the reinstatement of the Emperor at Delhi, he was deterred by other considerations. Clive had formed a very poor opinion of the Emperor's capacity and also of his honesty. He discovered at a very critical time, to which reference will be made presently, that a threatened invasion by the Mahrattas had been projected at the instance of the Emperor, although the latter was then in close alliance with the Company.

CHAPTER XIV

OFFICIAL SALARIES AND PRIVATE TRADE—LORD CORNWALLIS'S VIEWS—DISCONTENT IN THE CIVIL SERVICE—MUTINY IN THE ARMY—DOUBLE BATTA—CONDUCT OF SIR ROBERT FLETCHER—SUPPRESSION OF THE MUTINY—COURT OF DIRECTORS ON CLIVE'S LAST ADMINISTRATION—CLIVE'S STATE OF HEALTH—HE TAKES LEAVE OF HIS COLLEAGUES.

CLIVE's stay in India on this occasion was destined to be short, but there were two important questions with which he was compelled to deal before he could think of retiring, viz., the state of the civil service and the discontent, bordering upon mutiny, among the English officers of the Bengal army.

We have seen what evils had resulted from allowing the civil servants of the Company to carry on trade on their own account, and how, by the abuses connected with this permission, they had driven Kásim Ali into a war which, had it not been for the ability and gallantry of some of the chief military officers in the service, might have put an end to the

existence of the Company, and with it to British rule in India. The main cause of these evils was the inadequacy of the salaries allowed to the civil servants. The salary of a member of Council was only £300 a year—an income upon which it was impossible for him to live, still more impossible for him to save anything for the future. The salaries of servants of the lower grades were still smaller. To meet the difficulty the Court of Directors had permitted their servants to add to their incomes by embarking in private trade, and had tacitly acquiesced in their receiving large presents from the natives. It was a long time before the Court could be brought to see that the only suitable remedy lay in a large augmentation of salaries, accompanied by an absolute prohibition of private trade. This was the remedy which Clive and his Committee urged upon the Court, but that body absolutely refused to sanction it. They were still traders, unable to realise their duties and responsibilities as the rulers of what was destined to be a great Empire. It was not until more than a quarter of a century had elapsed, that in 1792, after the first capture of Seringapatam and the acquisition of the large territory in the south of India which that capture brought with it, they were induced by an urgent representation addressed to them by the Marquis of Cornwallis to sanction the measure which had in vain been propounded by Clive.

The following were Lord Cornwallis's words :—

'I consider it a duty to you and to my country to declare that the best rules and regulations that can be framed, either by yourselves or by the governments in India, will prove totally nugatory and useless unless you adopt as a decided and fixed principle that liberal salaries shall be annexed to every office of trust and responsibility at all the presidencies; that all perquisites shall be abolished; and that the most vigorous checks shall be established to prevent your servants from attempting to acquire fortunes by means that are often practised, but more publicly avowed, but for the pursuit of which many of them find an almost unanswerable apology by representing the impossibility of their even existing upon their narrow and wretched public allowances. The system that has been so long and fatally pursued in this country, of granting trifling salaries to men employed in high trust, and who are surrounded by great temptations, and of leaving them to look for their subsistence and future hope of retirement to perquisites and unavowed emoluments, is as cruelly destructive of the morals of individuals as it is ruinous to the interests of the Company.'

An increase of salaries having been disallowed, Clive was compelled to devise another means of meeting the evil. The plan which he adopted was to place the management of the public and private trade in Bengal under the control of the Government. The chief branch of this trade was salt. Clive established a society to

conduct the traffic in salt on the principle of a monopoly, the profits of which, after reserving ten lakhs a year for the Company, were to be divided among the servants of the Company according to their rank. The members of the Council and the Colonels in the army received respectively 70,000 rupees a year, and the subordinate officers, civil and military, in proportion. This scheme, like its predecessor, was disallowed by the Court after two years' trial, and then matters relapsed into their previous position.

On the occasion of one of Clive's visits to Murshidabad in 1766, he was informed that Mīr Jafar had left him by his will five lakhs of rupees, valued at that time, together with interest, at between £60,000 and £70,000. This sum he resolved to invest in a fund for the relief of the English officers and men of the East India Company's army. The arrangement was subsequently carried out with the sanction of the Court of Directors, and the fund was supplemented from the Indian treasury. It remained in operation until 1858, when, the East India Company having ceased to exist as a governing body, the fund was reclaimed by Clive's heirs-at-law. The objects, however, for which the fund had been constituted were not lost sight of. After the government of India was taken over by the Crown, the Secretary or State for India in Council decided to continue from the revenues of India the pensions which had been

paid up to that time out of Clive's fund. Those pensions are still paid, and are still called the Clive Fund Pensions.

About this time Clive was confronted by grave discontent in the civil service. Many of the senior civilians had perished in the massacre at Patna. Some of the juniors had in consequence been appointed to posts for which, owing to their youth and inexperience, they were unfit. Official secrets were divulged, and in other ways the public service suffered. In these circumstances Clive brought up from Madras four civil servants belonging to that establishment, and gave them vacant seats in the Bengal Council. What followed is described by Clive in a despatch to the Court of Directors, dated 31st January 1766, of which the following is an extract :—

‘We are sorry to find that our endeavours to serve the Company, in a manner the least injurious to your servants here, should be misconstrued. As soon as this measure became known by reports from Madras, and previous to our laying any proceedings before the Board, the young gentlemen of the settlement had set themselves up for judges of the propriety of our conduct and the degree of their own merit. Each would think himself qualified to transact your weighty affairs in Council, at an age when the laws of his country adjudged him unfit to manage his own concerns to the extent of forty shillings. They had not only set their hands to the memorial of complaint,

but entered into associations unbecoming at their years, and destructive of that subordination without which no government can stand. All visits to the President are forbidden. All invitations from him and the members of the Select Committee are to be slighted. The gentlemen called down by our authority from Madras are to be treated with neglect and contempt. Every man who deviates from this confederacy is to be stigmatised and avoided. In a word, the members are totally to separate themselves from the head, decorum and union are to be set at defiance, and it becomes a fair struggle whether we or the young gentlemen shall in future guide the helm of government. Look at their names, examine their standing, inquire into their services, and reflect upon the age of four-fifths of the subscribers to this bill of grievances, who now support the association, and you will be equally surprised with us at the presumptuous intemperance of youth, and convinced that a stop of three or four years in the course of promotion is indispensably necessary if you would have your Council composed of men of experience and discretion.

‘From this sketch of the behaviour of your servants, you will perceive the dangerous pitch to which the independence and licentious spirit of this settlement hath risen; you will then determine on the necessity and propriety of the step we have taken. In the meantime, we are resolved to support it, or we must

submit to the anarchy and confusion consequent on subjecting the decrees of your Select Committee to the revisal and repeal of young gentlemen just broke loose from the hands of their schoolmasters.'

Not long after the mutiny in the civil service had been suppressed, a difficulty arose with the army, which, in the hands of a less resolute man, might have been attended with the gravest consequences. We have seen how low in those days was the standard of official morality in the civil service. It cannot be said that a higher standard prevailed in the military service. In both cases the abuses which obtained were largely due to the failure of the Court of Directors to recognise the absolute necessity of granting adequate official remuneration in order to secure honest service. In both services it was impossible for the members to live upon their pay. In both the practice of engaging in trade, and of accepting presents from natives, had been tacitly sanctioned by the home authorities. In the earlier days of the Indian army, the officers in the three Presidencies drew a fixed rate of pay when in garrison or in the Presidency town, and when in the field an additional sum which was called '*batta*.' After Plassey, Mir Jafar, at the instance of Clive, had granted the officers of the Bengal army a further sum equal to the *batta*, which was called double *batta*. This was still continued, although the Court of Directors had sent out repeated orders for its discontinuance. There can be

no question that after the private trade and the acceptance of presents had been interdicted, it would have been impossible for the officers, either civil or military, to maintain their position without either an increase of pay or some other equivalent advantage. That equivalent had been for the time provided by Clive's establishment of a salt monopoly, and consequently there was no justification for the failure of Vansittart's and Spencer's governments to enforce the orders of the Court regarding the double *batta*. This was doubtless Clive's view, and in September 1765, he notified that on the 1st January 1756 the double *batta* would cease. Thereupon at once arose a conspiracy to prevent the order from being carried out. The success of the conspiracy was at the outset promoted, rather than hindered, by an important improvement in the organisation of the Bengal army which had just been made. Up to this time there had been no proper regimental or brigade organisation. Clive, when in England, had pressed the point upon the Court, who had given their approval to the main features of the scheme suggested by him for increasing the number of European officers and soldiers, and grading them in regiments and brigades. This organisation had been just completed when the notification of the stoppage of double *batta* appeared. The Bengal army had been divided into three brigades, commanded respectively by Colonel Sir Robert Fletcher, Colonel Richard Smith, and

Colonel Sir Robert Barker. The form which the conspiracy took, was that the officers concerned in it, some 200 in number, agreed to resign their commissions simultaneously on a given day, in the hope of thereby compelling the Government to withdraw their obnoxious orders. At the head of the conspiracy, although at first professing to discredit the fact of its existence, and then, when it could no longer be ignored, to condemn it, was Sir Robert Fletcher, the officer commanding the first brigade.

The conduct of this officer, when it came to be investigated, was proved to have been extremely discreditable. He had played a double game throughout. He had in his heart sympathised with the disaffected officers, and had, in fact, instigated some of them to join the combination. He had indeed been the soul of the conspiracy. He had posed as the champion of law and order at the very time that he was encouraging his brother officers to resign their commissions. He had endeavoured in the first instance to deceive Clive, but Clive had penetrated his treachery. He was tried by court-martial, and was clearly convicted of having concealed the plot for four months, and was thereupon dismissed from the service.

All this time the Mahrattas were threatening an invasion of Bengal, and there can be no doubt that the situation was extremely serious; but Clive's firmness prevailed. Officers were brought up from Madras.

Clive offered commissions to mercantile men, but only three accepted them. Indeed, there is reason to believe that there was much sympathy, not only on the part of civil servants, but on the part of many mercantile men, with the grievances of the military officers. The Sepoys, however, stood by Clive, as did some of the principal British military officers, including the officers commanding the second and third brigades. Several of the ringleaders were tried and cashiered. The rest were allowed to withdraw their resignations, and discipline was restored. The threatened Mahratta invasion passed away.

There was no part of Clive's career in which his resolute courage shone more brilliantly than it did on this occasion. Had there been the slightest faltering on his part, the whole power of the State must have been delivered into the hands of the army. Few men in history, placed in circumstances so grave, have acted with a judgment so sound and with a decision so consummate. Not one of Clive's other achievements have surpassed, in the courage which he evinced, and in the genius which he displayed, his suppression of this mutiny. Even if it had stood alone, it would have marked him as a true leader of men.

A remarkable incident connected with this mutiny, and very characteristic of the times, was the subsequent story of the recreant Brigadier, Sir Robert Fletcher. One would have thought that an officer

of his rank, who had taken the part which he had borne in the mutiny, after having been dismissed from the army, would not have been readmitted into the military service in any circumstances whatever; but, bad as his conduct had been, he had sufficient interest after his return to England to procure his reinstatement in the army, and was subsequently appointed to the high office of Commander-in-Chief at Madras.¹ Here he again showed the cloven foot. Unable apparently to abstain for any length of time from intrigue, he took a prominent part in the dispute which in 1775 ended in the forcible supersession and imprisonment of the Governor of Madras, Lord Pigot, by the members of his Council. Fletcher eventually died at Mauritius, where he had gone on sick leave.

Clive's last administration was drawing to a close when the mutiny of the officers took place. The Court of Directors, although differing from Clive's views on certain points, and some of them points of great importance, had formed an opinion of his last administration not less high than that which they entertained of his previous government of Bengal. In 1765 he had

¹ It appears that even Clive's friend, Grenville, urged Clive after his return to England not to oppose the reinstatement of Sir Robert Fletcher in the army. What course Clive took does not appear, but it is clear from what he said, in his defence before the House of Commons, of the Court of Directors having restored to the service almost every civil and military transgressor who had been dismissed, that he cannot have approved of Fletcher's reinstatement.

intimated his intention of resigning the government as soon as he could do so without prejudice to the public interests. In a despatch dated March 1766, the Court urged him to reconsider this decision. In doing so they paid a very high tribute to 'the penetration which had at once discerned the true interests of the Company in every branch' of the public service, 'to the rapidity with which he had restored peace, order and tranquillity,' to the unbiassed integrity which had governed all his actions, and to the great importance of his remaining in India for another year. But Clive's health had suffered much from the exposure and labour he had gone through. When the despatch reached India he was very seriously ill, and any prolongation of his stay would have been at the risk of his life. Moreover, he had already accomplished most of the objects for which the Court wished him to remain. Some of the worst of the civil servants had been got rid of. Although the Court had most unwisely refused to sanction the increase of salaries which Clive had advocated, for reasons the weight of which was incontestable, the temporary expedient which had been adopted for improving the incomes of the civil servants had met the immediate emergency. The suppression of the officers' mutiny, and the reorganisation of the army in regiments, had placed the military position upon a sound footing. Mr Verelst, who, on the suspension of Mr Sumner, had become the Governor-designate, had, it was


thought, proved his capacity, as had the members of Council, Messrs Sykes and Cartier.

Nothing now remained for Clive before embarking for England but to take leave of his colleagues. This he did in a weighty minute which he laid before them on the 16th January 1767, the last occasion on which he attended the Council. The most important point upon which he dwelt in this paper was the necessity for not only promulgating, but for rigorously enforcing, the orders of the Government. It had, he observed, been 'too much the custom in this Government to make orders and regulations, and then to suppose the business done. To what end and purpose are they made if they be not promulgated and enforced? No regulation can be carried into execution, no order obeyed, if you do not make rigorous examples of the disobedient. Upon this point I rest the welfare of the Company in Bengal. The servants are now brought to a proper sense of their duties. If you slacken the reins of government, affairs will soon revert to their former channel. Anarchy and corruption will again prevail, and, elate with a new victory, be too headstrong for any future efforts of government. Recall to your memories the many attempts that have been made in the civil and military departments to overcome our authority and to set up a kind of independency against the Court of Directors. Reflect also on the resolute measures we have pursued, and their wholesome effects. Dis-

obedience to legal power is the first step of sedition, and palliative measures effect no cure. Every tender compliance, every condescension on your parts, will only encourage more flagrant attacks, and will daily increase in strength, and be at last in vain resisted. Much of our time has been employed in correcting abuses. The important work has been prosecuted with zeal, diligence and disinterestedness; and we have the happiness to see our labours crowned with success. I leave the country in peace. I leave the civil and military departments under discipline and subordination. It is incumbent on you to keep them so. You have power, you have abilities, you have integrity. Let it not be said that you are deficient in resolution. I repeat that you must not fail to exact the most implicit obedience to your orders. Dismiss or suspend from your service any man who shall dare to dispute your authority. If you deviate from the principles upon which you have hitherto acted, and upon which you are conscious you ought to proceed, or if you do not make a proper use of that power with which you are invested, I shall hold myself acquitted, as I do now protest, against the consequences.'

A week later he communicated to his colleagues a supplemental minute embodying the following observations upon a point to which he had omitted to advert in his previous paper:—

'The people of this country,' he wrote, 'have little or no idea of a divided power; they imagine that all



MAP OF INDIA IN 1767.
SHOWING BRITISH POSSESSIONS AT THAT DATE.

authority is vested in one man. The Governor of Bengal should always be looked upon by them in this light, so far as is consistent with the honour of the Committee and the Council. In every vacant season, therefore, I think it expedient that he take a tour up the country in the quality of a supervisor-general. Frauds and oppressions of every sort being by this means laid open to his view, will in a great measure be prevented, and the natives will preserve a just opinion of the importance and dignity of our President, upon whose character and conduct much of the prosperity of the Company's affairs in Bengal must ever depend.'

These were Clive's last official utterances in India. They were worthy of the man who in less than twenty-two months had reformed the civil service and the army, had suppressed a dangerous mutiny, had reduced the expenditure, had by a wise and liberal economy nearly extinguished the Company's debt in India, and had substituted British for native rule over extensive and populous provinces.

If the Court of Directors, while justly according to Clive's last administration the praise which it so well deserved, had had the wisdom to adopt his recommendations regarding salaries, many of the evils which followed his departure might have been avoided; but in this, and in some other matters, the Court would seem to have laboured under a sort of judicial blindness, which was impervious to arguments, how-

ever cogent. Probably this was in a great measure due to the personal hostility of Sullivan and of some other members of the Court, and possibly in an even larger measure to the inability of men brought up to trade to realise their duties and the interests of the public when dealing with affairs of State.

CHAPTER XV

CLIVE LEAVES INDIA FOR THE LAST TIME — HIS
RECEPTION BY THE COURT OF DIRECTORS —
THE QUESTION OF HIS JAGÍR—ABANDONMENT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE DISMISSED
MEMBERS OF THE BENGAL COUNCIL — THE
SUBORDINATION OF THE MILITARY TO THE
CIVIL POWER — UNSATISFACTORY CONDITION
OF BENGAL—APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSION OF
SUPERVISORS, WHO PERISHED AT SEA — FAMINE
OF 1770—CARTIER SUCCEEDS VERELST, AND IS
SUCCEEDED BY WARREN HASTINGS — CLIVE'S
LETTER TO HASTINGS.

CLIVE embarked at Calcutta for England on the 29th January 1767. He had already announced the arrangements for carrying on the administration which were to take effect on his departure. Verelst was to succeed him as Governor. The command of the army, held by General Carnac, who sailed in the same ship with Clive, was to devolve upon Colonel Richard Smith. Sykes, Cartier and Beecher were to be the members of Council. The duration of the

voyage was not so prolonged as that of most of Clive's voyages. He landed at Portsmouth on the 14th July, and reached London on the following day. His health was in some degree re-established, but was still very far from good. His labours and anxieties, and the exposure he had undergone during his last administration, had told severely upon him, and had rendered essential a lengthened absence from public business; but this, partly owing to his own temperament, and partly owing to the course of events, he was not destined to enjoy. He met with a cordial greeting on his arrival in London. He was well received by the King and Queen, and also by the Court of Directors. The latter, as stated, had put up a statue of him in the East India House, and also statues of General Stringer Lawrence and of Admiral Pocock. It is clear from his letters that he expected to receive a British peerage; but this expectation was never fulfilled. Although, when Clive reached England, Pitt, then Earl of Chatham, was in office, and still retained his friendly feeling towards Clive, his state of health was such that he was absolutely incapacitated from public business. Clive's friends still formed a majority in the Court of Directors; but that Court and the Court of Proprietors were at issue on more than one important point, and the result of the controversies which took place was not always favourable to Clive. The acquisition of the Diwāni, and the great improvement which had taken place

in the financial position of the Company in Bengal, had led many of the proprietors of India stock to consider that the dividend ought to be increased. This was not the view of the Court of Directors, nor was it that of the Government, although it seems to have found some favour with Clive. Several of the leading Directors, notwithstanding the prosperity of Bengal affairs at that time, felt that the case was far otherwise in Madras. There the Company were engaged in hostilities with Hyder Ali, and the situation was by no means satisfactory. It is also possible that they were not free from misgivings as to the continuance in Bengal of the state of things which Clive had left behind him, and therefore deemed it unsafe to place any further burden upon the Company's revenues. However, the proposed increase of dividend, raising it to $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., was carried, although the Government interposed by a legislative Act which reduced the maximum dividend to 10 per cent. The action of the Company in this matter encouraged the Government, who were at that time in great financial straits, to exact from the Company an annual subsidy of £400,000. To this impost Clive was strongly opposed. He deemed it to be extortionate, and condemned it in language which gave considerable offence to some members of the Cabinet.

On another point which directly affected his personal interests, Clive was led to entertain hostile sentiments towards the Court of Directors

owing to the attitude of some of the members regarding the Jagír which had been conferred upon him by Mír Jafar. This Jagír, as we have seen, had formed a subject of controversy before Clive left England in 1764. The Court at that time, under the influence of Sullivan, had proposed to confiscate the grant, and orders to that effect had been sent out to India, but when shortly afterwards it was found necessary again to take advantage of Clive's services in Bengal, it was proposed to confirm his title to the grant on a permanent footing. Subsequently, at his own suggestion, it was settled that he should retain the Jagír for a further period of ten years, should he live so long, and that at the end of that time, or upon his death at an earlier date, it should revert to the Company. Shortly before Clive's return, a proposal to prolong still further his tenure of the Jagír had been made, as a suitable mode of rewarding his eminent services during his last administration. The proposal was to extend the grant for a further period of ten years after the term then current should have expired. This proposal had been carried in the Court of Proprietors by a very large majority, but in the Court of Directors there had been some hesitation as to the amount of the grant. However, when Clive reached London, the Court of Directors, having thanked him for his great services, called a General Court, at which the previous

resolution was unanimously passed. Still, the hesitation which had been shown rankled for a long time in Clive's mind, and materially affected his future sentiments towards the Court of Directors.

The following are the terms in which he expressed his opinion of them in a letter written not long after his return :—

‘With regard to the Directors, I tell you frankly that no one can entertain a worse opinion of them than I do. They have neither abilities nor resolution to manage such important concerns as are now under their care. Of this the world in general seems very sensible; and yet what to do I protest I know not. An attempt to reform may throw matters into greater confusion.

‘You see my Jagir is at last continued to me and my representatives for ten years after the expiration of my present right. I am more obliged to the Proprietors for this grant than to the Directors, who threw a great deal of cold water upon it. Indeed, their whole conduct towards me and my associates in Committee has shown weakness or something worse, for they have upon all occasions endeavoured to lessen the acquisitions we have obtained for them, and kept everything that might contribute to our reputation as secret as possible, and if Parliament had not brought our transactions to light, mankind would have been ignorant of what has been done. In short, they appear very envious

and jealous of my influence, and give ear to every idle story of my being hostile towards them. Everything looks as if we were not upon good terms. They have even asked my opinion upon their affairs in such a mean, sneaking manner that I have informed one of them, unless I am applied to in form, and unless more attention be paid to my advice, I shall decline giving any whatsoever. Thus matters stand at present, but how long they may remain so I know not, nor what changes may happen at the next election.'

Those sentiments were not worthy of a man of Clive's calibre. Their justice was not admitted by some of his most strenuous friends, thoroughly acquainted with the facts of the case. Scrafton, a man who had been closely connected with Clive in India, had been present at Plassey, and was now a member of the Court of Directors, did his best, but without effect, to remove Clive's suspicions of the hostility of various members of the Court. Very probably the state of Clive's health, and the irritability which accompanied it, rendered him more suspicious than he otherwise would have been of the loyalty of those upon whom he considered himself entitled to rely.

Another incident, however, which took place about the time of Clive's return, was far more calculated to arouse and to justify his resentment. It was the abandonment of proceedings against the members of

the Bengal Council who had been removed from office at the instance of Clive. The Court of Directors had resolved to bring these officials to trial for having received presents from natives after the order of the Court prohibiting the acceptance of such presents had reached them. There was at that time a very strong feeling among a large body in the Court of Proprietors against those members of the Court of Directors, most of them friends and supporters of Clive, who had opposed the increase of the dividend. Advantage of this feeling was taken by the inculcated officials to appeal to the Court of Proprietors against the proposed prosecution, and the appeal resulted in the prosecution being withdrawn. This showed that public officials, however culpable their conduct might have been, had only to amass wealth, and by that means acquire interest in England, in order to obtain condonation for their misdeeds.

Clive was not one of those who had denounced the increase of the dividend, and therefore was not aimed at by the majority of the Proprietors who had supported the withdrawal of the prosecutions; but the result of that measure was to him most serious, for it encouraged his enemies to make the attacks upon him, both in and out of Parliament, which embittered the remainder of his life.

Early in the year after his return (1768), Clive, by the advice of his physicians, went over to the

Continent, spending some time in Paris, and afterwards visiting Lyons, Montpellier and Spa. He had been urged to prolong his stay abroad, and to avoid the rigour of the ensuing English winter; but he so greatly disliked the tedium of an idle life that in August he returned to England. As regards his future comfort and his health, the decision was unfortunate, for his stay in the South of France was too short to effect the cure which might have resulted from a longer residence there; but Clive's was not a temperament which could tolerate inactivity for any length of time, and consequently he returned to London and threw himself, heart and soul, into the various public questions, mainly Indian questions, which were then under discussion.

Clive had never for a day lost his interest in India. He regarded that country as even then the greatest of our dependencies, and spared no pains in impressing upon his successors the views which he entertained. With Verelst, who had succeeded him as Governor of Bengal, he maintained an active correspondence. He had a high opinion of Verelst's character and of his ability, but he evidently had doubts as to his firmness. 'Your integrity,' he wrote to Verelst, 'and goodness of your heart must be acknowledged by all who know you, and it is with pleasure I observe you have set out with a close attention to other necessary and public qualifications. Continue in the full exertion of that steadiness and

resolution with which you began your government. Your judgment is sound. Set a just value, then, upon every opinion of your own, and always entertain a prudent degree of suspicion of the advice of any man who can possibly be biassed by self-interested motives. Before I touch upon particulars, permit me to urge, in general, the necessity there is for you and the whole Council and Committee to join in holding the military under due subordination and subjection.'

This question of maintaining the due subordination of the military to the civil power was one to which Clive continued to attach the greatest importance during the remainder of his life. The conspiracy in which a large number of the British officers in the Company's service had engaged during the last year of Clive's stay in India had taught him a lesson which he never forgot. To use Clive's own words, 'the dangerous consequences which may ensue from the least relaxation of command over a body so numerous as the English officers should ever be thought of with horror, and the good effects of maintaining an inflexible authority cannot be too often recollected in the instance of the late association.'

Clive had always thought well of the military capacity of Colonel Richard Smith, who on Carnac's retirement had been placed in the chief military command in Bengal, but he had never liked him. He

evidently regarded him as ambitious and aggressive, and as a man against whom the civil Governor should be constantly on his guard. In the letter already quoted, Clive writes regarding Colonel Smith in the following terms:—

‘I am glad to find that you are upon your guard against the pride and ambition of the Colonel, who, if there be any merit in the conduct of the military officers, will certainly claim the whole to himself and write the world to that purpose. His last, I should say his first, dispute, whether the Governor or the commanding officer of the troops ought to have the title of Commander-in-Chief, was such an open and audacious attack upon the dignity of your office that I am surprised you let it pass unnoticed. Had a minute been made of it, he would infallibly have been dismissed the service.’ This last remark would seem to indicate a somewhat exaggerated view of the situation. Within a very few years the designation of Commander-in-Chief had become the established description of the officers commanding the troops in each of the three Presidencies, and is now the recognised title of the officer who, under the organisation established a few years ago, commands the whole of the Indian Army. At the same time, allowance must be made for the state of things which then existed, as evidenced by the treatment of the Governor of Madras a few years later, in which the officer commanding the troops took an active part.

These were the questions which principally occupied Clive during the earlier months after his return from India ; but other matters of greater importance shortly afterwards came to the front. The state of affairs in India rapidly became extremely unsatisfactory. The two men who in succession followed Clive as Governors of Bengal were neither of them strong men. In the case of Verelst, we have seen, from the letter which has been already quoted, that Clive had but little confidence in his firmness, and from what subsequently transpired, it would seem that Cartier was a decidedly weak man. It is, however, only fair to say that Verelst possessed some admirable qualifications as an Indian Governor. He had served long in India, and possessed a thorough knowledge of the people. He had done good work as supervisor of the revenue administration in the three districts ceded by Kásim Ali. Now, however, no adequate check was maintained over the expenditure. In Bengal, owing to feeble and corrupt administration on the part of the subordinate officers, the revenue diminished. In Madras, the struggle with Hyder Ali involved heavy expenditure, and was at one time extremely critical. This state of things seriously affected the financial position of the Company in England, which was reduced to the greatest straits. The position was intensified by a terrible famine which devastated Bengal in 1770, when one-third of the population was computed to have perished.

In the latter part of the same year, Clive sustained a heavy loss in the death of Mr George Grenville, his chief friend and supporter in English political life. This event was most disastrous for Clive; for Grenville had been for some years his most consistent friend, and a very judicious adviser. Indeed, it is not too much to say that had Grenville lived a few years longer, his influence in Parliament and with the Government would have averted the attacks made upon Clive two years later, and also the proceedings in the House of Commons, which did so much to poison the latter years of his life.

Meanwhile, in 1769, Sullivan and several of his friends had been elected to the Direction. An attempt was made to secure the reappointment of Vansittart as Governor of Bengal, with the authority of Governor-General. This Clive had sufficient influence to prevent. Thereupon the Court of Directors resolved to send out to Bengal three Commissioners with very large powers, to investigate and reform Indian administration. Vansittart was appointed a member of this Commission. He and Clive had formerly been intimate friends, and it was upon Clive's recommendation that Vansittart had been appointed Governor of Bengal in 1760; but partly in consequence of the removal of Mir Jafar from the Nawábship, which Clive greatly resented, and partly in consequence of

Vansittart having joined the party of Sullivan, their friendship had been turned into bitter hostility. The two other members of the Commission were Scrafton and Forde, both staunch friends of Clive; but the Commission never reached its destination, the frigate *Aurora*, in which the members sailed, foundering at sea between the Cape and Calcutta.

It was then determined to appoint another Governor, and Warren Hastings, at that time second in Council at Madras, was selected for the office. Warren Hastings had served under Clive during his first government of Bengal. For some time after Plassey he was agent to the Governor at Murshidabad. There are letters still extant, many of them in Clive's handwriting, and all of them bearing Clive's autograph signature, which show that Clive had many opportunities of judging of Hastings's capacity, and, as has been said in an earlier chapter of this book, it has always been a matter of surprise that, when Clive was leaving India in 1760, and the choice of his successor was practically left to him, he should have preferred Vansittart to Hastings, and also to Watts. Hastings had been a member of Vansittart's Council at Calcutta from 1761 to the end of 1764, and had distinguished himself by the honesty of his official conduct, as contrasted with the dishonourable course followed by the majority of the

Council at that time. After a residence in England of five years, he was driven by poverty in 1769 to seek re-employment in India, and in that year accepted the appointment of second in Council at Madras. It seems that on that occasion he received some support from Clive. He was serving at Madras when it became necessary to select a new Governor of Bengal in succession to Cartier. Sykes, who had been a member of the Select Committee sent out with Clive in 1764—a very honest and discerning man—had in 1768 pressed the claims of Hastings upon Clive. Sykes's recommendation, supported probably by others, was doubtless renewed when the vacancy occurred in Bengal in 1771, on which occasion Clive took an active part in securing the appointment of Hastings. The following letter, which Clive addressed to Hastings after the appointment was made, indicates the estimate which he had formed of Hastings's capacity, and the impressions which had led him at one time to doubt his fitness for the post :—

‘BERKELEY SQUARE, 1st August 1771.

‘DEAR SIR,—The despatch of the *Lapwing* gives me an early opportunity of congratulating with you on your removal to Bengal; and as my zeal for the service actuated me to take the share I did in your appointment, the same principle pre-

vails upon me to offer you a few of my ideas upon the important Government in which you now preside.

‘Two or three months ago, when the plan of supervisors was renewed, Sir George Colebrook and Mr Purling desired my opinion. My advice was that, as the prosperity of the Company was now become a matter of very serious national concern, it behoved them to show that in appointments of this nature they were guided, not by the views of particular friends, but merely by that zeal which the duty of their station demanded for preserving and rendering permanent our possessions in India; and that therefore they should turn their thoughts towards men who stood high in public character and reputation. I proposed Mr Wedderburn, Mr Cornwall and Sir Jeffrey Amherst, together with you as Governor and one of the Council: and that these five should be invested with all the powers, civil and military. Sir Jeffrey Amherst, however, declined. As to the two former, however, they might be prevailed upon; but the Directors do not seem to embrace any great comprehensive plan of supervisorship, so as to make it an object for men of such consequence. My last proposition was that the Company should revert to the plan of my Government, viz., that a Committee of five should be appointed out of the best and ablest men in Bengal, of whom the Governor

should be the head, and this, I imagine, will be adopted.

‘The situation of affairs requires that you should be very circumspect and active. You are appointed Governor at a very critical time, when things are suspected to be almost at the worst, and when a general apprehension prevails of the mismanagement of the Company’s affairs. The last Parliamentary enquiry has thrown the whole state of India before the public, and every man sees clearly that, as matters are now conducted abroad, the Company will not long be able to pay the £400,000 to Government. The late dreadful famine, or a war, either with Sujah ud Daulah or the Mahrattas, will plunge us into still deeper distress. A discontented nation and disappointed Ministers will then call to account a weak and pusillanimous Court of Directors, who will turn the blow from themselves upon their agents abroad, and the consequences must be ruin both to the Company and the servants. In this situation you see the necessity of exerting yourself in time, provided the Directors give you proper powers, without which I confess you can do nothing; for self-interest or ignorance will obstruct every plan you can form for the public good.

‘You are upon the spot, and will learn my conduct from disinterested persons; and I wish your Government to be attended, as mine was, with success to the Company, and with the conscious-

ness of having discharged every duty with firmness and fidelity. Be impartial and just to the public, regardless of the interests of individuals where the honour of the nation and the real advantage of the Company are at stake, and resolute in carrying into execution your determinations, which, I hope, will at all times be rather founded upon your own opinion than that of others.

‘The business of politics and finance being so extensive, the Committee should not be embarrassed with private concerns. They ought not, therefore, to be allowed to trade. But their emoluments ought to be so large as to render trade unnecessary to the attainment of a competent fortune. For this purpose I am confident the salt will prove very sufficient. The society should be formed upon an improvement of a plan which was not perfected in my time. The price to the natives was too great, and so was the advantage to the servants. Reduce both, and I am persuaded there will be no complaint of oppression on the one hand, or want of emolument on the other.

‘The Company’s servants should all have a subsistence, but every idea of raising a fortune, till they are entitled to it by some years’ service, ought to be suppressed. If a general system of economy could be introduced, it would be happy for individuals, as well as for the public. The expenses of the Company in Bengal are hardly to be supported.

Great savings, I am certain, may be made. Bills for fortifications, cantonments, contracts, etc., must be abolished, together with every extravagant charge for travelling, diet, parade and pomp of subordinates. In short, by economy alone the Company may yet preserve its credit and affluence.

‘With regard to political measures, they are to be taken according to the occasion. When danger arises, every precaution must be made use of, but at the same time you must be prepared to meet and encounter it. This you must do with cheerfulness and confidence, never entertaining a thought of miscarrying till the misfortune actually happens; and even then you are not to despair, but be constantly contriving and carrying into execution schemes for retrieving affairs; always flattering yourself with an opinion that time and perseverance will get the better of everything.

‘From the little knowledge I have of you, I am convinced that you have not only abilities and personal resolution, but integrity and moderation with regard to riches; but I thought I discovered in you a diffidence in your own judgment, and too great an easiness of disposition, which may subject you insensibly to be *led* where you ought to *guide*. Another evil which may arise from it is, that you may pay too great an attention to the reports of the natives, and be inclined to look upon things in the worst instead of the best light. A proper confidence

in yourself, and never-failing hope of success, will be a bar to this and every other ill that your situation is liable to; and as I am sure that you are not wanting in abilities for the great office of Governor, I must add that an opportunity is now given you of making yourself one of the most distinguished characters of this country.

‘I perceive I have been very free in delivering my sentiments; but to make an apology were to contradict the opinion I profess to have of your understanding, and to doubt whether you would receive this as a token of my esteem.

‘It is perhaps unnecessary to add that this letter, which I have written in the fullest confidence, should be kept entirely to yourself. If a reciprocal communication of our sentiments on India affairs be agreeable to you, you may depend upon my continuing the correspondence in such manner as to show that I am with the sincerest wishes for your honour and success, dear sir, your very faithful humble servant,

CLIVE.’

This letter is interesting, as containing a free expression of Clive’s views on the then situation in India, and his estimate of the great man to whom it was addressed; but subsequent events speedily showed that Clive was entirely mistaken in supposing Hastings to be deficient in resolution. The two men differed in many respects. Their training had

been different, but in the important quality of courage under difficulties, of the '*mens æqua in arduis*,' it is hard to choose between them ; indeed, if we consider the difficulties with which Hastings had to contend during his long service as Governor of Bengal, and subsequently as Governor-General of India, and afterwards during his seven years' impeachment before Parliament, and when we remember the sad ending of Clive's life, we feel almost constrained to award the palm to Hastings.

CHAPTER XVI

ATTACKS UPON CLIVE IN THE PRESS—PROCEEDINGS
IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS — PRACTICAL
ACQUITTAL OF CLIVE — THE COMMITTEE OF
SECRECY AND ITS RESULTS — THE REGULATING
ACT OF 1773—THE STRAIN UPON CLIVE—HIS
DEATH.

UP to this time Clive had maintained a somewhat isolated position in Parliament, having joined none of the great parties in the State, and it was feared by his enemies, not unnaturally, that if he now threw in his lot with the Ministers of the Crown, the difficulties of their task would be seriously increased.

When the letter to Hastings was written, and for some time previously, Clive's enemies in the Court of Directors and in the Court of Proprietors, with Sullivan at their head, were busily engaged in preparing an attack upon him in Parliament. About the same time Clive had conferences on the state of affairs in India with Lord North, then Prime Minister, and with the Secretary of State, Lord Rochford. These conferences would seem to

have precipitated the crisis ; but the events which followed did not take the precise shape which Clive had, or could have, anticipated. His discussions with Ministers had not prepared him for any hostile action on their part, nor does it appear that anything of the sort was at that time intended. When Parliament met on the 22d January 1772, the speech from the throne announced that it was proposed to introduce a measure to provide new laws 'for supplying defects or remedying abuses' in the administration of India ; but Clive had no reason to suppose that the new laws referred to any other reforms than those which he had himself advocated. Shortly afterwards, however, Sullivan, who was at that time deputy-chairman of the Court of Directors, and also a member of the House of Commons, gave notice of a motion to introduce a Bill 'for the better regulation of the affairs of the East India Company and of their servants in India, and for the administration of justice in Bengal.'

Several of the measures provided for in this Bill were measures which Clive had repeatedly advocated ; but when, on the 30th March, the debate came on, Sullivan's speech introducing the Bill, although he did not mention Clive's name, was practically an indictment of Clive.

For some time previously the newspapers had teemed with attacks upon him. Both in the Indian civil service and in the army he had made

enemies during his last administration by his stern repression of abuses and inflexible enforcement of orders. The leaders in the very formidable mutiny of the British officers of the Bengal army, with which Clive had dealt so effectively during the last year of his government, and the members of Council whom in the previous year he had dismissed or suspended for their violation of the orders of the Court in regard to the acceptance of presents from natives, did their best to stimulate the attacks upon him. The very crimes which he had incurred the odium of repressing were laid to his charge. The unsatisfactory condition of the Company's affairs after his departure from India, attributable in a great measure to the errors of his successors, was ascribed to him.

Stung to the quick by the onslaught made upon him, and by the ingratitude of the authorities who ought to have come forward in his defence, Clive took advantage of the debate raised by Sullivan to reply to his assailants, and in a speech of remarkable eloquence and vigour, in regard to which Lord Chatham¹ said that he had never listened to a finer speech, demolished the accusations which had been made against him.

This speech, which occupies thirty-four columns of Almon's Parliamentary History,² is too long to

¹ The Earl of Chatham was present in the House of Commons under the gallery when the speech was made.

² Revised and published by T. C. Hansard in 1813.

reproduce in the text of this memoir, but it will be found printed at length as an Appendix.¹ In it Clive went fully into the charges which had been made against him. He reminded the House how, in 1764, when the affairs of Bengal and of the Company were in a dangerous and critical situation, he had been sent out to put them straight, how the Court of Directors at that time had not treated him with the consideration to which he was entitled, but had grudged him the necessary powers, while those they gave him had been so loosely worded that when he reached Calcutta they were contested by the Council, and he was compelled to place a broad construction upon them in order to secure the objects with which they had been given. Three paths, he said, were before him. One 'was strewn with abundance of fair advantages.' He might have put himself at the head of the Government as he found it. He might have encouraged the resolution that the Council had taken, not to execute the new covenants which prohibited the receipt of presents, and he might, notwithstanding that he had signed the covenant himself, have increased his wealth by unjustifiable means.

Or he might, finding his powers disputed, have left Bengal without making an effort to save it.

The third path was intricate, but he resolved to pursue it. He determined to do his duty, although

¹ Appendix I.

he incurred the odium of the whole settlement. He took the resolution 'of cleansing the Augean stable.' 'It was that conduct,' he said, 'which has occasioned the public papers to teem with scurrility and abuse against me, ever since my return to England. It was that conduct which occasioned these charges. But it was that conduct which enables me now, when the day of judgment is come, to look my judges in the face. It was that conduct which enables me now to lay my hand upon my heart, and most solemnly to declare to this House, to the gallery and to the whole world at large, that I never in a single instance lost sight of what I thought the honour and true interest of my country and the Company; that I was never guilty of any acts of violence or oppression, unless the bringing of offenders to justice can be deemed so; that as to extortion, such an idea never entered into my mind; that I did not suffer those under me to permit any acts of violence, oppression or extortion; that my influence was never employed for the advantage of any man, contrary to the strictest principles of honour and justice; and that, so far from reaping any benefit myself from the expedition, I returned to England many thousand pounds out of pocket—a fact of which this House will presently be convinced.'¹

¹It is evident that Clive here refers to his last government of Bengal.

Clive then proceeded to deal in detail with the charges contained in the papers sent to him by the Court of Directors. They referred to monopolies which had been established by the Government of Bengal in cotton and diamonds, and also in salt, betel and tobacco. As to cotton, he averred that he knew no more about it than the Pope of Rome. Trade was not his profession. As to the establishment of a gold coinage, it was a subject of which he had no personal knowledge. It was very much out of his sphere. The object of the Select Committee was, by establishing a gold coinage, to obviate the evils resulting from the drain of silver to China and other places. He had never sent a single rupee or gold mohur to be coined in his life. It was alleged that the monopolies in salt, betel nut and tobacco, and other commodities, had occasioned the late famine in Bengal. To this Clive replied that he could not understand how a monopoly of salt, betel and tobacco in the years 1765 and 1766 could occasion a want of rain and scarcity of rice in 1770. He went into the question of the inland trade, and showed how completely his action in regard to it had been in accordance with the orders of the Court. As to the tax upon salt, he remarked that the Select Committee had established the plan which had been adopted, 'upon experience and a thorough knowledge of the Company's interest,'

while the conduct of the Court of Directors in abolishing it was 'founded upon obstinacy and ignorance.'

The attack upon this occasion was directed almost entirely against Clive's last administration, and as there was no fault to be found with that administration, but on the contrary it had been signalised by services of the highest merit, the attack in all probability would have failed, had not Clive taken advantage of the occasion to denounce the mal-administration both of His Majesty's Government and of the Court of Directors. His denunciation of these bodies, and especially of the Government, was an error in tact which was largely, if not entirely, responsible for the issue of the debate. As one of Clive's biographers has told us,¹ it was remarked by his best friends on this occasion that 'he had never spoken with greater eloquence, or with more evil tendency as regarded himself.' He denounced the policy, or rather the want of policy, of the Government as deficient in courage and in foresight, while at the same time their treatment of the Company was grasping and unfair. 'The Company,' he said, 'had acquired an empire more extensive than any kingdom in Europe, France and Russia excepted. They had acquired a revenue of four millions sterling, and a trade in proportion. It was natural to suppose that such an object would have merited

¹ Gleig's *Life of Lord Clive*, p. 295.

the most serious attention of Administration;¹ that in concert with the Court of Directors, they would have considered the nature of the Company's charter, and have adopted a plan adequate to such possessions. Did they take it into consideration? No, they did not. They treated it rather as a South Sea bubble than as anything solid and substantial; they thought of nothing but the present time, regardless of the future. They said, "Let us get what we can to-day, let to-morrow take care of itself;" they thought of nothing but the immediate division of the loaves and fishes; nay, so anxious were they to lay their hands upon some immediate advantage, that they actually went so far as to influence a parcel of temporary proprietors to bully the Directors into their terms. It was their duty, Sir, to have called upon the Directors for a plan; and if a plan in consequence had not been laid before them, it would then have become their duty, with the aid and assistance of Parliament, to have formed one themselves. If Administration had done their duty, we should not now have heard a speech from the Throne intimating the necessity of Parliamentary interposition to save our possessions in India from impending ruin.'

Not less emphatic was Clive's condemnation of the

¹ The word 'Administration' seems to have been constantly used in those days where we should now use the word 'Government.' It was frequently used in this sense by Clive, and also by Edmund Burke.

Court of Directors. He especially denounced their recent action in yielding to the Court of Proprietors, and abandoning the prosecutions of the officials who had been dismissed or suspended for having violated the orders of the Court against the acceptance of presents. He said that by dropping these prosecutions the Directors 'gave a stab to their own vitals. From that instant they destroyed their own power abroad, and erased from the minds of their servants in India every wholesome regulation which the Committee had established. The servants abroad were in anxious suspense to learn whether they were punishable, or not, for misconduct. The lenity or weakness of the Court of Directors confirmed their doubts. From that instant all covenants were forgotten, or only looked upon as so many sheets of blank paper, and from that instant began that relaxation of government so much now complained of, and so much still to be dreaded.'

The Court of Proprietors and the General Courts, at which the Court of Directors and the Court of Proprietors sat together, received no mercy from him. Their violent proceedings, he alleged, had subverted the authority of the Directors, which was further weakened by the system of annual contested elections for the Direction.

Clive was answered in a violent, but by no means convincing, speech by Governor Johnston, a brother of the Mr Johnston who had led the opposition to Clive in the Bengal Council. The motion for the

introduction of the Bill was passed without a division, and on the 13th April it was laid on the table, but it never took its place on the Statute-book ; for after the second reading, another member, Colonel Burgoyne, apparently in concert with Sullivan, moved for the appointment of a select Committee 'to inquire into the nature, state and condition of the East India Company, and of the British affairs in the East Indies.' This motion was also carried without a division, though not without considerable discussion, Edmund Burke, among other members, protesting warmly against the proposed inquiry. The Select Committee was composed of thirty-one members. It included Clive and his former Secretary, Mr Henry Strachey, but it was mainly composed of members hostile to Clive. It speedily became apparent that the intention was to place Clive upon his trial. He was closely cross-examined as to the events of 1757 before and after Plassey, including the episode of Omichand and the presents received by him from Mir Jafar. He was questioned not only as to his acts, but as to his motives ; but he bore himself with unfailing firmness. He admitted and justified everything he had done. When questioned as to the fraud played upon Omichand, and as to his having forged Admiral Watson's signature, he boldly avowed both these incidents, and said that in the same circumstances he would do the same things over again. He frankly admitted the receipt of enormous presents from Mir

Jafar ; but contended that as the law stood he was not debarred by any consideration, either of honour or of duty, from receiving them. Addressing the chairman at the close of a long cross-examination, he exclaimed : ' Am I not rather deserving of praise for the moderation which marked my proceedings ? Consider the situation in which the victory at Plassey had placed me. A great prince was dependent on my pleasure ; an opulent city lay at my mercy ; its richest bankers bid against each other for my smiles ; I walked through vaults which were thrown open to me alone, piled on either hand with gold and jewels ! Mr Chairman, at this moment I stand astonished at my own moderation ! '

In the course of a few weeks the Select Committee issued two reports, which were at once printed and circulated broadcast through the country, Clive's enemies hoping thereby to prejudice the public mind against him. The result was not exactly what they anticipated, for while the lower classes generally accepted their views, the more intelligent members of the community could not help admiring the straightforward courage with which Clive met the charges, the frankness of his admissions, and the manliness and dignity of his bearing.

The King took an early opportunity of manifesting his favourable sentiments towards Clive. Three weeks after the reports of the Select Committee had been laid on the table of the House of Commons,

Clive was invested with the Order of the Bath. In the course of the year he was appointed Lord-Lieutenant of Shropshire, the county to which he belonged, and also of Montgomeryshire. But his enemies were not prepared to desist from their attacks upon him without a further struggle. At the opening of the session of 1773, the Select Committee resumed its inquiries, and on the 10th May, Colonel Burgoyne moved the following resolutions :—

1st. That all acquisitions made under the influence of a military force, or by treaty with foreign princes, did of right belong to the State.

2d. That to appropriate acquisitions so made, to the private emolument of persons entrusted with any civil or military power of the State, is illegal.

3d. That very great sums of money, and other valuable property, had been acquired in Bengal from princes and others of that country by persons entrusted with the civil and military powers of the State by means of such powers, which sums of money and valuable property have been appropriated to the private use of such persons.

These resolutions were obviously directed against Clive, but in order that there might be no doubt upon the subject, Burgoyne, when moving them, made a direct and violent attack upon Clive, and intimated that, in the event of the resolutions being passed, he should follow them up by moving : ‘That persons who had acquired sums of money by presents or otherwise

in India, if they had acquired such sums by virtue of their acting in a public capacity, should be forced to make restitution.'

The resolutions were all carried, the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General (Thurlow) voting for them, while the Solicitor-General (Wedderburn) voted and made a forcible speech against them. A few days later Burgoyne moved the further resolution of which he had given notice. It was in these words :—

'That it appears to this House that Robert Lord Clive, Baron of Plassey in the Kingdom of Ireland, about the time of the deposing of Suraj ud Daulah, Nawáb of Bengal, and the establishing of Mír Jafar on the Masnad, did, through the influence of the powers with which he was entrusted as a member of the Select Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, obtain and possess himself of two lakhs and 80,000 rupees, as member of the Select Committee; a further sum of two lakhs of rupees as Commander-in-Chief; and a further sum of sixteen lakhs of rupees or more under the denomination of private donation; which sums, amounting together to twenty lakhs and 80,000 rupees, were of the value, in English money, of £234,000; and that in so doing the said Robert Lord Clive abused the powers with which he was entrusted, to the evil example of the servants of the public.'

The motion was followed by a debate, in the course

of which Clive made another speech,¹ in which he recapitulated his services, and referred to the approval which on several occasions they had received from the Court of Directors. After reading to the House more than one letter from the Court expressing their full approval of all his proceedings, he said :—

‘After such certificates as these, Sir, am I to be brought here as a criminal, and the very best parts of my conduct construed as a crime against the State? Is this the reward that is now held out to persons who have performed such important services to their country? If it is, Sir, the future consequences that will attend the execution of any important trust, committed to the persons who have the care of it, will be fatal indeed; and I am sure the noble lord upon the Treasury Bench, whose great humanity and abilities I revere, would never have consented to the resolutions that were passed the other night if he had thought on the dreadful consequences that would attend them.

‘Sir, I cannot say that I either sit or rest easy when I find by the extensive resolution proposed that all I have in the world is to be confiscated, and that no one will henceforward take my security for a shilling. These, Sir, are dreadful apprehensions to remain under, and I cannot look upon myself but as a bankrupt; nothing my own, and totally unable to give any security while these resolutions are pending. Such,

Sir, is the situation I am in. I have not anything left which I can call my own except my paternal fortune of £500 per annum, which has been in the family for ages past. But upon this I am content to live, and perhaps I shall find more real content of mind and happiness therein than in the trembling affluence of an unsettled fortune.

‘But, Sir, I must make one more observation, that if the definition of the honourable gentleman (General Burgoyne) and of this House is that the State, as expressed in these resolutions, is *quoad hoc* the Company, then, Sir, every farthing that I enjoy is granted to me. But to be called, after sixteen years have elapsed, to account for my conduct in this manner, and after an uninterrupted enjoyment of my property, to have it questioned and considered as obtaining it unwarrantably, is hard indeed, and a treatment I should not think the British Senate capable of. But if it should be the case, I have a conscious innocence within me that tells me my conduct is irreproachable. “*Frangas non flectes.*” They may take from me what I have. They may as they think, make me poor, but I will be happy. I mean not this as my defence, though I have done for the present. My defence will be made at that bar, and before I sit down I have one request to make to the House, that when they come to decide upon my honour, they will not forget their own.’

After Clive sat down, the debate was adjourned to

the 21st May, when Burgoyne's motion, the text of which has been already given, was put to the vote. It was at once moved as an amendment by Mr Stanley that the first part of the motion ending with the words 'English money, of £234,000' should be put separately. Mr Rose Fuller, who seconded the amendment, added to it a clause that the words 'through the influence of the powers with which he was entrusted as a member of the Select Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the British forces,' should be left out. This occasioned a long debate, at the end of which Mr Stanley's amendment, as further amended by Mr Fuller, was carried by a majority of 155 votes against 95.

Burgoyne then made a final attempt to carry his point by moving that 'Lord Clive did, in so doing, abuse the powers with which he was entrusted to the evil example of the servants of the public.' The majority of the House, who had just negatived a similar motion, were not prepared to accept this, and the previous question was carried without a division. Finally, at five o'clock in the morning, it was moved by Wedderburn and carried, also without a division, that 'Robert Lord Clive did at the same time render great and meritorious services to his country.' Thus ended this extraordinary inquiry, which, although not technically a trial, was one in reality. The result was to relieve Clive from further anxiety as to his future.

There was more than one noteworthy feature connected with these proceedings. Before they concluded, the Prime Minister perceived that the real, indeed the sole, object of the Select Committee was to injure Clive, and that its investigations did not tend to throw any light upon the affairs of the East India Company, at that time most seriously embarrassed. He therefore obtained, at the commencement of the Session of 1773, the appointment of a Committee of Secrecy, composed of thirteen members, with power to examine the books of the Company, and with instructions to report upon its financial position, and also to state whether the Directors should be allowed to carry out a proposal which they had made, to send out six Supervisors to superintend the affairs of India. The existence at the same time of two Committees of the House of Commons, both dealing with the affairs of India, has been described as a strange anomaly, and it is probable that the two Committees at times travelled over the same ground; but the objects with which the two Committees were appointed were different. The object sought in the appointment of the Select Committee was, it is clear, to ruin Clive. The object in view in the appointment of the Committee of Secrecy was to reform Indian administration. The first Committee failed in its object. It inflicted upon Clive a protracted torture. It probably helped to shorten his life; but it failed to

deprive him of his property, and it did not materially injure his reputation. The verdict with which the inquiry conducted by the Select Committee closed was not at all the sort of verdict which Sullivan and Clive's other enemies had in view. On the other hand, the inquiries held by the Committee of Secrecy were followed by some useful reforms, most of them in accordance with recommendations previously made by Clive. Of these the most important was the Regulating Act of 1773, which, though defective in some respects, was a great improvement upon the state of things which previously existed. It created a Governor-General with control over the whole of British India. It substituted for the cumbersome arrangement of a Council composed of sixteen members, with a Select Committee which could overrule the decisions of the Council, a Council composed of four members. It substituted four years for one year as the period for which the Directors of the Company were to hold their seats, and it raised the qualification for a vote at the election of the Directors. Its great defect was that it withheld from the Governor-General the power of overruling his Council, a power which Clive had asked for when he was sent out to India in 1764. The withholding of this power was the main cause of Warren Hastings's difficulties, although the latter were doubtless in no small measure due to the extraordinary unfitness of some of the men

appointed to the new Council, and especially of Sir Philip Francis.

The proceedings of the Select Committee were characterised by a vindictive spirit which was extremely discreditable to the House of Commons. James Mill, who, in his *History of British India*, took, as a general rule, by no means a favourable view of Clive's conduct and character, condemns the Parliamentary proceedings against Clive in language, the justice of which it is impossible to dispute. He writes, 'The considerations which fairly recommended the rejection or at least a very great modification of the general proceedings, were not so much as mentioned; the punishment threatened was more grievous than the offence; it was punishment by an *ex post facto* law, because, however contrary to the principles of right government, the presents received from Mir Jafar, and however odious to the moral sense the deception practised upon Omichand, there was no law at the time which forbade them; the presents, however contrary to European morals and ideas, were perfectly correspondent to those of the country in which they were received, and to the expectations of the parties by whom they were bestowed; the treachery to Omichand was countenanced and palliated by some of the principles and many of the admired incidents of European diplomacy; Clive, though never inattentive to his own interests, was actuated by a sincere desire to promote the prosperity of the

Company, and appears not in any instance to have sacrificed what he regarded as their interests to his own; and it would have required an extraordinary man, which no one ought to be punished for not being, to have acted in that most trying situation in which he was placed with greater disinterestedness than he displayed.¹

We have said that the verdict of the House of Commons relieved Clive from anxiety as to his future. But it did not relieve him from the consequences of the heavy strain, both mental and physical, to which he had been exposed during the time the inquiry lasted, extending over the greater part of two Sessions, and the interval between them. While the strain continued, Clive bore up against it with the unfailing courage which he invariably evinced in times of difficulty. But when the inquiry terminated and the strain was removed, he seems to have gradually collapsed. The maladies which he had brought with him from India, induced by a life of constant exposure and fatigue in an unhealthy climate, and aggravated rather than alleviated by a free and increasing use of opium, would seem not only to have sapped his physical strength, but to have caused extreme mental depression. He suffered much from gall-stones. He tried the waters of Bath, and again visited the Continent, but none of the remedies which were prescribed afforded permanent

¹ Mill's *History of British India*, vol. iii. pp. 358-359.

relief. Notwithstanding all he had undergone, he still had many of the blessings of life. He had a beautiful and accomplished wife, devotedly attached to him, affectionate sons and daughters, and a large body of friends, most of whom had stood by him during all his troubles. Added to these advantages, he was in possession, now secure, of a magnificent fortune, which enabled him to gratify his generous instincts in conferring benefits upon his family and friends. He was still in early middle age, and might, had he desired it, have taken an active part in politics, if indeed he had not been again employed in a military capacity, in which he had already so greatly distinguished himself. It has been said that the Government contemplated employing him in America, in the war which was then looming in the near future, and it is not improbable that in this event, as more than one of his biographers has suggested, the independence of the United States might have been postponed for another half-century. The one thing he lacked was that greatest blessing of all, unimpaired health. His physical sufferings, added to a tendency to mental depression which had characterised him from an early age, were doubtless in a great measure responsible for his melancholy end, although there can be little question that it was hastened by the trying events of the previous two years. Some years before his death, in a letter addressed to his friend and secretary,

Henry Strachey, Clive had used the following language :—

‘I suffer in the manner I did on board the *Britannia*, both from the bile and from my former nervous complaint, but not more, which convinces me the roots of both disorders still remain, and I much fear I must be unhappy as long as I live, tho’ I am certain there is nothing mortal in either of them, and, in all probability, I shall drag on a miserable life for 15 or 20 years longer, as I have already done since the year 1752. That I am fatter and stronger since I landed at Portsmouth is certain, that I can trot on horseback for 15 to 20 miles together, use more exercise, and have left off opium entirely.

‘VEZENAS, April 22, 1768.’

And a few days before the end came, in a letter to the same correspondent, he used language still more despondent,—

‘How miserable,’ he wrote, ‘is my condition. I have a disease which makes life insupportable, but which doctors tell me won’t shorten it an hour.’

Clive’s death took place on the 22d November 1774, when he was little more than forty-nine years of age. The manner of it, and the circumstances which attended it, like most things about Clive, were extraordinary. The following account is taken from Gleig’s *Life* :—

‘A female friend, it appears, was on a visit at his house. He had suffered extremely throughout the

whole of the 21st November, and was driven more than was usual with him to seek relief in strong doses of laudanum. The same process continued during the early part of the 22d; but that his reason was not clouded, nor his self-possession taken away, the following fact seems to prove. About noon on the 22d, or a little later, the lady came into his room and said, "Lord Clive, I cannot find a good pen; will you be so good as to make me one?" "To be sure," replied he; and taking a penknife from his waistcoat pocket, he moved towards one of the windows and mended the pen. The lady received it back with thanks, and withdrew. In a short time afterwards, a servant entering found Lord Clive dead; and the instrument with which he had destroyed himself proved, on examination, to be the same small knife with which he had mended his friend's pen.'

There is, however, another account of Clive's death, given by Sir Edward Strachey, and quoted in an article in the *Spectator* for the 4th November 1893, which differs from that given above, and is to the effect that on the day on which Clive committed suicide, he and Lady Clive, together with Mr and Mrs Strachey and Miss Ducarrel (the lady above referred to), were in a room in Clive's house in Berkeley Square,¹ when Clive left the room, and on

¹ Sir Edward Strachey, who has kindly communicated on the subject with the writer of this Memoir, now adds that some of the party, including Clive, were playing at whist.

his not returning, Mr Strachey advised Lady Clive to see where he was. 'She went to look for him, and at last, opening a door, found him with his throat cut.' In the following number of the *Spectator* (November 11, 1893) there is a letter from Sir Frederick Halliday, the oldest, and one of the most eminent of the Bengal civil servants still living, who is a grandson of Miss Ducarrel, or properly Ducarel. In this letter Sir F. Halliday repeats the story, as told by Gleig, on the authority of his grandmother, whom he describes as a woman with a strong, clear head, who lived on to 1834, when she was ninety-two years old. The two accounts would be reconcilable were it not that Sir Frederick states that Clive, after mending the pen, went into another apartment, and immediately put an end to himself—the point is not perhaps of much importance.

Clive was buried in the churchyard at Moreton Say, the parish in which he was born.

CHAPTER XVII

REMARKABLE POINTS IN THE CAREER OF CLIVE—
CLIVE'S CHARACTER—INCONSISTENCIES IN IT—
MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE'S ESTIMATE OF CLIVE
—PUBLIC INGRATITUDE EVINCED TOWARDS CLIVE
AND HIS THREE GREATEST SUCCESSORS.

THE career of Clive was a very remarkable one, whether we consider the position and reputation which he, beginning life as a clerk in the service of a mercantile company, was able to achieve at a very early age; or the combination of administrative capacity in civil affairs with military genius of the highest order; or the difficulties under which he laboured, arising from a temperament peculiarly susceptible of nervous depression, and from a physique by no means strong; or the shortness of the time in which his work was done.

Perhaps the most extraordinary part of the story is the very few years which it took to lay the foundation of the British Indian Empire. Clive received his first military commission in 1747, and his first course of service in India was brought to a close in February 1753. In that brief period, amounting to less than six years, Clive by his defence of Arcot, by his victory at Kaveripák, and by the other operations

in which he was engaged in the South of India, at the age of twenty-seven established his reputation as a military commander. His second visit to India, which included Plassey and the establishment of British ascendancy in Bengal, lasted only from 27th November 1755 to 25th February 1760, or little more than four years. His third and last visit, in which he laid the foundations of regular government in Bengal, was cut short by ill health in twenty-two months. Clive's real work in India thus occupied, all told, a little less than twelve years.

In spite of all that has been written about Clive, a considerable amount of misconception regarding his true character exists even to this day. The common estimate of him still is that he was a brave and able, but violent and unscrupulous man. The prejudice against him which embittered the latter years of his life, although in a great degree unfounded, has not yet entirely passed away. In a modern poem, entitled 'Clive's Dream before Plassey,'¹ Clive is thus apostrophised :—

'Violent and bad, thou art Jehovah's servant still,
And e'en to thee a dream may be an Angel of His will.

Macauley's statement that 'Clive, like most men who are born with strong passions and tried by strong temptations, committed great faults, but that our island has scarcely ever produced a man more truly great either in arms or in council,' is not only more

¹ *Ex Erema*, poems chiefly written in India, by H. G. Keene. London, 1855.

generous but more just. The transactions upon which Clive has been chiefly attacked are the fraud upon Omichand and the pecuniary arrangement with Mír Jafar. For the fraud upon Omichand it is impossible to offer any defence. It was not only morally a crime, but, regarded merely from the point of view of political expediency, it was a blunder of a kind which, if it had been copied in after times, would have deprived our Government in India of one of the main sources of its power—the implicit confidence of the natives in British faith. It is sometimes suggested, in defence of Clive's action in this matter, that Watts and some of the other parties to the conspiracy against the Nawáb were in the power of the latter, and that their lives would certainly have been sacrificed had Omichand disclosed the conspiracy ; but this argument ignores the fact that Omichand's silence would have been equally purchased by meeting his demand, instead of resorting to a discreditable trick which left an indelible stain upon Clive's reputation and upon the British name.

For the acceptance of the sum of money, large as it was, which Mír Jafar presented to Clive after Plassey, and of the Jagír which he subsequently conferred upon him, there is something to be said, if not in justification, at all events in extenuation. The East India Company at that time tacitly sanctioned the acceptance by their servants of presents from the native powers, paying them miserable salaries, but allowing

them to enrich themselves by trade and presents. That Clive would have scorned for the sake of personal gain, under any circumstances, to take a course which he knew to be inconsistent with the interests of his country, is proved by the whole of his career, and among other instances by his conduct in making war on his own responsibility upon the Dutch, at the time when a great part of his fortune was in hands of the Dutch East India Company. And whatever errors he committed in the two transactions above referred to, those errors were nobly redeemed by the energetic onslaught which he made during his second government of Bengal upon the system of oppression, extortion and corruption which then prevailed.

It is not easy to define Clive's character. Like many other characters, it was full of inconsistencies. Brave and daring, magnanimous and generous, possessing an inflexible will, and in every sense a leader of men, he was not free from some of the defects which are usually associated with a vain and petty nature. He was greedy of praise and resented detraction. By no means tolerant of opposition, he yet, when convinced of the ability of a man whom he disliked, was willing, as a matter of public duty, to employ him. Perhaps the most philosophic estimate of his character is that embodied in Mr Mountstuart Elphinstone's preface¹ to the *Rise and Progress of the British Power in the East*,¹ in which the following

¹ See Appendix III.

remarks are especially noteworthy : ' Clive's estimate of his own services, great as they were, by no means fell short of their actual value. This does not arise from any indulgence of vanity on his part ; but there is no occasion on which they can promote his views or interest, where they are not brought forward in an exaggerated form, with a boldness and consciousness of worth that command our respect and overcome our dislike to self-praise. Hence arose a marked peculiarity of Clive's character. After the enormous extent to which he profited by his situation, he delights to dwell on his integrity and moderation, and speaks of greed and rapacity in others with scorn and indignation. Convinced that the bounty of Mír Jafar fell short of his claims on the Company, he inveighs against his successors who receive presents which they had not earned, and speaks of them with disgust as the most criminal as well as the meanest of mankind. Nor are these sentiments assumed to impose upon the public. They are most strongly expressed in his most confidential letters, and appear to be drawn forth by the strength of his feelings. In no stage of his life did Clive appear with more dignity than during his persecution. His boasts of merit and service now appear as a personal resistance to calumny and oppression ; the spirit with which he avowed and gloried in his acts which excited the most clamour and odium, his independence towards his judges, his defiance of

his powerful enemies, excite our interest, while they command our respect and admiration.'

Clive's speeches during the inquiry in the House of Commons show considerable oratorical power, especially when we consider that action, and not speaking, formed the main business of his life. His letters were plain and to the point, if somewhat stiff and formal in expression. Some of them have been quoted in the pages of this Memoir. The following, addressed to Wedderburn on hearing of the death of his staunch friend, George Grenville, is a fair specimen of his style:—

‘BATH, 18th November 1770.

‘DEAR SIR,—If the receipt of your very obliging and confidential letter had not roused me, I doubt much whether I should have prevailed upon myself to put pen to paper, though there is something within that tells me I shall at last overcome a disorder so very distressing both to the mind and to the body. Although the waters agree with me better than any plan I have yet tried, yet by my feelings a journey abroad, I fear, must be undertaken before I can obtain a perfect recovery of my health.

‘Mr Grenville's death, though long expected, could not but affect me very severely. Gratitude first bound me to him; a more intimate connection afterwards gave an opportunity of admiring his abilities and respecting his worth and integrity. The dissolution of our valuable friend has shipwrecked all

our hopes for the present, and my indisposition hath not only made me indifferent to the world of politics, but to the world in general. What effect returning health may have, I cannot answer for ; but if I can judge for myself in my present situation, I wish to support that independency which will be approved of by my friends in particular, and by the public in general. My sentiments are the same as yours with regard to our conduct in the present times.

‘Your delicacy towards me serves only to convince me of the propriety of my conduct in leaving you the absolute master of your own conduct in Parliament, free from all control but that of your own judgment, and I am happy in this opportunity. Your great and uncommon abilities must, sooner or later, place you in one of the first posts of this Kingdom, and you may be assured no man on earth wishes to see your honour and your independency firmly established more than I.’

Among Clive’s weaknesses were foppery in dress and a love of display. When on service he dressed very plainly ; but at other times he was much addicted to fine clothes, and also to splendour in the liveries of his domestic servants and in his general style of living. In this respect he appears to have somewhat resembled the other Anglo-Indians of the time, commonly known as the ‘Nabobs,’ who, having acquired large fortunes in India, sometimes by questionable methods, vied in their expenditure with men of rank in this country.

Lord Chatham, in one of his speeches, gave expression to the opinion very commonly entertained regarding the 'Nabobs' in these words: 'For some years past there has been an influx of wealth into this country which has been attended with many fatal consequences, because it had not been the regular, natural produce of labour and honesty. The riches of Asia have been poured in or upon us, and have brought with them not only Asiatic luxury, but, I fear, Asiatic principles of government. Without connections, without any natural interest in the soil, the importers of foreign gold have forced their way into Parliament by such a torrent of private corruption as no private hereditary fortune could resist.'

There can be no doubt that the evil repute in which men of this class were held had a prejudicial influence upon Clive in the eyes of his countrymen, and led the more ignorant members of the community, unmindful of his eminent services, to sympathise with his opponents.

His great wealth, which is said to have yielded an income of £40,000 a year, representing in those days a much larger revenue than it does at the present time, enabled him to indulge his taste for grandeur and to give full play to his general instincts. His mansion in Berkeley Square was lavishly furnished and decorated. He greatly improved his old home at Styche, which was usually occupied by his relatives. He purchased Claremont from the Duchess of New-

castle, and expended a large sum in improving it, besides presenting to his friend Wedderburn a house in the neighbourhood, in order that he might have a pleasant neighbour ; but the generosity with which he dispensed his wealth excited envy rather than admiration.

It cannot be said that Clive was a man of refinement either in manner or in appearance. His manner was often brusque, and in society he was dull, except when aroused by the discussion of some topic in which he took an interest. His figure was ungraceful. His temper, though warm, was generally kept under control. In some of the sterling qualities of human nature Clive must be accorded a high place. He never forgot a kindness. To his friend and benefactor, Stringer Lawrence, he presented an annuity of £500, and he offered a similar sum to Carnac if the latter wished to retire from the Indian service.

In the relations of private life, Clive's character appears to have been irreproachable. He was a generous and dutiful son, a kind brother, an affectionate husband and father, and a firm friend.

But it is mainly by his public acts that Clive must be judged. His life from an early age was devoted to the public service. His industry, both in India and in England, was indefatigable. His views were clear and far-seeing. Mr Elphinstone, in his otherwise excellent summary of Clive's character¹ and career, hardly does justice to him on this point. He

¹ Appendix III., p. 300.

says that 'Clive's views were clear within the circle of his vision, but they were not extensive.' When we remember that Clive advised the transfer of the government of India to the Crown nearly 100 years before that transfer was effected, and that he foresaw the conquest of Madagascar by the French,¹ which took place only a few years ago, it is impossible to maintain that Clive's views were not extensive. Few statesmen have discerned more clearly the possibilities of the future. Warren Hastings, Wellesley, and Dalhousie completed Clive's work, but the foundations of the British Empire in India were securely laid in those comparatively few years in which Robert Clive's brilliant services were rendered. All these men met with ingratitude from their contemporaries. The impeachment of Hastings, extending over seven long years, is a blot upon English history. The treatment of Wellesley by the Directors of the East India Company proved them incapable, at that time at all events, of realizing their responsibilities as governors of a great Empire, while the ignorant clamour against Dalhousie after the Mutiny took place, showed how speedily the recollection of splendid services may for a time be blotted out by disaster; but the fame of all these men has stood the test of years, and of none more than of him who has formed the subject of this Memoir.

¹ Appendix I., pp. 274, 275.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

IN the course of a debate in the House of Commons, on a motion made by Mr Sullivan, then deputy-chairman of the East India Company, under date the 30th March 1772, for leave to bring in a Bill for the better regulation of the affairs of the East India Company and for the due administration of justice in Bengal, Lord Clive made the following speech:—

Sir, it is with great diffidence that I attempt to speak to this House, but I find myself so particularly called upon that I must make the attempt, though I should expose myself in so doing. With what confidence can I venture to give my sentiments upon a subject of such national consequence, who myself stand charged with having been the cause of the present melancholy situation of the Company's affairs in Bengal? This House can have no reliance on my opinion whilst such an impression remains unremoved. The House will therefore give me the leave to remove this impression, and to endeavour to restore myself to their favourable opinion, which, I flatter myself, they entertained of my conduct before these charges were exhibited against me. Nor do I wish to lay my

conduct before the members of this House only—I speak likewise to my country in general, upon whom I put myself, not only without reluctance, but with alacrity.

It is well known that I was called upon, in the year 1764, by a General Court, to undertake the management of the Company's affairs in Bengal when they were in a very critical and dangerous situation. It is as well known that my circumstances were independent and affluent. Happy in the sense of my past conduct and services, happy in my family, happy in my connections, happy in everything but my health, which I lost in the Company's service, never to be regained. This situation, this happiness, I relinquished at the call of the Company, to go to a far-distant, unhealthy climate, to undertake the envious task of reformation. My enemies will suppose that I was actuated by mercenary motives. But this House and my country at large will, I hope, think more liberally. They will conceive that I undertook this expedition from a principle of gratitude, from a point of honour, and from a desire of doing essential service to that Company under whose auspices I had acquired my fortune and my fame.

My prospects on going abroad were by no means pleasing or encouraging; for after a violent contest, thirteen Directors only were chosen who thought favourably of my endeavours to serve the Company; the other eleven, however well they might wish to

the Company, were not willing that their good purposes should be accomplished by me. They first gave all possible obstruction to my acceptance of the government, and afterwards declined investing me with those powers without which I could not have acted effectually for the benefit of the Company. Upon my arrival in Bengal, I found the powers given were so loosely and jesuitically worded that they were immediately contested by the Council. I was determined, however, to put the most extensive construction upon them, because I was determined to do my duty to my country.

Three paths were before me. One was strewed with abundance of fair advantages. I might have put myself at the head of the Government as I found it. I might have encouraged the resolution which the gentlemen had taken, not to execute the new covenants which prohibited the receipt of presents; and although I had executed the covenants myself, I might have contrived to return to England with an immense fortune infamously added to the one before honourably obtained. Such an increase of wealth might have added to my weight in this country, but it would not have added to my peace of mind; because all men of honour and sentiment would have justly condemned me.

Finding my powers thus disputed, I might in despair have given up the commonwealth and have left Bengal without making an effort to save it. Such

conduct would have been deemed the effect of folly and cowardice.

The third path was intricate. Dangers and difficulties were on every side. But I resolved to pursue it. In short, I was determined to do my duty to the public although I should incur the odium of the whole settlement. The welfare of the Company required a vigorous exertion, and I took the resolution of cleansing the Augean stable.

It was that conduct which has occasioned the public papers to teem with scurrility and abuse against me, ever since my return to England. It was that conduct which occasioned these charges. But it was that conduct which enables me now, when the day of judgment is come, to look my judges in the face. It was that conduct which enables me now to lay my hand upon my heart and most solemnly to declare to this House, to the gallery and to the whole world at large, that I never, in a single instance, lost sight of what I thought the honour and true interest of my country and the Company; that I was never guilty of any acts of violence or oppression, unless the bringing offenders to justice can be deemed so; that, as to extortion, such an idea never entered into my mind; that I did not suffer those under me to commit any acts of violence, oppression or extortion; that my influence was never employed for the advantage of any man, contrary to the strictest principles of honour

and justice ; and that, so far from reaping any benefit myself from the expedition, I returned to England many thousand pounds out of pocket—a fact of which this House will presently be convinced.

The House will, I hope, permit me to lay before them a state of the charges I have alluded to, as well as of the manner in which they were conveyed to me.

The first public intimation I had of them was by the following letter from the Company's secretary :—

‘EAST INDIA HOUSE, 7th Jan. 1772.

‘MY LORD,—The Court of Directors of the East India Company having lately received several papers containing charges respecting the management of the Company's affairs in Bengal, wherein your Lordship is made a party, I am commanded to send you the enclosed copies thereof, and at the same time to acquaint your Lordship that, if you have any observations to make thereon, the Court of Directors would be glad to receive them as expeditiously as may be convenient to your Lordship.—I am, with great respect, my Lord, etc., etc.

‘P. MITCHELL, *Sec.*

‘The Right Hon. LORD CLIVE.’

My reply was to the Court of Directors as follows :—

‘GENTLEMEN,—I have received a letter from your secretary inclosing copies of several papers, which he

informs me were lately received by you, containing charges respecting the management of the Company's affairs in Bengal, wherein I am made a party ; and at the same time acquainting me that, if I have any observations to make thereon, you will be glad to receive them as expeditiously as may be convenient to me.

'You have not been pleased to inform me from whom you received those papers ; to what end they were laid before you ; what resolution you have come to concerning them ; nor for what purpose you expect my observations upon them.

'I shall, however, observe to you that upon the public records of the Company, where the whole of my conduct is stated, you may find a sufficient confutation of the charges which you have transmitted to me. And I cannot but suppose that if any part of my conduct had been injurious to the service, contradictory to my engagements with the Company, or even mysterious to you, four years and a half since my arrival in England would not have elapsed before your duty would have impelled you to call me to account.—I am, gentlemen, your most obedient servant,

'CLIVE.

'To the Hon. the COURT OF DIRECTORS.'

The charges I shall briefly state in the following order :—

First, a monopoly of cotton. Trade was not my

profession. My line has been military and political. I owe all I have in the world to my having been at the head of an army; and as to cotton—I know no more about it than the Pope of Rome.

The second charge against me is a monopoly of diamonds. And this also I shall get rid of in a few words. There are only two channels by which a servant of the Company can, with propriety, remit his fortune. The one, by paying the money into the treasury in India, and receiving bills upon the Company, payable in England; the other, by diamonds.

By the acquisition of the Diwání, and the successful endeavours of the Select Committee, the Company's treasury was so rich that we could not have been justified in drawing bills upon the Company. It was necessary I should, in some mode, remit the amount of my Jagír. For this purpose, and for this only, I sent an agent into a distant and independent country to make purchases of diamonds. Those diamonds were not sent home clandestinely; I caused them to be registered; I paid the duties upon them, and these remittances, upon the whole, turn out three per cent. worse than bills of exchange upon the Company. This is all I know of a monopoly of diamonds.

The third charge is frauds in the exchange and in the gold coinage. This is a subject very much out of my sphere. I am totally unacquainted with the proportions of alloy and the mixture of metals. All I

can speak to is the principle upon which we formed the plan of a gold coinage.

Everybody knows that silver is the only current coin in Bengal, and that gold is merely a species of merchandise. The Select Committee, apprehensive that the prodigious annual drains of silver to China and other places would soon occasion a scarcity of that metal in Bengal, considered of means to obviate the bad effect of those exports. We knew that there must be great quantities of gold in the country, and we hoped to make it circulate in coin. Hence the establishment of the gold currency. Whether it answered our purpose or not I cannot say, as I did not remain in Bengal long enough to experience the effect of it. But this I know, that the assay and mint master, by whose judgment we were guided, was a very able and a very honest man, and has, I understand, given a full and satisfactory explanation of his plan to the Court of Directors. With regard to myself, I shall only assert that I did not receive a farthing advantage from it, and that I never sent a single rupee or gold mohur to be coined in my life.

The fourth charge has this extraordinary title—A monopoly of salt, betel nut and tobacco, and other commodities, which occasioned the late famine. How a monopoly of salt, betel nut and tobacco in the years 1765 and 1766 could occasion a want of rain and scarcity of rice in the year 1770, is past my comprehension. I confess I cannot answer that

part of this article. And as to other commodities, as they have not been specified I cannot say anything to them. But with regard to the monopoly (as it is called) of salt, betel nut and tobacco, I will endeavour to explain the whole of that matter, and the House will permit me to dwell the longer upon it, as it is a point particularly insisted on by my adversaries. It is a part of my conduct that may be objected to by those who are unacquainted with the subject. I know it has been misunderstood and misrepresented even by some of my friends. They have imputed it to an error of judgment. Now, however ready I shall always be to acknowledge such an error, yet I hope to convince this House that no part of my conduct has been more unexceptionable, and that the plan, if it had been adopted by the Court of Directors, and strictly adhered to by the Government in Bengal, would have proved not only advantageous to the Company, but also beneficial to the country ; but the Court of Directors, alarmed at the word monopoly, seem never to have examined, and I am sure never thoroughly comprehended, the principles and effect of it.

Many years ago an expensive embassy was sent to Delhi to obtain certain grants and privileges from the Great Moghul in favour of the East India Company, and amongst others was obtained the privilege of trading duty free. The servants were indulged with this privilege under the sanction of

the Company's name. The Company never carried on any inland trade; their commerce has been confined to exports and imports only. It is impossible that the servants should have a more extensive right than the Company itself ever had. Yet they claimed a privilege of carrying on an inland trade duty free. The absurdity of a privilege so ruinous to the natives, and so prejudicial to the revenues of the country, is obvious. At the revolution in 1757 no such claim was set up, nor was any such trade carried on publicly, or to my knowledge, during my government which ended in the beginning of the year 1760.

The first appearance of this claim was in Governor Vansittart's time. The Nawáb Kásim Ali Khán strongly objected to it, representing to the Governor and Council the fatal consequences to the black merchants and to the revenues of his country. Mr Vansittart was sensible of the justice of the Nawáb's complaints, and soon after entered into articles of agreement that the English should carry on an inland trade in salt, paying a duty of nine per cent., which in fact was no remedy to the evil, because the natives paid infinitely more. The Council disavowed this act of Mr Vansittart, and insisted upon their right to all inland trade duty free. The Nawáb, enraged, threw open the trade throughout his country, and abolished all duties, in order that his own subjects might trade upon an equal footing with the English. This on the other hand disobliged the

Council, who insisted that the Nawáb should not suffer even his own subjects to trade duty free, but that the English alone should enjoy that privilege. These transactions were not clearly known to the Court of Directors till the year 1762, when they disapproved of them in the strongest terms, positively forbidding their servants to carry on any inland trade whatsoever. It was nevertheless continued, and with exemption from duties except in the article of salt; upon which a duty of two and a half per cent. only was agreed to be paid, by a treaty with the Nawáb Mír Jafar, after the deposition of Kásim Ali Khán.

Although the Court of Directors had been of opinion that the inland trade ought to be totally abolished, they, as well as the Proprietors, thought the Company's servants might be indulged in it under certain restrictions and regulations. In consequence of this idea, the General Court, on the 18th of May 1764, came to the following resolution:—

‘Resolved that it be recommended to the Court of Directors to re-consider the orders sent to Bengal relative to the trade of the Company's servants in the articles of salt, betel nut and tobacco; and that they do give such directions for regulating the same, agreeable to the interest of the Company and Subah, as to them may appear most prudent, either by settling here at home the restrictions under which this trade ought to be carried on, or by referring

- it to the Governor and Council of Fort William to regulate this important point in such a manner as may prevent all future disputes betwixt the Subah and the Company.'

This resolution was supported by the Court of Directors, who in their general letter to the Governor and Council, dated 1st of June 1764, at the time I went out to India, issued the following orders:—

Par. 54. 'For the reasons given in our letter of the 8th of February last, we were then induced to send positive orders to put a final and effectual end to the inland trade in salt, betel nut and tobacco, and all other articles whatsoever, produced and consumed in the country. To the remarks we made in that letter we must add one observation, which is, it appears very extraordinary that in a trade so extremely lucrative to individuals, the interest of the Company should not have been at all attended to or considered.

55. 'Those orders were sent, it is true, before we received the new treaty you entered into with Mir Jafar Ali Khán, upon his re-establishment in the Subahship, in which it is agreed that the English shall carry on their trade, by means of their own dustick, free from all duties, taxes and impositions in all parts of the country, excepting the article of salt, on which a duty of two and a half per cent. is to be levied on the rowanna or Hughli market price; wherein it is further agreed that the

late perwannahs issued by Kásim Ali Khán, granting to all merchants the exemption of all duties for the space of two years, shall be reversed and called in, and the duties collected as before.

56. 'These are terms which appear to be so very injurious to the Nawáb and to the natives that they cannot, in the very nature of them, tend to anything but the producing general heartburnings and dissatisfaction; and consequently there can be little reason to expect the tranquillity of the country can be permanent. The orders, therefore, in our said letter of the 8th of February are to remain in force until a more equitable and satisfactory plan can be formed and adopted, which, as it is impossible for us to frame here, destitute as we are of the information and lights necessary to guide us in settling such an important affair—

57. 'You are therefore hereby ordered and directed, as soon after the receipt of this as may be convenient, to consult the Nawáb as to the manner of carrying on the inland trade in salt, betel nut and tobacco, and the other articles produced and consumed in the country, which may be most to his satisfaction and advantage, the interest of the Company, and likewise of the Company's servants.

58. 'You are thereupon to form a proper and equitable plan for carrying on the said trade, and transmit the same to us, accompanied by such explanations, observations and remarks as may enable

us to give our sentiments and directions thereupon in a full and explicit manner.

59. 'In doing this, as before observed, you are to have a particular regard to the interest and entire satisfaction of the Nawáb, both with respect to his revenues and the proper support of his government ; in short, this plan must be settled with his free will and consent, and in such a manner as not to afford any just grounds for complaint.

60. 'In the next place, the utmost care and attention must be bestowed in forming the said plan, that in some proper mode or shape a just and equitable consideration be secured for the Company.

61. 'If any inconveniences shall be apprehended to arise to the Company's investments upon carrying on such an inland trade, you are to give us your full thoughts thereupon, and in what manner they may be obviated.

62. 'You are to give your impartial and unbiassed thoughts, also, whether the carrying on this inland trade may affect the just rights and privileges of the French, Dutch or any other Europeans, and thereby tend to draw on any national altercations and embroils, which are by all means to be avoided in forming the said plan ; therefore you are to be particularly careful to prevent these, or any other evils of the like kind.'

Notwithstanding these authorities, it has been asserted that the Select Committee in Bengal, when

they framed a plan for carrying on the trade in salt, betel nut and tobacco, acted in disobedience to the orders of the Company. And to support this assertion, partial extracts have been produced of some of the Company's letters, which were in fact written in answer to those proceedings of former administrations in Bengal, of which I have already given some description.

When the Select Committee assembled in Bengal, they were determined upon a thorough reformation. They were determined at all events to do their duty.

It is necessary the House should know that there are but two ways by which gentlemen can acquire fortunes in Bengal—by the inland trade, and by presents. The export and import trade had been for some years dwindling away, and was not worth the attention of the servants. It was carried on chiefly by free merchants and free mariners, and they could scarcely live by it. The inland trade was, as I have shown, permitted to be carried on upon some equitable plan for the benefit of the Company, who had hitherto received no advantage from it, and likewise for the benefit of the Company's servants, who hitherto had swallowed up the whole.

With regard to the receipt of presents: that mode of raising a fortune was intended to be prevented by the new covenants. But we must consider a little the nature of the funds for presents. Every

revolution in Bengal was attended with some diminution of the Nawáb's authority, and with some advantages to the Company. Kásim Ali Khán, upon the deposition of Mír Jafar, was obliged to make over to the Company territorial possessions to the amount of between six and seven hundred thousand pounds per annum. Mír Jafar, when he was reinstated in the Subahship, added above sixty thousand pounds a month more for the support of our army during the war; so that the Company became possessed of one-half of the Nawáb's revenues. The Nawáb was allowed to collect the other half for himself. But in fact he was no more than a banker for the Company's servants, who could draw upon him as often and to what amount they pleased.

The new covenants, indeed, which prohibited the receipt of presents, were intended to prevent this mode of raising fortunes; but the Select Committee went much deeper; they struck at the root of the evil by procuring the whole for the Company, which totally deprived the servants of this resource.

It was not expedient, however, to draw the reins too tight. It was not expedient that the Company's servants should pass from affluence to beggary. It was necessary that some emoluments should accrue to the servants in general, and more especially to those in superior stations, who were to assist in carrying on the measures of government. The

salary of a councillor is, I think, scarcely three hundred pounds per annum: and it is well known that he cannot live in that country for less than three thousand pounds. The same proportion holds among the other servants. It was requisite, therefore, that an establishment should take place; and the Select Committee, after the most mature deliberation, judged that the trade in salt, betel nut and tobacco, under proper regulations, might effectually answer the purpose. The great object of our consideration was, whether this trade could be regulated for the advantage of the Company, and also for the Company's servants, without oppressing the natives. We thought it could. The House will observe that I make no mention of the Nawáb, because the Company, to whom the revenues now belonged, stood in his shoes, a circumstance which seems never to have been thoroughly adverted to by the Directors, even to this day.

Had we only formed our plan and deferred the execution of it till the pleasure of the Court of Directors should be known, all the gentlemen in their service must in the meantime have been totally unprovided for. But the declared intention of the Company was that the trade in salt, betel nut and tobacco should be regulated, not only for their own advantage, but for the advantage of their servants. A plan was accordingly framed. I was up the country at the time, employed in

settling the treaty of peace with Sujah ul Daulah, and obtaining from the Moghul the grant of the Diwáni. The plan was framed principally by Mr Sumner, who took the medium price of salt throughout the country for above twenty years past, and fixed the price at from twelve to fifteen per cent. below that medium. Hence it was not probable that any grievance should fall upon the poor; and the plan was settled for one year only, that we might have an early opportunity of completing afterwards what was originally intended as an experiment. A duty, however, of thirty-five per cent. upon salt was established for the Company, which amounted to about £120,000 per annum; and all the Company's servants except writers, and also all the field officers of the army, had shares, according to their respective rank. But I soon found there was some defect in this plan. It was really a monopoly. The trade was taken out of the hands of some of the merchants. The proportion of the Company's servants was too large, the duty to the Company was too small. The agents appointed to sell the salt had made an improper use of their power; they had not strictly kept up to their contract, which was that they should receive five per cent. upon the sale of salt as a recompense for their trouble, and that they should not enter into any trade for themselves, under a very severe penalty.

I therefore proposed a plan for the next year, which I think destroyed every idea of monopoly. The society, instead of employing agents up the country to dispose of the salt, were to sell it at Calcutta, and at the places where it was made, to the black merchants only, who were each limited to a certain quantity of purchase, and tied down to a price for sale at every market town. The duty to the Company was now established at fifty per cent., which would produce £160,000 per annum; the black merchants were to have the liberty of transporting the salt all over the country, free from every taxation or obstruction; and the strictest orders were issued that no Englishmen, or their agents, should directly or indirectly have any further concern in it.

With regard to the price, I must inform the House that in Bengal salt stands the maker in about 2s. 6d. per maund by the time it reaches Calcutta. A maund is 80 pounds. The duty to the Company, and the advantages to the servants, were stated at about 2s. 6d. more, which makes upon the whole one hundred per cent. Salt in England, I am told, stands the maker in about 8d. per bushel, or 56 pounds; and the duty is 3s. 4d. per bushel, which is five hundred per cent. I have inquired into the salt trade in England. I think we settled it upon rather a better footing in India; for the quantity to be

bought by any one dealer was fixed, and the price at which it was to be sold in every town throughout the kingdom, according to the distance from the salt pans, was also fixed.

In London, salt is sold at 5s. a bushel, which is something less than a penny a pound. In India, salt is sold by the maund, which is, as I have said, 80 pounds, and it comes to a rupee, or 2s. 6d., a maund, all expenses paid, exclusive of the duty. The duty, as I have informed the House, is 2s. 6d. more.

Now, I will suppose that salt in Bengal sold under the second year's plan at the very price fixed by the first year's plan, then it would stand the consumer in about three farthings a pound at Calcutta, a penny a pound at distant places, and five farthings a pound at Patna, which is one of the most distant parts, being about 1200 miles by water from Calcutta.

The whole quantity of salt contracted for by the society was 24 lakhs of maunds, which, multiplied by 80 for the number of maunds in a pound, make 192 millions of pounds. The number of inhabitants I shall take upon the hon. member's (Mr Sullivan) computation, that is to say, 15 millions. I strike off 5 millions for infants and accidents. Then divide the 192 millions of pounds by the other 10 millions of inhabitants, and we shall find the quantity of salt consumed in one year, by the rich and by the poor, will be under 20 pounds each. To give the

argument its utmost scope, I allow 20 pounds to the poor as well as to the rich man, although it is certain he does not consume half the quantity. These 20 pounds will cost the individual at Calcutta rather less than 1s. 3d., in the centre of the provinces, 1s. 8d., and at Patna, the greatest distance, rather less than 2s. 6d. This is the utmost of every man's expense in the year for salt.

The lowest wages in Bengal are 2 rupees a month, which is 24 rupees, or £3 per annum. The poor man can scarcely be said to be at any other expense than for eating. They drink nothing but water; they wear no clothes; the houses are built with mud or clay, thatched with straw. Now, I leave the House to judge whether the expense of from 1s. 3d. to 2s. 6d. a year for 20 pounds of salt, even to these the very poorest of the inhabitants, can be a grievance. The eyes of the world have been blinded by publications. The matter of fact is this: the grievance fell upon a number of black merchants who used to live by that trade, for the Company's servants not only monopolised the salt, but, by virtue of their influence and power, bought it at what price they pleased, and sold it at what price they pleased.

To indulge my enemies to the utmost, I will allow for a moment, although it is not so, that in the intermediate time, between the farming of the salt trade by a Mussulman (for it was always a monopoly in the hands of Khoja Vazid, or some person or persons

who paid large sums of money to the Nawáb or his Ministers for the exclusive privilege) and the regulations established by the Select Committee, salt was sold somewhat cheaper. What does that infer? It infers only this, that the Company's servants, by virtue of their power and authority, exonerated the salt of all those duties and exactions which it was formerly subject to, amounting, perhaps, to two hundred per cent., and then made a merit of selling it cheaper to the inhabitants; as if a set of men in this country, by their power and influence, were to decline paying the duty of five hundred per cent. to Government, and then boast of selling it at a lower price than had been usual. In fact, when the salt was what has been called an open trade, it was then the most monopolised, because the Company's servants traded in it to what extent and advantage they thought proper, as indeed they did in every other article of inland trade.

In short, the Select Committee established their plan upon experience and a thorough knowledge of the Company's interest, and the conduct of the Court of Directors in abolishing it was founded upon obstinacy and ignorance.

A short history of the conduct of these gentlemen will set the matter in its proper light.

I have said before that the Directors disapproved of the trade in salt, betel nut and tobacco carried on by the servants from the first moment that they became acquainted with it.

They positively and repeatedly ordered that they should have no concern in it, directly or indirectly. They declared that it was an infringement of the rights of the natives, that they had consulted the sages in the law, and that the servants were liable to prosecution for persevering in that illicit trade. After this, they agreed that the Select Committee should regulate this trade in such a manner as might be advantageous to the Company and their servants without injury to the Nawáb. The Committee did regulate it; a very large profit was established for the Company. The servants, also, were amply provided for, and no oppression (under the Committee's regulation) could possibly fall upon the people of the country. The Court of Directors disapproved of our plan, and did not substitute any in the room of it, neither did they establish any duties. They issued orders that their servants, who acted as sovereigns, should totally relinquish this trade themselves, and endeavour to prevent its being monopolised by any rich overgrown merchant of the country. They meant that it should be laid open to the natives, and to them only, not seeing that their orders could not extend to the servants of foreign companies, who would, of course, gain considerably by that trade, of which the English were to be deprived.

In November 1767, and not before, the Court of Directors came to a determination of allowing their servants, in lieu of this trade, two and a half per cent.

upon the revenues. They then also, for the first time, thought of establishing a duty upon salt. They proposed fixing it so as that it should produce to the Company £31,000 per annum. At this time I was in England; I heard accidentally what was in agitation. I expostulated with the Court of Directors by letter; I represented to them that they were doing the most manifest injury to the Company; that if those advantages which the Select Committee had proposed for the servants were disapproved of, they ought to be enjoyed by the Company; that those advantages and the duties together would amount to £300,000 per annum, which I thought no inconsiderable object. I further represented to them that although they should give the servants two and a half per cent. on the revenues in lieu of the salt trade, the gentlemen might still trade in that article, under the names of their banyans or black agents, to what extent they pleased. To these representations they paid no other attention than that of altering the proposed duty from £31,000 to £120,000 per annum. What was the consequence? The servants received the two and a half per cent. on the revenues; they traded in salt as much as ever, but without paying the duty, and I am well informed that the Company, from the time of the abolition of the Committee's plan to this hour, have not received a shilling duty. Finally, the Court of Directors suffered this branch of trade to revert to the very channel from whence

had flowed all those abuses and all those misfortunes which they had so loudly complained of. This trade, contrary to their own ideas of equity to the natives, and contrary to the advice of the sages of the law, is now laid open to the English, and to every European, as well as native, inhabitant of Bengal, Behar and Orissa. The consequences of this we are still to learn. As the case stands at present, the Court of Directors have in all this time (five years) given up no less than £1,500,000, which the Company ought to have received if the emoluments taken from the servants had been added to the duty proposed by the Select Committee. And in this sum is not included the two and a half per cent. commission granted out of the revenues.

Having thus stated everything material relative to this matter, I submit to the consideration of the House whether the plan adopted by the Committee was for the benefit of the Company or not. The House will observe that I have spoken of the salt trade only. I omit mentioning the betel nut and tobacco trade, because the former is not an advantageous article in comparison with the salt trade, and the latter, although a part of the plan of the Committee, was totally relinquished.

The Governor and Council are accused of having entered into a combination, by bond, to support the society in spite of any orders from home. Mr Bolts, in his book, has given a copy of the bond. The

substance of the bond was stated in the public proceedings of the Board sent to England for the information of the Directors, and we applied to them for permission to renew the bond annually, if the plan of the salt trade met with their approbation. In that bond the committee of trade made themselves responsible for the duties. The contract for the making of salt ran for a year. The society, therefore, could not be abolished before the end of the year, which was the first of September; and nothing more seems necessary to prove we had no idea of contesting any orders from home, but that on the contrary we resolved to obey, than to read to the House the following resolution of the Select Committee:—

‘Resolved, that the society of trade shall be abolished, and the inland trade totally relinquished on the first day of September next, but that we fully express our sentiments in our next advices to the Company, respecting the advantages which would result to the service and to the country from the continuance of this trade under the present restrictions.’

This resolution also confutes a particular accusation against myself; for the gentleman who laid the charges before the Court of Directors has roundly asserted that, although the Company disapproved of the plan of the society, no order was issued during my government for abolishing it.

I must in this case beg leave to inform the House that I, as Governor, had a proportion of advantage

in this trade. What that proportion was, and in what manner I disposed of it, shall be clearly and accurately stated before I sit down.

I shall now proceed to the next charge against me, which is speculation of revenues. And here I must have recourse to a minute of mine, which stands recorded in the India House, because I think it will explain this matter much more fully than I can do by word of mouth, and the House will see in that minute the ground-work of part of a Bill proposed to be brought in for the regulation of the Company's affairs abroad.

‘LORD CLIVE’S MINUTE.

‘Our attention as a Select Committee, invested with extraordinary powers by the Court of Directors, has been constantly engaged in reforming the abuses which had crept into the several departments of this Government. The important work has been steadily prosecuted with zeal, diligence and disinterestedness on our parts ; and the success of our labour gives us reason to hope that our employers will be of opinion we have established many useful and necessary regulations. Many others, however, are still wanting to complete our plan ; but I doubt not that the same principles which have hitherto guided our conduct will continue to direct and justify the measures we have yet to pursue.

‘To place the President in such a situation as will

render his Government honourable to himself and advantageous to the Company, appears to me an object of as much consequence as any that has been taken into our consideration. Where such immense revenues are concerned, where power and authority are so enlarged, and where the eye of justice and equity should be ever watchful, a Governor ought not to be embarrassed with private business; he ought to be free from every occupation in which his judgment can possibly be biassed by his interest. The extensive commercial affairs, the study of the finances, the politics of the country, the epistolary correspondence, the proceedings of Council and Committee, these are sufficient to employ every moment of his time, and I am confident they cannot be conducted with the requisite attention to the Company's interest if the mind of the Governor be diverted by complicated mercantile affairs of his own.

‘If we look back on those unhappy dissensions which have frequently brought the Company's possessions in Bengal almost to the point of destruction, we shall find that they have generally proceeded from the conduct of Governors, who, too eager in the pursuit of private interest, have involved themselves in affairs which could not be reconciled to the strict principles of integrity. To prevent scrutinies and discoveries which might in any degree affect their honour, they have frequently been reduced to the necessity of conniving at abuses which would other-

wise have been brought to light and remedied. The welfare of this great Company should be the sole study of a Governor; attached to that point alone, his measures could never be thwarted by the malice of opposition, because they would all be proposed for the public good; and actions will always be justified or condemned from the principles on which they are founded.

‘Such a state of independency and honour must be highly eligible to a Governor; and in my opinion it can only be acquired by cutting off all possibility of his benefiting himself either by trade, or by that influence which his power necessarily gives him in these opulent provinces.

‘I therefore propose that the Governor shall in the most public manner, in the presence of all the Company’s servants, the mayor and aldermen, and free merchants, assemble at the mayor’s court, take the oath and execute the penalty bond annexed.

‘The consideration I have proposed is, one and one-eighth per cent. upon the revenues; excepting those arising from the Company’s own lands at Calcutta, Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong.

‘Although by these means a Governor will not be able to amass a fortune of a million or half a million in the space of two or three years, yet he will acquire a very handsome independency, and be in that very situation which a man of nice honour and true zeal for the service would wish to possess. Thus

situated, he may defy all opposition in Council : he will have nothing to ask, nothing to propose, but what he means for the advantage of his employers ; he may defy the law, because there can be no foundation for a bill of discovery ; and he may defy the obloquy of the world, because there can be nothing censurable in his conduct. In short, if stability can be insured to such a Government as this, where riches have been acquired in abundance, in a small space of time, by all ways and means, and by men with or without capacities, it must be effected by a Governor thus restricted, and I shall think it an honour, if my proposal be approved, to set the first example.'

In the bond herein mentioned, and which I executed, was inserted a penalty of £150,000 : £50,000 of which was to go to the informer, and £100,000 to the Company, if the Governor should be convicted of having benefited himself, directly or indirectly, beyond that commission. In addition to this was an oath to the same purport, and of as solemn a nature as could be devised. There were a few necessary exceptions in the bond and in the oath. The common interest for money was permitted to be received till remittances could be obtained. The purchase of diamonds for remittance to England was allowed, and such presents as might be received under the new covenants were also allowed. But of this last exception I did not avail myself ; for after

I had executed the bond, every, the most trifling, present, even to the value of 6d., was brought to the Company's credit.

A circumstance of allegation against me is brought from a letter I wrote to the Court of Directors before I went abroad, in which I had expressed my disapprobation of the commission of two and a half per cent. that had been granted to Governor Vansittart on the Company's territorial possessions, notwithstanding which I had received a commission of one and one-eighth myself. The case was this : the Court of Directors did not think proper to restrain Mr Vansittart in any respect or degree. He executed no penalty bond. He took no restricted oath. He had unlimited liberty to receive presents, to trade to any amount ; and he had this commission of two and a half per cent. on the Company's territorial possessions into the bargain ; in short, he was at liberty to make what fortune he pleased. Now, the commission of one and one-eighth per cent. which I received was an establishment proposed not only for myself, but for all future governors in lieu of everything, in consequence of giving up every emolument whatsoever that might be made in that station. The Court of Directors, so far from disapproving of this commission, continued it to my successor.

Another charge is, that I took to myself these advantages arising from the salt trade, and the one and one-eighth commission, although I had declared

in the letter which I have just alluded to that I had no interested motives in accepting the government. With what justice this can be alleged against me, the House may immediately determine.

I carried out three gentlemen with me. These gentlemen I certainly meant to serve, but I meant to serve them in a way that should be honourable for themselves and honourable for me, and that should at the same time be consistent with the interest of the Company. One was Mr Maskelyne, a relation of mine. A friendship commenced between us in our early years. We began life together. We were both of us writers in the Company's service in the year 1745; we were both made prisoners in Madras, when it was taken by M. La Bourdonnais; we made our escape together; we then entered into the military service together as ensigns; we served together at the siege of Pondicherry; we went into the field together; but our fates were very different; he was a second time taken prisoner. This misfortune put a stop to all his prospects, whilst I went on in a career of success. He continued in the civil and military service till he was of the rank of Council, and after fifteen years' service in India, was obliged by ill health to return to his native country, not worth £3000 in the world. I thought him entitled to some share of my affluence, but what I did for him was not sufficient to make his circumstances perfectly independent; for these reasons I

took him with me on my last expedition. Another gentleman was my secretary, now a member of this House. He was recommended to me by one of the greatest men in the kingdom, now no more, Mr Grenville. Many and great are the obligations I have been under to him, but the greatest of all the obligations was his having recommended me to this gentleman. Without his abilities and indefatigable industry, I could never have gone through my great and arduous undertaking, and in serving me he served the Company. The third gentleman was Mr Ingham, a surgeon, who quitted a profession of some hundreds a year to accompany me to Bengal.

I stood in a particular point of view ; my situation was nice and critical ; the eyes of the whole settlement were upon me. It was difficult for me to take any steps with regard to those gentlemen without being condemned. They had executed no covenants ; I might have suffered them to receive presents to any amount : the world would then have said that I carried them out with me in order to evade my own covenants, and to receive presents for me, as well as for themselves. I might have granted them the privilege of trade, the advantage of which, under my favour and credit, might have been to any amount. The objection to this also was obvious : it would have been said that my own interest was at the bottom ; that they traded under my influence ; and that the extent of their concerns interfered with persons who

had a better right. It was therefore determined that they should not benefit themselves a farthing but by what they should receive from my hands.

My share, as Governor, in the salt society, and also the manner in which it was disposed of, were publicly known both here and abroad before my return to England; and yet this latter has of late been considered as something clandestine. But I think I can prove to the satisfaction of this House that it was known to everybody.

In the beginning of the year 1767, a General Court was called for the purpose of rewarding my services. A continuation of ten years of the Jagir was proposed. In opposition to this, some people urged that I was benefiting myself largely abroad. A friend of mine, an hon. member of this House, hereupon read to the Court an extract from a letter he had received from me upon that subject. Before the question was balloted for, he printed this letter in handbills, and also published it repeatedly in all the newspapers. I have one of them, which was printed at that time, now in my hands, and with permission will read it.

‘That his lordship has been adding to his fortune abroad is most untrue; his friends defy the bitterest of his enemies to support the charge. A solemn asseveration in that respect from Lord Clive himself was read in Court by the friends to whom Lord Clive had addressed his letter; and it is now submitted to print in order to discredit assertions which are false;

or else to remain in public testimony against his lordship.'

EXTRACT of a LETTER from LORD CLIVE, dated
Calcutta, 30th September 1765.

'That you may assert with confidence the justice of my cause, I do declare, by the God who made me, it is my absolute determination to refuse every present of consequence, and that I will not return to England with one rupee more than what arises from my Jagir. My profits arising from salt shall be divided among those friends who have endangered their lives and constitutions in attending me. The congratulatory nazzars, etc., shall be set opposite to my extraordinary expenses; and if aught remains, it shall go to Poplar or some other hospital.'

In Mr Bolts' book is a copy of a bond, by which it appears that I sold my concern in salt for £32,000. I do acknowledge there is such a bond, but the sum actually received by me on that account amounted only to about £10,800. The fact was this: I could not think of suffering the three before-mentioned gentlemen who had accompanied me to India to return to England without realising something on their account; I said so to my friends in Bengal. The salt concern was of a very extensive, tedious nature, and the accounts might not be made up in some years. Could I, in honour, leave those gentlemen in a situation which made it doubtful when they

should receive anything, and to what amount? I told them I would not: I told them I would get rid of this salt concern at once, that they might be secure of the money amongst them. I therefore disposed of my whole concern in salt, even my share for the second year, which was just commenced, for the sum mentioned in the bond. But when the mode of a commission of one and one-eighth per cent. on the revenues was settled for the Governor in lieu of every other emolument, I then relinquished my share in salt for that year (the second year) in which I was to receive the commission, and had paid back about £20,000 of the £32,000.

It now remains, Sir, for me to show that my own interest was not the motive of my going to India.

I have here an account of every sixpence I received or disbursed from the day of my leaving England to the day of my return. It is taken from my books, which were kept all the time I was in India by Mr Verelst, who will readily attest their accuracy. I omit the first part of this account, because it was transmitted to the Court of Directors, and stands upon record in the India House. The other part I will read. The House will observe that in this account there are the names of others whom I rewarded besides the gentlemen I have mentioned. One was an old servant who went out with me; and the others were young gentlemen in my secretary's office.

The balance against me, upon the whole, is £5816.¹ Now, sir, I have no objection to having this account lodged among the records of this House, that it may stand in judgment for or against me if future Commissioners, either on the part of the Crown or the East India Company, should ever think a retrospection into my conduct necessary.

There is only one circumstance more with which I shall trouble the House; and I do assure them I should be ashamed to touch upon it, as it may carry with it an appearance of vanity, were not my honour and reputation so much at stake. It was in my power to have taken from my enemies every shadow of pretence for arraigning my conduct, on account of these profits, as they have been called, of my Government. I could have rewarded those gentlemen much more liberally without the possibility of an accusation. But I should not have acted so much to my own satisfaction, nor, I believe, so much to that of the House, if I had neglected the opportunity that offered of doing something essentially beneficial to the East India's Company's service.

The old Nawáb, Mír Jafar, if ever Mussulman had a friendship for a Christian, had a friendship for me. When the news of my appointment to the govern-

¹ It has not been thought necessary to insert the figured statement in this Appendix. It clearly shows that Clive, instead of having added to his fortune during his last administration of Bengal, was a loser to the extent of £5816.

ment reached Bengal, he immediately quitted Muxadavad,¹ came down to Calcutta, impatiently waited my arrival for six weeks, fell ill, returned to his capital, and died. Two or three days before his death, in the presence of his wife, and in the presence of his Minister, he said to his son and successor, 'Whatever you think proper to give to Lord Clive on your own account, the means are in your power. But, as a testimony of my affection for him, I desire you will pay to him as a legacy from me five lakhs of rupees.' I must observe that the Nawáb's death happened whilst I was on my voyage, and some months before my arrival in Bengal. The principal and interest amounted to near £70,000. A very respectable gentleman and great lawyer, who is now the Speaker of this honourable House, gave his opinion in favour of my right to this legacy in the strongest terms; another great lawyer, a member of this House, has often declared to me in private his opinion of my right; and the Court of Directors have themselves confirmed that right. Authentic attestations of this legacy are upon record in the India House. The whole of the money, added to about £40,000 more, which I prevailed on the Nawáb to bestow, is established for a military fund in support of officers and soldiers who may be invalided in any part of India, and also in support of their widows. Nothing was

¹ This seems to have been the name in those days of the town commonly and correctly called 'Murshidabad.'

wanting but such an establishment as this to make the East India Company's military service the best service in the world. Before that period, an indigent invalid officer and soldier might live in India, but if he returned to his native country he returned to beggary. By this fund the officers are entitled to half pay; the soldiers are upon the same footing as those in Chelsea Hospital; and the widows of both officers and soldiers have pensions.

Having encroached so long upon the patience of the House, I doubt whether I may now expect their further indulgence, or whether I must defer what I have to say upon this important business till a future occasion.

(House—Go on, go on.)

But before I proceed, I must beg leave to deviate a little into a digression on behalf of the Company's servants in general. It is dictated by humanity, by justice and by truth.

Indostan was always an absolute despotic government. The inhabitants, especially of Bengal, in inferior stations, are servile, mean, submissive and humble. In superior stations they are luxurious, effeminate, tyrannical, treacherous, venal, cruel. The country of Bengal is called, by way of distinction, the paradise of the earth. It not only abounds with the necessaries of life to such a degree as to furnish a great part of India with its superfluity, but it abounds in very curious and valuable manufactures,

sufficient not only for its own use, but for the use of the whole globe. The silver of the west and the gold of the east have for many years been pouring into that country, and goods only have been sent out in return. This has added to the luxury and extravagance of Bengal.

From time immemorial it has been the custom of that country for an inferior never to come into the presence of a superior without a present. It begins at the Nawáb, and ends at the lowest man that has an inferior. The Nawáb has told me that the small presents he received amounted to £300,000 a year; and I can believe him, because I know that I might have received as much during my last government. The Company's servants have ever been accustomed to receive presents. Even before we took part in the country troubles, when our possessions were very confined and limited, the Governor and others used to receive presents; and I will take upon me to assert that there has not been an officer commanding His Majesty's fleet, nor an officer commanding His Majesty's army, not a Governor, not a member of Council, not any other person, civil or military, in such a station as to have connection with the country government, who has not received presents. With regard to Bengal, there they flow in abundance indeed. Let the House figure to itself a country consisting of fifteen millions of inhabitants, a revenue of four millions sterling, and a trade in proportion. By

progressive steps the Company have become the sovereigns of that empire. Can it be supposed that their servants will refrain from advantages so obviously resulting from their situation? The Company's servants, however, have not been the authors of those acts of violence and oppression of which it is the fashion to accuse them. Such crimes are committed by the natives of the country acting as their agents, and for the most part without their knowledge. Those agents, and the banyans, never desist till, according to the ministerial phrase, they have dragged their masters into the kennel; and then the acts of violence begin. The passion for gain is as strong as the passion of love. I will suppose that two intimate friends have lived long together; that one of them has married a beautiful woman; that the friend still continues to live in the house, and that this beautiful woman, forgetting her duty to her husband, attempts to seduce the friend, who, though in the vigour of his youth, may, from a high principle of honour, at first resist the temptation, and even rebuke the lady. But if he still continues to live under the same roof, and she still continues to throw out her allurements, he must be seduced at last or fly. Now the banyan is the fair lady to the Company's servants. He lays his bags of silver before him to-day; gold to-morrow; jewels the next day; and if these fail, he then tempts him in the way of his profession, which is trade. He

assures him that goods may be had cheap, and sold to great advantage up the country. In this manner is the attack carried on ; and the Company's servant has no resource, for he cannot fly. In short, flesh and blood cannot bear it. Let us for a moment consider the nature of the education of a young man who goes to India. The advantages arising from the Company's service are now very generally known ; and the great object of every man is to get his son appointed a writer to Bengal, which is usually at the age of sixteen. His parents and relations represent to him how certain he is of making a fortune ; that my Lord Such-a-one, and my Lord Such-a-one, acquired so much money in such a time ; and Mr Such-a-one, and Mr Such-a-one, so much in such a time. Thus are their principles corrupted at their very setting out, and as they generally go a good many together, they inflame one another's expectations to such a degree, in the course of the voyage, that they fix upon a period for their return before their arrival.

Let us now take a view of one of these writers arrived in Bengal, and not worth a groat. As soon as he lands, a banyan, worth perhaps £100,000, desires he may have the honour of serving this young gentleman at 4s. 6d. per month. The Company has provided chambers for him, but they are not good enough ; the banyan finds better. The young man takes a walk about the town ; he observes that other writers, arrived only a year before him, live in splendid

apartments or have houses of their own, ride upon fine prancing Arabian horses, and in palanqueens and chaises; that they keep seraglios, make entertainments, and treat with champagne and claret. When he returns, he tells the banyan what he has observed. The banyan assures him he may soon arrive at the same good fortune; he furnishes him with money; he is then at his mercy. The advantages of the banyan advance with the rank of his master, who in acquiring one fortune generally spends three. But this is not the worst of it; he is in a state of dependence under the banyan, who commits such acts of violence and oppression as his interest prompts him to, under the pretended sanction and authority of the Company's servant. Hence, Sir, arises the clamour against the English gentlemen in India. But look at them in a retired situation, when returned to England, when they are no longer Nawábs and sovereigns of the East; see if there be anything tyrannical in their disposition towards their inferiors; see if they are not good and humane masters. Are they not charitable? Are they not benevolent? Are they not generous? Are they not hospitable? If they are, thus far, not contemptible members of society, and if in all their dealings between man and man their conduct is strictly honourable, if, in short, there has not yet been one character found amongst them sufficiently flagitious for Mr Foote to exhibit on the theatre in the Haymarket, may we not con-

clude that if they have erred, it has been because they were men placed in situations subject to little or no control?

But if the servants of the Company are to be loaded with the demerit of every misfortune in India, let them also have the merit they are entitled to. The Court of Directors surely will not claim to themselves the merit of those advantages which the nation and the Company are at present in possession of. The officers of the navy and army have had great share in the execution; but the Company's servants were the cabinet council, who planned everything; and to them also may be ascribed some part of the merit of our great acquisitions.

I will now pass to other matter—matter as important as ever came before the House. India yields at present a clear produce to the public and to individuals of between two and three millions sterling per annum. If this object should be lost, what can Administration substitute in the room of it? I tremble when I think of the risk we lately ran from the ambitious designs of the French. They may have suspended for a time their views upon India, but I am sure they have not given them up. It is strongly reported they have at this moment 10,000 men at the islands,¹ and a great number of transports; these men are not to return to France, and yet the islands cannot maintain them; but at Madagascar

¹ The islands referred to are Mauritius and Bourbon.

they may possess themselves of a country capable of supporting any number. This they certainly will do, and their forces, instead of decreasing, will increase by additional battalions poured out from France, until they are ready to carry into execution their favourite design. The noble lord at the head of the Treasury will do me the justice to say that I laid before him a paper, drawn up fifteen months ago, in which I stated almost everything that has since happened relating to the views of France upon the East Indies. It was indeed impossible for me to be deceived, knowing the preparations that had been made.

If ever France should lay hold of our possessions, she will soon add to them all the rest of the East Indies. The other European nations there will immediately fall before her—not even the Dutch can stand; the empire of the sea will follow; thus will her acquisitions in the East, if any can, give her universal monarchy. I repeat, and I would have what I say remembered, that the French have not given up their designs upon India.

But danger abroad being for the present suspended, let us think of the danger at home.

It is certain that our affairs in Bengal are in a very deplorable condition, and that the nation cannot receive their £400,000, and the Proprietors their £200,000 increase of dividend, much longer, if something be not done.

It is necessary, since these affairs are brought before Parliament, that we should endeavour to understand them. There are a few material points which I will state as clearly as I can. The revenues, the inland trade, the charges civil and military, and the public trade, by which I mean the trade of the Company.

Upon the receipt of the revenues depend the £400,000 a year to Government, and the £200,000 a year additional dividend to the Proprietors; and upon the Company's or public trade depends the coming home of the revenues.

There are no mines of gold and silver in Bengal, therefore the revenues can be brought hither only through the medium of the Company's trade.

Upon the civil and military expenses depends whether we shall have any surplus revenue at all; for if they are swelled up too high, you can receive no revenues. Upon the inland trade depends in some degree the receipt of the revenues. Upon the inland trade depends almost totally the happiness and prosperity of the people. Indeed, the true cause of the distress in Bengal, as far as it relates to the inland trade, is this. The Company's servants and their agents have taken into their own hands the whole of that trade, which they have carried on in a capacity before unknown; for they have traded not only as merchants, but as sovereigns, and by grasping at the whole of the inland trade, have taken the bread out of the

mouths of thousands and thousands of merchants who used formerly to carry on that trade, and who are now reduced to beggary.

With regard to the public trade, it is material to observe what it has been and what it now is. Here is an account of the prime costs of the Company's investments from Bengal for seven years preceding the acquisition of the Diwání, and for seven years subsequent, together with the number of ships employed.

(It has not been thought necessary to insert here the figured statements which are referred to.)

This account must be exact, because I had the whole of it from the India House particulars of the last year, which the Court of Directors are not yet in possession of. But I cannot doubt their authenticity, as I received them from a gentleman in Council at Bengal.

The House will observe that the gross collections have not decreased considerably till the year 1770, which was the year of the famine; but that the civil and military expenses have been gradually increasing ever since I left Bengal, which was in the beginning of the year 1767. And here lies the danger. The evil is not so much in the revenues falling short as in the expenses increasing. The best means of raising the revenues is to reduce the civil and military charges. Why should we strive at an actual increase of the revenues? They avail nothing unless we can invest

them ; and to raise them beyond a certain point is to distress the country, and to reduce to indigence numbers who from time immemorial have derived their subsistence from them.

With regard to the increase of the expenses, I take the case to stand thus. Before the Company became possessed of the Diwāni, their agents had other ways of making fortunes. Presents were open to them. They are now at an end. It was expedient for them to find some other channel—the channel of the civil and military charges. Every man now who is permitted to make a bill makes a fortune.

It is not the simple pay of officers and men upon the military and civil establishment which occasions our enormous expense, but the contingent bills of contractors, commissaries, engineers, etc., out of which, I am sure, great savings might be made. These intolerable expenses have alarmed the Directors, and persuaded them to come to Parliament for assistance. And, if I mistake not, they will soon go to Administration, and tell them they cannot pay the £400,000, and that they must lower the dividend to the Proprietors.

I attribute the present situation of our affairs to four causes : a relaxation of government in my successors ; great neglect on the part of Administration ; notorious misconduct on the part of the Directors ; and the violent and outrageous proceedings of General Courts, in which I include contested elections.

Mr Verelst, who succeeded me in the government, I do believe to be a man of as much real worth and honour as ever existed; and so far from being wanting in humanity, as Mr Bolts asserts, I know that he had too much humanity. Humanity, if I may be allowed the expression, has been his ruin. If he had had less, it would have been better for the nation, better for the Company, better for the natives, and better for himself. No man came to the government with a fairer character, and notwithstanding what I have said, I am conscious no man ever left it with a fairer. He acted upon principles of disinterestedness from beginning to end: and let the Directors, if they can, tell me where I could have laid my finger upon a fitter man. But the truth is, he governed with too lenient a hand. The too great tenderness of his disposition I saw and dreaded. Nothing was wanting on my part to prompt him to pursue vigorous measures. Nor did I confine myself to verbal advice only. I gave it in writing before I resigned the government. The House will permit me to read to them my sentiments upon that occasion. They are contained in my farewell letter to the Select Committee, wherein I forewarned them of almost every misfortune that has since happened. The whole thing is too long to trouble the House with. I shall therefore read only that part of it which relates to the present subject.

‘EXTRACT from my FAREWELL LETTER to the SELECT COMMITTEE, dated 16th January 1767.

‘The reformation proposed by the Committee of Inspection will, I hope, be duly attended to. It has been too much the custom in this government to make orders and regulations, and thence to suppose the business done. To what end and purpose are they made, if they be not promulgated and enforced? No regulation can be carried into execution, no order obeyed, if you do not make rigorous examples of the disobedient. Upon this point I rest the welfare of the Company in Bengal. The servants are now brought to a proper sense of their duty; if you slacken the reins of government, affairs will soon revert to their former channel, and anarchy and corruption will again prevail, and, elate with a new victory, be too headstrong for any future efforts of government. Recall to your memories the many attempts that have been made in the civil and military departments to overcome our authority, and to set up a kind of independency against the Court of Directors. Reflect also on the resolute measures we have pursued, and their wholesome effects. Disobedience to legal power is the first step to sedition; and palliative remedies effect no cure. Every tender compliance, every condescension on your parts will only encourage more flagrant attacks, which will increase in

strength daily, and be at last in vain resisted. Much of our time has been employed in correcting abuses. The important work has been prosecuted with zeal, diligence and disinterestedness, and we have had the happiness to see our labours crowned with success. I leave the country in peace ; I leave the civil and military departments under discipline and subordination ; it is incumbent upon you to keep them so. You have power, you have abilities, you have integrity ; let it not be said that you are deficient in resolution. I repeat that you must not fail to exact the most implicit obedience to your orders. Dismiss or suspend from the service any man who shall dare to dispute your authority. If you deviate from the principles upon which we have hitherto acted, and upon which you are conscious you ought to proceed, or if you do not make a proper use of that power with which you are invested, I shall hold myself acquitted, as I do now protest against the consequences.'

It is certain that, if my successor had followed my example and advice, the evil day would have been kept off some time longer. But had he kept the tightest rein, he could not have done much service to the Company, for neither he nor any man could have long guarded against the mischiefs occasioned by the Directors themselves, when they took away the powers of the Select Committee.

The Company had acquired an empire more extensive than any kingdom in Europe, France and Russia excepted. They had acquired a revenue of four millions sterling, and a trade in proportion. It was natural to suppose that such an object would have merited the most serious attention of Administration; that in concert with the Court of Directors they would have considered the nature of the Company's charter, and have adopted a plan adequate to such possessions. Did they take it into consideration? No, they did not. They treated it rather as a South Sea bubble than as anything solid and substantial; they thought of nothing but the present time, regardless of the future. They said, let us get what we can to-day, let to-morrow take care for itself; they thought of nothing but the immediate division of the loaves and fishes; nay, so anxious were they to lay their hands upon some immediate advantage that they actually went so far as to influence a parcel of temporary Proprietors to bully the Directors into their terms. It was their duty, Sir, to have called upon the Directors for a plan; and if a plan, in consequence, had not been laid before them, it would then have become their duty, with the aid and assistance of Parliament, to have formed one themselves. If Administration had done their duty, we should not now have heard a speech from the throne, intimating the necessity of parliamentary

interposition to save our possessions in India from impending ruin.

The next point is the misconduct on the part of the Court of Directors.

After the Court of Directors had in the highest terms approved of the conduct of that Committee who restored tranquillity to Bengal; who had restored a government of anarchy and confusion to good order; who had made a peace with Sujah Daulah, by which they obtained upwards of £600,000 for the Company; who had quelled both a civil and a military mutiny; who had re-established discipline and subordination in the army; who had obtained the Diwáni of Bengal, Behár and Orissa, which produced to the Company a net income of £1,300,000; who had paid off the greatest part of a bond debt in Bengal, amounting to near £900,000; who had left the treasury in such a flowing state that they drew few or no bills upon the Company at home; who laid the foundation of investments so large as were never before known or heard of; and who had by these means enabled the Company to assist Government with £400,000 a year, and to make an increase of dividend to the stockholders of £200,000, one would imagine that the Court of Directors would have supported a system of government which had been so very successful. But they acted upon very different principles; they dropped the prosecutions against

those gentlemen in Bengal whose conduct the Committee had censured and fully represented. Thus they gave a stab to their own vitals. From that instant they destroyed their own power abroad, and erased from the minds of their servants in India every wholesome regulation which the Committee had established. The servants abroad were in anxious suspense to learn whether they were punishable or not for misconduct. The lenity or weakness of the Court of Directors removed their doubts. From that instant all covenants were forgotten, or only looked upon as so many sheets of blank paper; and from that instant began that relaxation of government so much now complained of, and so much still to be dreaded.

Their next step was to destroy the powers of that Committee whose conduct they had with reason so highly approved of. They divided the powers; they gave half to the Council, and left the other half with the Committee. The consequence was, the Council and Committee became distracted by altercations and disputes for power, and have ever since been at variance, to the great detriment of the service. The Court of Directors, as if this was not enough, restored to the service almost every civil and military transgressor who had been dismissed; nay, they rewarded some of them by allowing them a continuation of their rank all the time they were in England. And now, as a condemnation of their own conduct and a

tacit confession of their own weakness, they come to Parliament with a Bill of Regulations, in which is inserted a clause to put such practices as much as possible out of their power for the future.

With regard to General Courts, I believe I need not dwell long on the consequences of them. Their violent proceedings have been subversive of the authority of the Court of Directors. The agents abroad have known this; they have therefore never scrupled to set the orders of the Court of Directors at defiance when it was their interest to disobey them, and they have escaped punishment by means of the over-awing interests of individuals at General Courts. Thus have General Courts co-operated with the Court of Directors in the mischiefs that have arisen in Bengal; whilst annual contested elections have, in a manner, deprived the Directors of the power of establishing any authority over their servants. The first half of the year is employed in freeing themselves from the obligations contracted by their last elections; and the second half is wasted in incurring new obligations, and securing their election for the next year, by daily sacrifices of some interest of the Company. The Direction, notwithstanding all these manœuvres, has been so fluctuating and unsettled that new and contradictory orders have been frequently sent out; and the servants (who, to say the truth, have generally understood the interest of the Company much better than the Directors) have in many

instances followed their own opinion, in opposition to theirs.

It is not my intention at present to trouble the House with the remedies for these evils. I rather choose to defer them till the Bill come into the House. I have now opened my budget; it is not a ministerial budget: it is an East India budget, which contains many precious stones, diamonds, rubies, etc., of the first water and magnitude; and there wants only a skilful jeweller and able artist to polish them and ascertain their real value.

APPENDIX II

LORD CLIVE's speech in the House of Commons on the 19th May 1773, on the order of the day, to take into further consideration the reports of the Select and Secret Committees appointed to inquire into the affairs of the East India Company :—

Sir, after rendering my country the services which I think I may, without any degree of vanity, claim the merit of, and after having nearly exhausted a life full of employment for the public welfare, and for the particular and advantageous emolument of the East India Company, I little thought transactions of this kind would have agitated the minds of my countrymen in such proceedings as these, tending to deprive me not only of my property and the fortune which I have fairly acquired, but of that which I hold more dear to me—my honour and my reputation. The House will not think me, I hope, fraught with any degree of vanity when I repeat again that I have done services to my country.

I must now beg leave to say a few words relative to the presents which I am charged with receiving unwarrantably. I must beg leave to observe to the

House that presents were allowed and received from the earliest time of the Direction. They have continued to be received uninterruptedly for the space of 150 years ; and men, Sir, who have sat in the Direction themselves have at several times received presents. This the Direction must know ; but I am firmly of opinion that in honourable cases presents are not improper to be received ; but when for dishonourable purposes, then, Sir, I hold them to be highly improper. In the early part of my life, my labours were without emolument or laurels, and I hope the House cannot think but that I ought to be rewarded for my services to my country in the latter part of it. When I was employed by the Company, their affairs abroad were in a condition much to be lamented. Misfortunes attended them in every part of their settlements, and the Nawábs looked with a jealous eye upon the small privileges and possessions they then enjoyed, and though small, in danger every day of being wrested from them. Fear and weakness of power sought for protection from the dangers that surrounded them. In this critical situation I was called forth, and it pleased God to make me the instrument of their delivery. In the various battles and attacks in which I was employed, I had the good fortune to succeed ; nor were such schemes or undertakings entered upon without the previous provocation of the country powers. The treachery of Suráj ud Daulah was for ever in our eye, and his perfidy

was never at rest ; nor did we attack Chandernagore till the treaty on his behalf was first violated.

After these conquests, Sir, and acquisitions gained for the Company, I returned home. They approved in the highest degree of what I have done ; and as a token of their approbation, they presented me with a rich sword set with diamonds. This, certainly, Sir, was no mark of their opinion that I had either violated treaties or disobeyed their orders. Nor did their commendation and good opinion of my services terminate here. As soon as troubles broke out in that country, and when the news of the terrible disaster of the taking of Calcutta from us arrived to the ear of the Company, they immediately sent to me and requested that I would go once more to India, to protect and secure their possessions ; that my presence alone would effect it ; and they should rest secured, through the good opinion they had of me, that success would accompany me, and that I should be the means of putting their affairs again in a prosperous situation. I did not hesitate a moment to accept the offer. I went abroad, resolving not to benefit myself one single shilling on my return, and I strictly and religiously adhered to it. When I arrived there, I subdued Angria, a very powerful prince. I re-took Calcutta with an inconsiderable army. Suráj ud Daulah had at all times betrayed a disposition to break the treaty ; and when an army was sent under the command of M. Duprée, which

might have proved fatal to us, I do not hesitate to say that we bribed the general of that army, who immediately wrote to the Nawáb to let him know the English were invincible; and, upon a second request from the Nawáb to M. Duprée, that he would march with his army and destroy the English, his answer was couched in the same terms. He said that he always found the English invincible, and that it would have been the height of imprudence to hazard an attack. By such means, and by this stratagem, we succeeded. We soon discovered that the Nawáb, Suráj ud Daulah, was so turbulent and restless that he only waited for the departure of the fleet to exterminate the English. But, as treacherous men are too apt to have men of the same cast and disposition about them, the Nawáb was not wanting of such companions. Omichand, his confidential servant, as he thought, told his master of an agreement made between the English and M. Duprée to attack him, and received for that advice a sum of not less than four lakhs of rupees. Finding this to be the man in whom the Nawáb entirely trusted, it soon became our object to consider him as a most material engine in the intended revolution. We therefore make such an agreement as was necessary for the purpose, and entered into a treaty with him to satisfy his demands. When all things were prepared, and the evening of the event was appointed, Omichand informed Mr Watts, who was

at the court of the Nawáb, that he insisted upon thirty lakhs of rupees, and five per cent. upon all the treasure that should be found ; that, unless that was immediately complied with, he would disclose the whole to the Nawáb ; and that Mr Watts, and the two other English gentleman then at the court, should be cut off before the morning. Mr Watts, immediately on this information, despatched an express to me at the Council. I did not hesitate to find out a stratagem to save the lives of these people, and secure success to the intended event. For this purpose we signed another treaty. The one was called the red, the other the white treaty. This treaty was signed by everyone except Admiral Watson ; and I should have considered myself sufficiently authorised to put his name to it by the conversation I had with him. As to the person who signed Admiral Watson's name to the treaty, whether he did it in his presence or not I cannot say, but this I know, that he thought he had sufficient authority for so doing. This treaty was immediately sent to Omichand, who did not suspect the stratagem. The event took place, and success attended it ; and the House, I am fully persuaded, will agree with me that, when the very existence of the Company was at stake, and the lives of these people so precariously situated, and so certain of being destroyed, it was a matter of a true policy and of justice to deceive so great a villain. I have in my hand, Sir, a letter signed

by Admiral Watson, Messrs Manningham, Watts, etc., which, I apprehend will carry Admiral Watson's thorough approbation of the proceedings of the revolution, and the means by which it was obtained. (His lordship then read the letter, which conveyed Admiral Watson's full approbation.)

Nor, Sir, great as my fortune is (and which bears no proportion to what I might have made), yet, to show that I did not harass or lay under contribution those whom I have conquered for my own emolument, I can tell this House that neither I nor anyone in my army received a sixpence from the inhabitants of Muxadabad. My Jagir was not received till 1759, though it has been reported I received it at the revolution in 1757.

I must beg leave to mention another circumstance to this House; that, upon these troubles, the Dutch were encouraged by the Nawáb to enter the country with seven ships and a vast army. I did not hesitate a moment to give them battle; and in twenty-four hours I destroyed every ship they had, and their whole army was either killed, wounded or taken prisoners. At this time the Dutch had most of my money; and in this instance, I think, I showed a zeal for the honour and interest of the Company superior to every other object even of my own concerns. I must now beg leave to read in the House two letters from the Court of Directors to myself, containing their approbation of the revolution in Bengal. These

letters, Sir, came not through the common channel of address to the Governor and Council, but were directed to myself. (His lordship then read the letters, which contained the most full and satisfactory approbation of what is termed in one of the letters the late glorious and profitable revolution.) These, Sir, are surely sufficient certificates of my behaviour and the proceedings of that revolution; and, whatever the House may think of them, will remain an everlasting approbation of my conduct from those persons who alone employed me, and whose servant I was. A late Minister (Lord Chatham), whose abilities have been an honour to his country, and whom this House will ever revere, will, I am sure, come to your bar, and not only tell you how highly he thought of my services at the time, but also what his opinion is now.

I am, however, sure that I shall have justice done me by the inquiry of those men who are likely to be appointed to go to India to regulate the affairs of that country. Then, Sir, may come from that part of the world a full justification of my conduct. Here I must beg leave to read a part of my late speech. (Here his lordship read a part of the letter and of his speech, made on the 30th of March 1772, stating the acquisitions he had obtained for the Company and the public.) After these services, I thought at least I might have enjoyed my fortune uninterrupted, and unenvied by those not so rich as myself. (Here his lordship then read another letter from the Company,

which contained in a stronger manner than any of the preceding ones a full and ample commendation and approbation of all his proceedings; this etter was directed to his lordship, and dated the 4th of March 1767.)

Upon my arrival, Sir, in England a second time, a committee of the Directors waited upon me to desire to know when I would receive the congratulations of the Direction. I accordingly waited upon them at their court in Leadenhall Street, and the chairman, at a very full court, addressed me in the words contained in this letter (which his lordship read). These, Sir, were circumstances, certainly, that gave me a full satisfaction, and a ground to think that my conduct, in every instance, was approved of. After such certificates as these, Sir, am I to be brought here like a criminal, and the very best parts of my conduct construed into crimes against the State? Is this the reward that is now held out to persons who have performed such important services to their country? If it is, Sir, the future consequences that will attend the execution of any important trust committed to the persons who have the care of it will be fatal indeed; and I am sure the noble lord upon the Treasury bench, whose great humanity and abilities I revere, would never have consented to the resolutions that passed the other night if he had thought on the dreadful consequences that would attend them.

Sir, I cannot say that I either sit or rest easy when I find by the extensive resolution proposed that all I have in the world is to be confiscated, and that no one will henceforward take my security for a shilling. These, Sir, are dreadful apprehensions to remain under, and I cannot look upon myself but as a bankrupt; nothing my own, and totally unable to give any security while these resolutions are pending. Such, Sir, is the situation I am in. I have not anything left which I can call my own except my paternal fortune of £500 per annum, and which has been in the family for ages past. But upon this I am content to live, and perhaps I shall find more real content of mind and happiness therein than in the trembling affluence of an unsettled fortune.

But, Sir, I must make one more observation, that if the definition of the hon. gentleman (General Burgoyne) and of this House is that the State, as expressed in these resolutions, is *quoad hoc* the Company, then, Sir, every farthing that I enjoy is granted to me. But to be called, after sixteen years have elapsed, to account for my conduct in this manner, and after an uninterrupted enjoyment of my property, to have been questioned and considered as obtaining it unwarrantably, is hard indeed, and a treatment I should not think the British Senate capable of. But if it should be the case, I have a conscious innocence within me that tells me my conduct is irreproachable. '*Frangas non flectes.*' They may take from

me what I have. They may, as they think, make me poor, but I will be happy. I mean not this as my defence, though I have done for the present. My defence will be made at that bar, and before I sit down I have one request to make to the House, that when they come to decide upon my honour, they will not forget their own.

APPENDIX III

MR ELPHINSTONE'S ESTIMATE OF CLIVE

(*Given in the Preface to his 'Rise and Progress of the British Power in the East,' p. 7.*)

'THE only chance of success in this part of the history lies in stern impartiality, mixed with candour and indulgence, towards all the parties concerned. Measures must be discussed, serving no doubt to illustrate the characters of the leading men of the day, but more with a view to utility, and to pointing out what objects are to be attained and what are the sure means of ascertaining and promoting them.

'This is the key to the treatment of Clive's character, commanding respect and admiration from its great qualities, which feelings are painfully checked by instances of duplicity and meanness.

'The impression he leaves is that of force and grandeur; a masculine understanding; a fine judgment; an inflexible will; little moved by real dangers, and by arguments and menaces not at all. He exercised a supreme control over those who shared his counsels or executed his resolves. Men yielded to a pressure which they knew could not be turned

aside, and either partook of its impulse or were crushed by its progress.

‘Where overmatched by his enemies, he appears in even greater grandeur. He meets the most formidable accusations with bold avowal and a confident justification. He makes no attempt to soften his enemies or conciliate the public, but stands on his merits and services with a pride which in other circumstances would have been arrogance.

After acknowledging his errors, history presents few great characters more blameless (?)¹ than that of Clive. Though stern and imperious by nature, his temper was proof against a thousand trials, and in a life spent amidst scenes of blood and suffering he has never been accused of a single act of cruelty. He coveted money as an instrument of ambition, but never acquired it in any manner that he did not openly avow, and he scorned to preserve it by swerving a hair’s-breadth from his duty. His few political offences he was led into by zeal for the public, and for the same object he sacrificed the peace of his last years and risked his accumulations of wealth and glory. He possessed undaunted courage, a strong understanding, sagacity and soundness of judgment, and unrivalled vigour in action. A mind so endowed rises high above ordinary imperfections. At worst it is a rough-hewn Colossus, where the irregularities of the surface are lost in the grandeur of the whole.

¹ The mark of interrogation is by the author, Mr Elphinstone.

‘Though naturally bold, open and direct, Clive did not despise the use of artifice when his purposes required it, and it is this propensity that casts a shade of meanness over his great qualities that prevents that unmixed respect which so powerful a character must otherwise have commanded.

‘Though Clive had a natural sense of honour, his independent and even reckless character made him indifferent to the opinion of others and regardless of form and propriety. The society in which he lived in India was not likely to promote refinement; the agitated scene in which he was soon engaged, the eagerness for success, the calamities and disgrace attendant on failure, left little time for reflection or hesitation. The practice of the natives, the example of the French, and the maxims current among his brother officers, led him to rate boldness and vigour far above scrupulous correctness, and the result was a high sense of honour, with but little delicacy of sentiment. He could sacrifice his life to his duty, but not his interest to his moderation; he was generous to his friends, but barely just to his enemies. He would have rejected praise he had not earned, but neither forgot, nor allowed others to forget, the extent of his real deserts.

‘Clive’s estimate of his own services, great as they were, by no means fell short of their actual value. This does not arise from any indulgence of vanity on his part, but there is no occasion on which they

can promote his views or interest where they are not brought forward in an exaggerated form, with a boldness and consciousness of worth that command our respect, and overcome our dislike to self praise. Hence arose a marked peculiarity of Clive's character. After the enormous extent to which he had profited by his situation, he delights to dwell on his integrity and moderation, and speaks of greed and rapacity in others with scorn and indignation. Convinced that the bounty of Mîr Jafar fell short of his claims on the Company, he inveighs against his successors who received presents which they had not earned, and speaks of them with disgust as the most criminal, as well as the meanest of mankind. Nor are these sentiments assumed to impose upon the public; they are most strongly expressed in his most confidential letters, and appear to be drawn forth by the strength of his feelings. In no stage of his life did Clive appear with more dignity than during his persecution. His boasts of merit and service now appear as a proud resistance to calumny and oppression; the spirit with which he avowed and gloried in the acts which excited the most clamour and odium, his independence towards his judges, his defiance of his powerful enemies, excite our interest, while they command our respect and admiration.

‘Clive's views were clear within the circle of his vision, but they were not extensive. His political plans were founded on the existing relations without

much attention to prospective changes. His reforms were temporary expedients, and even his knowledge of the state of India in his time was only accurate within the scene where he had himself been an actor.'

CLIVE'S RETURN HOME.

'He now paid for his disinterestedness. All who had been brought to punishment by his severity; all who had suffered indirectly by his reforms; all who were disappointed in their hopes of wealth and favour, with their numerous connections among the Proprietors, and with the old band of enemies at the Indian Office House, combined to raise a clamour against him; and in this were speedily joined those who envied his wealth and reputation, and a numerous class whose indignation against Indians had been roused by the very abuses which Clive had put down, and which in their ignorance they imputed to him, in common with all the Company's servants. Against these attacks the Government gave him no protection.

'All his former proceedings, over which many years had passed, and which, when not applauded at the time, had received a general sanction from his appointment to the government of India at a time when honesty and public spirit were regarded as much as talent, all were scrutinised as if they were now mentioned for the first time.

‘But all these investigations brought forth no fresh charge against the accused. Whatever faults Clive might have committed, the facts had never been denied, and his acquisitions, if immoderate, were on too great a scale to be concealed. There were no petty peculations, no lurking corruption to be detected. A Committee with a hostile president, with Mr Johnston himself for a member, produced a report, the effect of which may be judged by the result. A motion strongly inculpatory was made by the chairman, Clive replying by avowing everything of which he was accused, and declaring that in similar circumstances he would do the same again.

‘The division of the House was worthy the best days of the Roman Senate. Without approving of actions of mixed merit or demerit, or sanctioning questionable principles, they voted that Robert Lord Clive had rendered great and meritorious services to his country.

‘But this honourable testimony could not remove the effect of two years of persecution; and it is doubtful whether the sense of injury and ingratitude did not concur with sufferings from disease to cut off the career of this proud and aspiring genius.’

APPENDIX IV

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PEDIGREE OF LORD CLIVE

(EXTRACT)

RICHARD CLIVE of Huxley, co. Chester, = JANE, d. of William Brereton of Brereton, co. Chester, by Ann, d. of Sir Salop; *d.* 27 Ap. 1572; brass in H. Trinity Ch., Chester.

Sir George Clive of the same, Knt., = Susanna, d. of Henry Copinger of Davington, co. Kent, esq. Chancr. of the Exchequer in Ireland, &c.; kntd. 4 Aug. 1588, *d.* 1 Sept. 1591.

1. Joshua Clive of Huxley and Styche, = Mary, d. of Andrew Charlton of Apley, co. Salop. 2. Ambrose Clive of Styche, co. Salop, esq. = Alice, d. of Thomas Townshend of Braconash, co. Norf., esq.

Rachel Clive, heiress of Clive in = Thomas Wilbraham of Nantwich, Middlewich and of Huxley; *m.* 24 co. Chester; *d.* 25 June 1589, of Linc. March 1619-20, *d.* 5 Ap. 1657. Inn, &c., *d.* 1643.

Robert Clive of Styche, co. Salop, = Mary, d. of Sir Edward Allyn of Hatfield Priory, co. Essex, Bart. esq.; admd. to Linc. Inn 7 June 1632, as 's. and h. appt. of Ambrose C. of Styche, co. Salop, arm.'

George Clive of Wormbridge, co. Heref., *jure uxoris*; *d. vita patris*. = Mary, d. and heir of Martin Husbands of Wormbridge, co. Heref.

3. Edward Clive of Wormbridge.

1. Robert Clive of Styche, = Elizabeth, d. of Richard Amphlett of Hadsor, co. Worc., esq., by Anne, d. of Edw. Cookes of Bentley Pauncefoot, co. Worc., 'founder's kin' at Worcester College.

2. George Clive, Cursitor Baron of the Exchequer; buried in Lincoln's Inn Chapel 5 Jan. 1739-40.

George Clive = Catherine Raftor, *b.* 1711, *m.* 1732, *d.* 7 Dec. 1785. "Kitty Clive."

1. Sir Edward Clive, Knt.; *b.* 1704, admd. to Linc. Inn as s. and heir of Edwd. of Wormbridge, gent., 27 March 1719, J. Common Pleas, 1753-70.

1. Robert. *d.* unm.

2. George. of Drayton, co. Salop.

4. Benjamin Clive. =

3. Richard Clive of Styche, co. Salop, esq.

= Rebecca, d. of Nathaniel Gaskell of Manchester, gent. (*d.* 20 Nov. 1716, aged 63), by Sarah Wilson (*m.* 27 June 1693, *d.* 1, burd. 4 May 1707).

Sarah Gaskell, *m.*, 13 May 1718, Hugh, 11th Lord Sempill (*d.* 25 Nov. 1746), and *d.* 17 April 1749.

Elizabeth Gaskell, *m.*, 1717, Daniel Bayley of Manchester, and *d.* 26 Feb. 1734, aged 34.

Other issue.


Margaret, d. of Edmund Maskelyne of Westminster, &c.

= 1. Robert Clive, *b.* at Styche, 29 Sept. bapt. 2 Oct. 1725, at Moreton Say; Lord Clive of Plassey, &c.

Ann Clive. = George Sempill, Col. E. I. C. Service; *d.* 18 Oct. 1779.

John, Lord Sempill.

(EXTRACT)





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